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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
The world is changing at an ever-increasing pace around us. The rise in speed of communication 
and global social connectivity (Figure 1-2); the ubiquitous personal computing through smart 
phones; and human-level task performance by machines (e.g. autonomous vehicles) etc. are 
creating unprecedented challenges and new opportunities for society. However, human 
civilization has survived for thousands of years, relying on social and cultural adaption across 
myriad periods of duress. One expects that the resiliency and robustness of human kind also will 
help the species adapt to the current and future challenges. 
 






Figure 1-2: The Impact of social media: Source givingcompass.org 
Cultural Algorithms (CA) are stochastic optimization methods that are modelled after human 
culture and are suited to finding the solutions to problems embedded in complex environments 
(Figure 1-1). The CA belong to the class of population-based optimization algorithms but are 
enhanced in that the population agents are connected by a social network and they share a 
common Belief Space. Knowledge of various types reside in the Belief Space and are distributed 
to the population via a Knowledge Distribution (KD) mechanism on a periodic basis. Each type of 
knowledge is a metaheuristic that guides the associated population individuals through the 
problem search space in a specific manner. A knowledge distribution mechanism serves as a 
hyper-heuristic that solves the problem of selecting the right metaheuristic at the right time for 
each population individual. 
Hitherto, CA implementations have used competitive KD mechanisms – i.e. mechanisms where 
knowledge types are pitted against each other and vie for the control of a population of 





controls the individual in the next period. Competitive KD methods have performed well for 
problems embedded in static environments. Relatively recently, CA research has evolved to 
encompass dynamic problem environments – which for immediate purpose can be defined as 
environments that can change over time. The degree and rate of an environment’s changes can 
be referred to as its complexity.  
Given increasing environmental complexity, a natural question arises as to whether the KD 
mechanisms that also incorporate cooperation can perform better in such dynamic environments? 
Stochastic optimization requires a balance between exploration and exploitation (Matej 
Črepinšek, 2013). Among other projections, each knowledge type or metaheuristic can also be 
viewed as a point on the exploration-exploitation continuum, due to the nature in which it moves 
the individual through the search space. All else being equal, in CA the Knowledge Distribution 
mechanism is the primary allocator of resources between exploration and exploitation. It controls 
allocations both at the macro (population-level) and the micro (individual-level). Thus, the KD 
mechanism, through the allocation of knowledge in the population space, is a key determiner of 
optimization performance. 
Game theory is a formal approach for analyzing the behaviors of goal-oriented, interacting 
entities. Here the term ‘entity’ should be interpreted broadly. For example, it could refer to 
software agents, individuals in a population, organizations, countries or even blocs of countries 
(e.g. NATO vs. Warsaw pact countries).  Game theory can inform about both competitive and 
cooperative situations. For example, alliance formation as in the case of the European Union was 






The application of Game theory for Knowledge Distribution mechanisms in Cultural Algorithms 
thus seems very apropos, especially in the light of eliciting cooperation among the available 
knowledge types. Game theory is an established discipline in that it is both broad and deep with 
applications in myriad fields, e.g. economics, social sciences, marketing, computer science, 
military strategy, to name just a few. Hence it is a rich source for ideas for game-based knowledge 
distribution. 
The primary question that this research tries to answer is whether cooperative games can be 
an effective mechanism for Knowledge Distribution in Cultural Algorithms especially in the case 
of dynamic environments and / or complex domains. 
1.1 Cooperative and Completive Games 
In this research, CA knowledge distribution is studied in the context of 3 types of games that 
encompass both cooperation and competition: 
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
• Stag-Hunt  
• Stackelberg 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is a well-studied game whose analytical solution settles in favor of non-
cooperative actions. However, when played repeatedly cooperation can emerge. Axelrod    
showed that reciprocity based stable strategies can emerge in iterated game play (e.g. tit-for-tat) 
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).  
Stag-Hunt is a game that models situations where the default is cooperation but can lead to 





a group of hunters must cooperate to hunt a stag – a more difficult task but with a larger reward. 
The alternate is to hunt a rabbit which each hunter can do alone without needing cooperation 
from others – but this provides lower reward. Hunters initially wait for a stag to appear but the 
longer the delay in sighting a stag (which are rarer) the more tempted they are to defect and go 
after a rabbit (which are plentiful).  Among other situations, Stag-Hunt has been used to study 
alliance formation (Boudreau, Rentschler, & Sanders, 2019) and the evolution of social structure 
(Skyrms, 2004). 
Stackelberg is a model of collusion/competition in Microeconomics that is closely related to 
Cournot competition. Here a leader firm takes the lead in setting the production-level/price in a 
market that is being targeted by the leader and a few followers. The leader can take advantage of 
its first-mover position to set an advantageous production target / price. However, the leader and 
followers have enough information to implicitly coordinate on prices and production for mutual 
benefit, given their relative market positions. In Stackelberg, limited cooperation emerges due to 
the inherent structure in the interaction arena. The Stackelberg model is often applied in product 
pricing and production strategies. For example, Yu and Hong have studied supply-demand balance 
in the electricity market in the context of a Stackelberg game (Yu & Hong, 2016). 
1.2 CAT Software to Support Competitive / Cooperative Communication 
To evaluate game-based knowledge distribution, two new CA software systems were 
developed that implement several KD mechanisms. The CA default KD mechanism - Weighted 
Majority (WTD) or “wisdom of the crowd” - is used as a baseline for comparison in both systems.  
The two systems, described below, optimize in vastly different domains. This was done in order 





that span both cooperation and competition are a better method of knowledge distribution than 
Weighted Majority which is akin to “wisdom of the crowd (majority voting). Majority voting is 
shown to work well when the signal-to-noise ratio is weak or when the environment is relatively 
static. For example, many animal cultures use a form of voting to make group decisions (Hoole, 
2018).  By contrast, human cultures are rich and complex where social network games play a vital 
role in knowledge flow (Jiang, Chen, & Liu, 2014)  and eliciting cooperation (Takano, Wada, & 
Fukuda, 2016).  
The first system, CATGame, solves numerical optimization problems in both static and dynamic 
environments. CATGame supports a variety of game mechanics. Here the KD mechanism is 
implemented in an abstract manner and serves as the framework that can be used to study 
concrete game implementations by injecting them into the this mechanism. All three games 
described above leverage this framework.  
The second system, CATNeuro, evolves optimal deep learning models i.e. neural networks 
(Goodfellow, Bengio, & Courville, 2016) – a domain very different from numerical optimization. 
Each of the population individuals in CATGame contain a vector of real numbers. And those in 
CATNeuro contain a directed graph - a somewhat direct encoding of a deep learning model. 
CATNeuro takes many aspects from the neuro-evolution discipline (Miikkulainen, et al., 2017) 
(Stanley & Miikkulainen, 2002) but adapts them to work in the Cultural Algorithms framework. 
The CA knowledge sources operate accordingly in each domain, i.e. move individuals through a) 
a real-valued hyperspace for numerical optimization; and b) the space of directed graph 
structures for deep learning models. However, in both cases the respective knowledge sources 





1.3 Models of Complex Dynamic Environments in CATGame 
To evaluate the performance of the various knowledge distribution mechanisms implemented 
in CATGame, the Cones World test problem generator is used. Cones World is based on the DF1 
generator devised by Morrison and De Jong (Morrison & De Jong, 1999); DF1 is specifically 
designed to evaluate the performance of evolutionary algorithms in dynamic environments.  A 
sample 2D Cones World landscape is shown in Figure 1-3. The optimization goal is to find the 
global maximum (highest peak) of the landscape within a specified epsilon. There may be a 
thousand or so cones – i.e. local maxima – making this a relatively hard optimization problem.  The 
Cones World problem generator includes dynamics to periodically modify the landscapes while 
the performance optimization is still underway. The level of change from landscape-to-landscape 
– i.e. the dynamic complexity of the environment – is controllable by a system parameter.  
 
Figure 1-3: Sample 2D Cones World landscape 
A key characteristic to note is how quickly the system recovers from a shock. In other words, 
when the proverbial rug is pulled from under, how many iterations does the system take on 





system may take longer or could get stuck at a local maximum more of the time. The KD 
mechanisms are tested at varying levels of dynamic complexity – from linear changes, to non-
linear, all the way to near-chaotic changes – to better understand each’s responsiveness to 
different levels of dynamic complexity. 
Multiple types of metrics are collected and analyzed to obtain a wholistic, multi-faceted 
understanding of KD operation and performance. The primary performance metric is the number 
of generations needed in order to reach solution within the specified epsilon. However, since 
knowledge distribution operates in the context of a social network, several ‘social’ metrics are also 
collected, such as Schelling’s segregation index (Schelling, 1971); diffusion; and information 
related to the dynamics of knowledge flow in the network.  
1.4 Models of Complexity in CATNeuro 
The notion of complexity to test CATGame is in the form of change over time. By contrast, 
CATNeuro must solve an inherently complex, multi-layered optimization problem. The top level is 
that of the overall structure of the model as illustrated in Figure 1-4. At this top level, deep learning 
models are directed graphs that process input to produce output – the optimization should 
produce a feasible and hopefully compact top-level structures (often there is no single right 
answer).  
The internal nodes of the top-level graph are modules which are smaller, reusable graphs. The 
system maintains several module ‘species’. Each species is evolved in a separate population so as 
to protect the members from being eliminated too early and reducing overall available diversity – 





optimization is to select the right modules for the internal nodes from the available species of 
modules. 
Several parameters associated with both the top-level and module individuals also need tuning. 
For example, the overall learning rate (top level) and deep learning operation parameters 
(module-level) e.g. number of dimensions of a dense node; activation type (ReLU, TanH), etc. This 
is the third level of optimization. 
 
Figure 1-4: Example CATNeuro evolved model - shows overall structure and the structure of selected modules 
The structures produced by CATNeuro are translated into concrete deep learning models for 
the chosen deep learning library (e.g. CNTK, Tensorflow, PyTorch, etc.). The concrete models are 
then trained using the available training data for the problem. The error or loss obtained from the 





a general system that can be used to optimize deep learning models for any problem as long as a 
suitable training dataset is available for the given problem. The training dataset for the CATNeuro 
test problem is created via a Reinforcement Learning process and is explained next. 
 
Figure 1-5: A frame from FightingICE game 
The test problem selected for CATNeuro is the construction of a deep learning model driven 
controller to play a fighting game called FightingICE (Intelligent Computer Entertainment lab., 
Ritsumeikan University, 2018). FightingICE is a research testbed for AI, maintained by Ritsumeikan 






The FightingICE research testbed is part of an annual competition for AI-driven controllers. 
Among other features, the testbed allows programmatic access to internal game state which can 
be used to create controllers that play the characters in the game. Each player has 56 possible 
actions to choose from (e.g. jump, hit, block, throw projectile, etc.). 
Any deep learning model requires a fair amount of training data to train. To acquire the training 
data for the deep learning controller model, a Reinforcement Learning (Sutton & Barto, 2018) 
inspired approach was followed. The main idea is to first learn a mapping (as a table) between 
game state and action distribution. In Reinforcement Learning parlance this known as a policy 
table. How such a mapping is learned is described later. If however such a mapping is available, 
an agent (or controller) can use it to play the game. It can look up the current game state in the 
table and if there is a match, it can then sample from the found distribution and play the selected 
action. Otherwise it may take a random action.  
For very large game state spaces, as is the case for FightingICE, a table-based approach is not 
feasible as the table will have either many gaps or will be impractically large. A better approach is 
to convert the table into a neural network model which would be a compressed representation of 
the table. A table is discrete mapping whereas the corresponding neural net is a continuous one. 
The neural network model can be learned from the table by using the table as the training data. 
The network can “fill in the blanks”, i.e. can abstract over the learnings available in the policy table. 
How is the policy table learnt? For the FightingICE controller, the process is to play many games 
and record each frame’s non-pixel data to obtain representative samples of states encountered 
during game play. The table is initialized with uniform action distributions for each recorded state. 





simulation actions produce a win, the probability of choosing the winning actions for the 
corresponding states is increased and the table updated accordingly. Initially actions are selected 
at random but later a mix of random and sampled actions are used. It takes a while for the policy 
table to converge but eventually it does. Following this process resulted in a 1.3 million row policy 
table with a disk size of about 1 gigabyte. The table thus learnt provides sufficient data to train a 
deep learning model to be used as a controller. 
Stag-Hunt – for which CATGame experimental results showed as performing the best – and 
WTD knowledge distribution mechanisms are implemented for CATNeuro. Several deep learning 
models are evolved using each of the mechanisms, with the training data obtained from the policy 
table. FightingICE was played for each model and game play statistics recorded. The selected 
opponents for all test games are a) “Jerry Mizuno” (Chu & Thawonmas, 2017) – an algorithmically-
driven AI used as the benchmark for comparison and b) “Thunder” (Intelligent Computer 
Entertainment lab., Ritsumeikan University)  the 2018 FightingICE competition champion. 
In addition to game statics (e.g. hits-to-opponent; relative-score; distribution of actions taken; 
etc.) several aspects of the produced model structures were noted (e.g. the number learnable 
parameter weights; number of nodes; number of edges; maximum path length; etc.). The game 
play statistics and model structural properties are analyzed and compared to evaluate the 
performance of each knowledge distribution mechanism under CATNeuro. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the 





distribution is one of the primary determiners of CA performance, the prior mechanisms and their 
historical progression is detailed in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 4 is a primer on Game Theory. Only the basics are covered in enough detail for one to 
understand the application of games to CA knowledge distribution. Chapter 5 explores how games 
can be used for knowledge distribution in CA, and details an abstract mechanism for injecting a 
wide variety of games into the CA framework for study. The concepts and implementations of the 
three games mentioned earlier are provided in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 7 details the experimental framework used to evaluate game-based knowledge 
distribution mechanisms implemented in CATGame. The Cones World based dynamic landscape 
generation mechanism is explained in detail. Also detailed are the various ‘social’ metrics used for 
evaluation such as Schelling’ Index of segregation; diffusion; and analytical methods based on a 
Markovian view of knowledge flow across the population network. Data collected from CATGame 
experiments, conducted as described in Chapter 7, are analyzed and presented in Chapter 8. 
The CATNeuro system and the experimental framework to evaluate CATNeuro is explained in 
Chapter 9. It details the graph operations used to evolved deep learning models and the mapping 
of those operations to knowledge sources. Chapter 9 also provides a description of the FightingICE 
game and the reinforcement learning inspired method used to create the training data for deep 
learning, along with the training regime used to train the models. Chapter 10 presents the 
performance analysis for CATNeuro knowledge distribution mechanisms from the experimental 
data collected. Finally, the main conclusions of this research are summarized in Chapter 11. Future 





CHAPTER 2 CULTURAL ALGORITHMS FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
In the spirit of Ant Colony Optimization (Dorigo, Maniezzo, & Colorni, 1996) (ACO) and Particle 
Swarm Optimization (PSO) (Kennedy & Eberhart, 1995), the Cultural Algorithm (CA) (Reynolds R. 
G., 1978) is a socially motivated knowledge-driven approach that can be used to find optimal 
solutions in a search landscape. Its applications exist in a diverse set of domains, e.g. numerical 
optimization (Ali, Suganthan, Reynolds, & Al-Badarneh, 2016); archeology (Jayyousi & Reynolds, 
2014), biology (Judeh, Jayyousi, Acharya, Reynolds, & Zhu, 2014);  gesture recognition (Waris & 
Reynolds, 2015), and computer vision (Waris & Reynolds, 2018); to name some.  As with ACO and 
PSO, the CA approach employs a socially interacting population of agents. By contrast however 
CA also employs a high-level component called the Belief Space that collects and disseminates 
varied types of knowledge from/to the population. The Belief Space consists of Knowledge 
Sources (KS), each of which essentially represents a type of search strategy. Some KS are primarily 
exploratory while others are primarily exploitative and yet others can be like stem cells that can 
be explorative or exploitative depending on the context. The Cultural Algorithm is a hyper-
heuristic that determines what strategies to distribute to the population. 
The two components (Population and Belief Space) are connected by an interface; the 
communications protocol. The interface consists of an acceptance function and an influence 
function. The acceptance function manages transferring experience from the Population 
component to the Belief Space. In turn, the influence function is concerned with distribution of 
knowledge across a social network. One of the keys to the influence function is the knowledge 





are distributed among the population of individuals. The establishment of the right dynamic 
balance between the influences of the various Knowledge Sources on the population of individuals 
is a key goal of CA. 
Over the years, many knowledge distribution mechanisms have been proposed and studied 
(Peng, 2005) (Che, 2009) (Reynolds & Kinnaird-Heether, 2013) (Al-Tirawi & Reynolds, 2018). This 
are detailed in Chapter 3. However, prior research on Cultural Algorithms has focused exclusively 
on competitive KD mechanisms where each individual in the population is assigned one 
Knowledge Source (the winner) that influences that individual for the next generation.  
Biologically inspired computing was first given impetus by the John Holland with the 
development of Genetic Algorithms (GA) (Holland, 1992). GA mimic the chromosomal processes 
of mutation and inheritance that occurs in nature. The philosophical underpinnings go all the way 
back to Darwin and the aphorism “survival of the fittest”. In fact, the GA structure follows nature’s 
form quite closely. A population of individuals is evolved through mutation and crossover of 
‘genetic material’; individuals are evaluated for fitness as candidate solutions against the problem 
space under consideration; the fittest individuals receive higher chance of passing their genes on 
to the next generation. 
2.1 The Cultural Algorithm 
CA are a computational model of cultural evolution that happens at a faster pace than 
biological evolution (Perreault, 2012). Dawkins (Dawkins, 1976) proposed the idea of ‘meme’ as 
carrier of cultural knowledge, analogous to genes in biology. The Belief Space in CA can function 
as the storehouse of memetic information that can be transcribed on to future generations. The 






Figure 2-1: Cultural Algorithms Framework (source: CA papers) 
The major components of the CA are explained next and the pseudocode for the main loop is 
given in Figure 2-4: 
• Population Space – a collection of agents or individuals. Each individual contains 
information that can determine its action and behaviors. The individuals may be 
networked together in some topology (see Figure 2-2). Each is associated with a single 
Knowledge Source (in most cases). 
• Belief Space – stores and organizes different categories of knowledge into the 
aforementioned Knowledge Sources. The Knowledge Sources reside in the Belief Space 
and are organized in a tree structure as shown in Figure 2-3. Knowledge is harvested from 
the current population generation and stored into the Belief Space. It is then disseminated 
to the next generation.  This knowledge transfer and update occurs via the 























• Communication Protocol – methods for transferring knowledge between the Population 
Space and the Belief Space. It consists of an Accept, Update and Influence functions. Every 
generation, interesting individuals from the current generation are inducted via the Accept 
function into the Belief Space. The Update function harvests knowledge from the selected 
individuals and updates the stored knowledge in the Belief Space. The Update function 
flows accepted individuals as per Figure 2-3. The Influence function updates the 
population to create the next generation by a) first associating each individual with a 
Knowledge Source using the knowledge distribution mechanism; and b) modifying the 
individual via its associated KS to move it through the search space in search of better 
solutions. 
 






Figure 2-3: Knowledge Source dependency graph (source: CA papers) 
Begin 
t = 0; 
initialize BeliefSpace; Pop 
repeat 
   Pop <- evaluateFitness (Pop) 
   Selected-Indvs <- accept(Pop) 
   BeliefSpace <- update (BeliefSpace, Selected-Indvs) 
   Pop <- influence (BeliefSpace, Pop) 
   t <- t + 1 
until (termination condition achieved) 
End 
Figure 2-4: Cultural Algorithms Pseudocode (source: CA papers) 
Knowledge Sources can be viewed as being exploitative or explorative. Exploitative KS explore 
a local region of the search space. For example, the Situational KS tracks exemplar individuals in 
the population. Individuals under its influence are small variations of one of the exemplars stored 
in the Belief Space. Situational knowledge is therefore considered exploitative. The Topographic 
KS on the other hand maintains knowledge of diverse regions of the search space by tracking 
clusters of individuals. Under its influence, individuals are likely to move to a location in or near 
one of the clusters which span a larger radius than that around a single individual. 
It must be noted that Knowledge Sources operate on principles harvested from the dynamics 





particular domain really determines where on the explorative-exploitative scale they fall. For 
example, Normative KS as interpreted for numerical problems is considered explorative whereas 
it is considered exploitative in CATNeuro because it does not alter the structure of the graph and 
instead only changes the parameters of the graph nodes. 
The CA can be configured with either homogenous (fixed) or heterogenous network topologies 
(Figure 2-5). Reynolds, et al (Reynolds, Gawasmeh, & Salaymeh, 2015 ) found that homogenous 
topologies were more efficient in low entropy problems but a variation of heterogenous 
topologies performed more predictably in higher complexity problems.  Below (Figure 2-5) are 
examples of completely connected graphs. Disjoint graphs can be represented in a co-evolution 
fashion as multiple populations are may communicate via the Belief Space. 
 
Figure 2-5: Homogenous and Heterogenous topologies (source: CA papers) 
The CA has been applied in a vast variety of problem domains. In addition to the applications 





2019); implement security policies (Bhuyan, Lu, Reynolds, Zhang, & Ahmed, 2019); and multi-
objective optimization (Stanley S. D., 2020), among others. Several books by Reynolds covers 
additional applications (Reynolds R. G., 2020), (Reynolds R. G., 2019). 
2.2 Knowledge Sources 
The CA framework allows for different types of Knowledge Sources to be combined in a 
synergistic manner. The schematic in Figure 2-6 depicts the flow of knowledge from the Belief 
Space to the population space.  
The number and types of Knowledge Sources is not fixed. However, the CA is typically 
configured with a default set, namely Situational, History, Domain, Topographical and Normative 
knowledge. These are described in some detail in Table 2-1. KS usage is selective and new 
knowledge types can be integrated into the Belief Space, if required by the problem domain. Colon 
(Colon, 2012) for example, augmented CA with a ‘Contextual’ rule-based knowledge 
representation to determine optimal plans for pediatric nursing care. The reader is referred to 
other CA papers for the detailed explanation of the commonly used Knowledge Source 






Figure 2-6: CA Knowledge distribution flow (source: CA papers) 
Conceptually, each KS represents some process in cultural evolution. These abstract concepts 
are translated into concrete implementations based on the problem domain. In general, for 
numerical optimization problems, the KS operate on numerical vectors. Each vector is a point in 
the problem hyperspace and represents a candidate solution. Each KS modifies the vector 
elements, in its own way, to guide the associated individual to optimality in the search space. The  
The CATGame system is meant for numerical optimization and thus operates on numerical 
vectors as described above. CATNeuro by contrast operates on directed graphs and hence the KS 
Knowledge Sources 
in Belief Space 
Social network of the 
population individuals 
with current KS 
assignments 
Location of individuals 
in the search space 
Performance of the individuals 
with respect to the search 
landscape 
New KS assignments 







need to modify graphs. This is done with the help of graph operations derived from NEAT (Stanley 
& Miikkulainen, 2002), namely: 
• Toggle Connection 
• Add Connection 
• Add Node 
• Crossover 
• Mutate Parameter 
These operations are   described in detail in section 9.1. Here the mapping of these operations 
to the various KS is described in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1:Default Knowledge Source Types 
Knowledge Source & 
Description 
Acceptance  Influence 
Situational 
Situational knowledge was first 
introduced by Chung (Chung, 
1997). It consists of a set of 
exemplar individuals along with 
their parameter values and the 
fitness value. These individuals 
represent ‘event-based’ 
memories observed within some 
species. They also serve as 
examples for other individuals to 
follow. 
Best performing individuals 
are added to the list of 
exemplars maintained by 
Situational KS. The new list is 
ranked by fitness and 
truncated to the configured 
maximum length. 
Numeric: The parameter values of 
an individual under the influence 
of this KS are mutated in the 
direction of the corresponding 
parameter values of the exemplars 
or evolved from their current 
values. The probability between 
the two actions depends on a 
configure probability with bias 
towards parameter evolution. 
 
Neuro: Graph of a randomly 
selected exemplar is evolved via an 
operation sampled from the 
probability distribution over 
operations associated with 
Situational (see Figure 2-7). The 
updated graph is then assigned to 







In cultural terms this knowledge 
represents the accepted norms 
of behaviors in a society.   
Normative knowledge was also 
introduced by Chung (Chung, 
1997). It is a set of intervals for 
each of the parameters of the 
problem. The intervals are 
considered promising range of 
values for the corresponding 
parameters.  
The interval ranges 
maintained by Normative KS 
are updated from the 
parameter values associated 
with best performing 
individuals. 
Numeric: The parameter values of 
the population individuals are 
mutated in accordance with the 
intervals. If a parameter value falls 
outside the range, a value is 
randomly assigned from the range 
interval. Otherwise the value is 
mutated around its current value. 
 
Neuro: The parameters of the 
influenced individuals’ graph are 
evolved by sampling from kernel 
density estimates (Cosma Shalizi 




In cultural terms, this KS 
represents the knowledge of the 
landscape or the terrain. The 
version of Topographic KS used 
for CATGame and CATNeuro is 
based on the Brainstorm 
optimization algorithm (Shi, 
2011). The individuals are 
grouped into clusters (using an 
algorithm such as K-means). The 
clustering mechanism by its 
nature divides the top 
performers into diverse groups 
each of which marks a promising 
region of the search space. 
 
Note: Earlier versions of this KS 
use multi-dimensional trees. Jin 
(Jin & Reynolds, 1999) 
introduced topographic or 
regional knowledge. The search 
space is divided into cells. A list 
of best cells is maintained. 
Overtime the cells may be 
divided into finer grained cells to 
provide better resolution for 
optimization.  
 
The top performing 
individuals are added to the 
list of individuals maintained 
by Topographic. The new list is 
ranked by fitness and 
truncated to a configured 
maximum. The updated list is 
clustered with K-means where 
each list individual is binned to 
a fixed number of clusters. 
 
Note that to perform K-means 
clustering some measure of 
distance is required between 
two individuals. This is usually 
the Euclidean distance in the 
case of numeric optimization. 
For CATNeuro a measure of 
distance is defined based on 
graph similarity (see Chapter 
9). 
Numeric: The parameter values of 
the influenced individual are 
derived by evolving those of the 
centroid individual of a randomly 
selected cluster. 
 
Neuro: Graph of a randomly 
selected centroid is evolved via an 
operation sampled from the 
probability distribution over 
operations associated with 
Topographic (see Figure 2-7). The 
probability distribution is heavily 
biased towards the crossover 
operation. The updated graph is 




Domain knowledge was 
introduced by Saleem (Saleem, 
Accept the current generation 
of top performers 
 
Numeric: The influenced 
individuals parameter values are 





2001).  The idea is to leverage 
knowledge specific to the 
problem domain – such as by 
consulting an expert in that 
domain. 
 
For numerical problems, Domain 
guides the individuals in a 
direction determined from local 
gradients. 
 
David Colon (Colon, 2012) used 
business rules as the basis of 
Domain knowledge. 
 
For Domain, CATNeuro is the 
primary KS for adding new nodes 
to a graph. CATNeuro encodes 
knowledge of graph structures 
to evolve structurally sound 
graphs for deep learning models 
however this applies for all KS 
except Normative (which does 
not modify structure).  
 
 gradient to achieve better 
performance (for high dimensional 
problems, the determination of 
local gradients may be expensive 
so CATGame also implements an 
alternate, Differential Evolution 
(Storn & Price, 1997) based version 
of Domain KS). 
 
Neuro: The influenced individuals’ 
graph is updated either by evolving 
its own current graph or that of a 
top performer of the current 
generation. Neuro evolution is 
elitist (Stanley & Miikkulainen, 
2002). With configured probability, 
a top performer’s graph is chosen 
over the individuals own. Graph 
evolution is strongly biased 
towards addition of a new node to 
the graph. 
Historical 
History knowledge was also 
introduced by Saleem (Saleem, 
2001). In cultural terms it 
represents ‘episodic’ memories. 
History maintains the trail of 
best performers over time. This 
allows for backtracking or 
branching from a prior best – 
helpful if the optimization is 
stuck in local optima. 
 
Add new best, if any, to the 
history list. Truncate the list to 
a configured maximum 
Numeric: If the influenced 
individual’s fitness is worse than 
that of a randomly selected best 
from the history list, the influenced 
individual is assigned mutated 
parameters of the selected history 
individual. Otherwise the 
influenced individual’s parameters 
are evolved around their current 
values. 
 
Neuro: Here the mechanism used 
is similar to the one used for 
numeric problems except that the 
mutation applied is a graph 
operation which is sampled from 
the distribution given in Figure 2-7. 
For History, equal weight is given 
to mutate parameter, toggle 







To enable better exploration and to prevent premature convergence, the Knowledge Sources 
are not deterministically mapped to graph operations in the CATNeuro system. Rather the KS are 
associated via probability distributions. When a KS influences a popluation indvidual, it samples 
from the associated distribution and selects a graph operation to apply. A high level view of this 
mapping is in Figure 2-7 and more details are given in Chapter 9. In Figure 2-7, each row visually 
depicts the probabilty of selecting a graph operation for the corresponding KS. Each ‘block’ of each 
row corresponds to a graph operation. The graph operations are shown on the x-axis. The color 
of  the block represents probability. The color key on the right side provides a mapping from color 
to proability value. As an examle Topographic is biased to select the Crossover operation but can 
select Add Connection or Add Node operations with some probability. If a KS is under represnted 
in the population then, under a determinsitic mapping, the corresponding  graph operation could 







Figure 2-7: Knowledge Source to graph operation heat map - colors represent probability; row probabilities sums to 1 
(source: CA papers) 
2.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of Cultural Algorithms in terms of its architecture, major 
components and operation, namely the Belief Space and the contained Knowledge Sources; the 
Population Space and its network configuration; Accept, Update and Influence functions and the 
influence of KS on population individuals depending upon the problem domain (e.g. numerical 
optimization or graph evolution). 
The role of knowledge distribution was briefly mentioned but since KD mechanisms are central 
to the research question, the entire next chapter is dedicated to describing the history of the CA 





CHAPTER 3 FROM COMPETITION TO COOPERATION: A PERSPECTIVE ON CA KNOWLEDGE 
FLOW MECHANISMS 
3.0 Introduction 
The Influence function is the main driver of knowledge distribution in Cultural Algorithms. It 
has two major roles a) to associate a Knowledge Source with each population individual – i.e. 
distribute knowledge; and b) to update the parameters of each population individual by letting 
the associated Knowledge Source operate on the said individual. The pseudocode of the Influence 
function is given Figure 3-1. First the direct influence for the individual is determined. The exact 
determination is performed by the underlying distribution mechanism. It could be as simple as 
taking the currently assigned KS. Or it may be a more involved calculation. Then the network 
neighbors of the individual are collected. And finally, a new KS assignment is arrived upon by 
utilizing the direct influence; state of the individual & its neighbors; and possibly other relevant 
information identified as “System State” in the referenced pseudocode. The newly determined KS 
is then used to influence the individual to obtain the offspring for the next generation. The new 
KS is associated with the offspring. 
import Population, Network, DirectInfluence, DetermineKS, SystemState 
init NewPopulation 
Begin  
   For individual in Population 
     ksDirect <- DirectInfluence(individual) 
     neighbors <- Network(individual) 
     ksNew = DetermineKS(ksDirect, individual, neighbors, SystemState) 
     offspring <- ksNew.Influence(individual) 
     offspring.KnowledgeSource <- ksNew 
     NewPopulation[individual.Id] <- offspring 
   End For 
   Return NewPopulation 
End 
 





Knowledge distribution emerged as a focused area of research over the evolution of the CA. 
Knowledge distribution generally does not affect how the Knowledge Sources modify the 
associated individuals. It is primarily concerned with the association of knowledge to individuals. 
Knowledge distribution mechanism is another heuristic (Figure 3-2). It is the primary allocator of 
compute resources to search strategies (metaheuristics) and is therefore an important operation 
in CA. The CA thus is a ‘hyperheuristic’ algorithm. 
 
Figure 3-2: Knowledge distribution operation 
Over the years, many distribution mechanisms have been studied.  Figure 3-3 displays the 
various distribution mechanisms relative to the fidelity of the environmental signal available in the 
optimization problem at hand. The left end corresponds to a completely noisy signal. As one 
moves to the right, the fidelity of the signal gets stronger and less noisy. Majority win is a good 
strategy when there is a signal but some background noise. The voting process filters out much of 
the noise. As the signal gets stronger particular knowledge sources may be better at tracking it 
and therefore can begin to carry more weight. Once the signal is strong enough that it is visible to 
most then an auction or bidding mechanism becomes useful to identify the individuals most 
Re-distribution of 
knowledge via heuristic 
Knowledge assignments of population 
individuals at generation t 





attracted to the signal. When the signal takes a more precise value the fixed price solution is 
possible. Now the agents have a precise set of moves, they can pay the price or not. At the far 
right, agents can make specific moves to support cooperation and competition or both. 
 
Figure 3-3: Spectrum of Knowledge Distribution mechanisms (source: CA papers) 
The following few sections describe the commonly used mechanisms for knowledge distribution. 
3.1 Random Selection 
The earliest CA knowledge distribution was random, i.e. individuals were randomly assigned a 
KS with equal probability. Reynolds and Saleem (Reynolds & Saleem, 2005) introduced Random 
knowledge distribution in 2005. Later mechanisms took account of individual and aggregate KS 
fitness, the social network structure, and other relevant factors. Peng (Peng, 2005) devised 
Knowledge Source assignment proportional to KS performance (see Figure 3-4) based on 
Charnov’s Marginal Value Theorem for predator/prey dynamic (Charnov, 1976). Ali (Ali M. , 2008) 
extended Peng’s work with the idea of a social fabric and flow of knowledge between connected 
individuals and introduced the Majority Win Knowledge Distribution mechanism. Che (Che, 2009) 
introduced a variety of homogeneous network topologies taken from the Particle Swarm 
literature and introduced the Weighted Majority win distribution mechanism. 
Random Majority 
Weighted 
Majority  Auction Game 






Figure 3-4: KS selection roulette wheel (source: CA papers) 
 
Figure 3-5: Simple Majority Knowledge Distribution (source: CA papers) 
3.2 Majority Win 
The difference between (simple) Majority and Weighted Majority is shown in Figure 3-5 and 
Figure 3-6, respectively. The diagrams show the KS assignment process for a single individual going 
from time t to t + 1. The surrounding circles represent neighbors which are coded with color and 
letter to represent their assigned KS (H=History, S-Situational, etc.). Each of these nodes has its 
own direct knowledge source. First the direct influence for the center node is arrived at. Then the 
Knowledge Sources of the neighboring nodes are considered. In the case of Simple Majority, the 
center individual gets the KS that is most frequent considering the direct influence and 
neighboring KS (with supplementary mechanisms to handle ties).  
Roulette Wheel Selection







Figure 3-6: Weighted Majority Knowledge Distribution (source: CA papers) 
Since Weighted Majority is the most commonly used mechanism and used as the benchmark for 
knowledge distribution, it is described more formally next using mathematical notation. 𝐾 =
{𝐻, 𝑆, 𝑁, 𝑇, 𝐷} 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐾𝑆. Let 𝑖 index population members. 𝑊𝑘 ∈𝐾 =
1
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑖
 ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖| 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖  
is the relative weight of each KS in the population, where 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖  is the fitness (assuming 
maximization objective) and 𝑘𝑖 is the KS of 𝑖 and ∑ 𝑊𝑘 = 1𝑘 . Let 𝑗 index 𝑖′𝑠 network neighbors 
then 𝑘𝑖1, 𝑘𝑖2, … , 𝑘𝑖𝑗 , …  be their KS. Also, 𝑘𝑖𝑔 ∈ 𝐾 be a randomly selected KS with selection 
probability 𝑊𝑘 – i.e. the direct influence. The KS assigned to 𝑖 in the next generation is 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤, 
given in Eq 3-1. 





 | 𝒌𝒊𝒋 = 𝒌) +  {
𝑾𝒌𝒊𝒈 𝒌𝒊𝒈 = 𝒌
𝟎 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆
  Eq 3-1 
 
Weighted majority denotes “wisdom of the crowd” and is a form of voting. Voting is also 
exhibited by animal cultures (Hoole, 2018). When the signal-to-noise ratio is relatively a simpler 
voting mechanism is often is as effective any alterative. 
3.3 Auctions 
More recent developments in CA’s have started to explore auctions for Knowledge Distribution 








(Reynolds & Kinnaird-Heether, 2013) . In the Auction KD mechanism devised by Reynolds and 
Kinnaird-Heether, ‘bidding wheels’ are first constructed for each KS. A pie or slice of the wheel 
proportionately represents the fitness of one of the individuals that the KS had influenced in some 
specified number of past generations. Each slice is a token for bidding with value proportional to 
its thickness. A mechanism solicits bids from the relevant KS for a contender individual. The KS 
cast bids with probability proportional to the value of the tokens they hold. The bidding 
mechanism determines a winner and the winning KS is assigned to the contender. The winning KS 
then removes the winning token so that it is no longer available for subsequent bids (see Figure 
3-7)  
 
Figure 3-7: Auction mechanism, [source: (Reynolds & Kinnaird-Heether, 2013)] 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
Knowledge distribution is a critical part of CA. It’s the primary allocator of compute resources 
and currently an active area of research in Cultural Algorithms. This chapter summarizes the prior 
work and currently active research in distribution mechanisms – from random, all the way to 





Departing from prior tradition, this research focuses on mechanisms that span both cooperation 
and competition. The new mechanisms are sourced from classical and evolutionary game theory.  
The next chapter is a brief primer on game theory designed to re-acquaint the reader with 
some terms and concepts that will be used later. Then in  Chapter 5, an abstract framework for 
injecting arbitrary games for knowledge distribution is described. The three specific game-based 
KD mechanisms, introduced earlier, are described in detail in Chapter 6. These are concrete 





CHAPTER 4 A PRIMER ON GAME THEORY 
4.0 Introduction 
Game theory is a well-studied discipline that is both broad and deep. Any extensive treatise of 
Game Theory is beyond the scope of this document but the curious reader is pointed to the 
comprehensive online book “Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical 
Foundations” by Shoham et al. (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009). This section describes some 
relevant terms and ideas – just enough to support the approach presented here. 
4.1 Basic Game Formulation 
A game can be represented in what is known as ‘normal’ form as a 3 tuple: 
𝜙 = (𝑁, 𝐴, 𝑢)  
N = Set of Actors (players) 
A = Set of actions available to actors – usually discrete choices but may be continuous (Veelen & Spreij, 
2009) 
u = Set of utility functions (u1, u2, …, un) corresponding to each player.  
 
The utility function determines the payout for the corresponding player given the actions taken 
by all players in the game. Often two-player games are represented in matrix form. An example 
of the well-studied, Prisoner’s Dilemma game is presented below: 
N = {1, 2} 
A = {Cooperate, Defect}  
u = Utilities as shown in Table 4-1 
 
 
Table 4-1: Prisoner's Dilemma Payout 
 Player 2: Cooperate Player 2: Defect 
Player 1: Cooperate 1, 1 -1, 2 






As an example, if player 1 Cooperates and player 2 Defects then player 1 gets utility -1 and 
player 2 gets utility 2. Game theorists are often concerned with ‘solving’ a posed game, i.e. 
determining the actions (or mix of actions) that players should play, if they are rational. Each 
player is expected to maximize its utility with a view that other players will do the same. In the 
Prisoners Dilemma game, rational players are expected to Defect. If either player Cooperates then 
the other player can maximize its payoff by Defecting (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) (Holland, 1992). 
4.2 Competitive and Cooperative Games 
There are several possible taxonomies for games in Game Theory however from the 
perspective of application to Cultural Algorithms dividing games into Competitive and Cooperative 
categories is useful (see Figure 4-1). Cooperative games are also referred to as Coalitional games 
and Competitive games are also referred to as Non-cooperative games in the literature. 
 
Figure 4-1: Competitive and Cooperative games – a useful categorization of games for the application of games to Cultural 
Algorithms  
Broadly speaking, in Competitive games each agent or player is trying to maximize its own 
utility, i.e. the agents behave in a selfish manner. In Cooperative games, agents may form teams 
or coalitions and work together to maximize the utility of the team. In the extreme case, all agents 








From the perspective of Cultural Algorithms, the various Knowledge Sources can be seen as 
agents in a game that can influence a particular population individual. If the game is formulated 
as a competitive game, the agents will compete against each other but there may be only one 
‘winner’ that acquires the individual and affects its parameters via the Influence function. Recall 
that population individuals exist in a (social) fabric or network, and that each individual is currently 
under the ‘influence’ of a Knowledge Source. An interplay between Knowledge Sources can 
develop via this network. 
Alternatively, the interplay between Knowledge Sources can be posited as a Cooperative game. 
The Knowledge Sources involved can form a single team or multiple competing teams. If multiple 
teams are formed then these teams can compete with one another to win the opportunity to 
influence of the current population individual. This interaction would be similar to what happens 
in a competitive game. The difference is that the winning team (or the grand coalition) would have 
multiple members that can collectively influence the population individual.  
The CA knowledge distribution mechanisms applied up until now associate a single KS with a 
population individual at each time step. From a Cooperative game perspective, this stipulation can 
be relaxed to allow multiple Knowledge Sources to influence a single individual at each time step. 
In Cooperative games, there are two additional problems to solve (when compared with 
Competitive games); 1) how stable coalitions or teams can form from the individual agents and 2) 





4.3 Some Common Competitive Games 
There are several well-known classes of games that have been given names (sometimes 
multiple names). A new game situation may be analyzed more quickly by mapping to an existing 
scenario, thereby harnessing the existing knowledge, solution strategies, etc. and applying them 
to the new game situation. This section describes some common classes of games. Most of the 
information in this section is sourced from the book Shoham et al. (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 
2009). 
Zero-Sum or Constant-Sum Games 
In such games the total payoff is a constant regardless of the strategies chosen by the players. 
One player’s gain is another player’s loss. Such games were studied very early on in GT 
development by van Neumann and Morgenstern (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). The 
minmax theorem was first published in 1928 by von Neumann that proved that the best strategy 
for each player is independent of the strategies of other players. A sample payoff matrix is given 
in Table 4-2. Zero sum games can be solved more easily using minmax strategies and are Pareto 
optimal. From a computational efficiency perspective it might be desirable to model a knowledge 
distribution mechanism as a zero-sum game. 
 
Table 4-2: Zero-sum Payoff Matrix Conducive to Minmax Solutions 
 Left Right 
Left 1, -1 1,-1 






Battle of the Sexes 
This is a game of both coordination and competition. Both players lose if they choose different 
actions. Both are better off if they chose the same action but the utility of the action differs for 
each player.  
This game is often posed as a husband and wife deciding on what movie to go to. Each has a 
preference for a different movie but above all they both want to be together. A possible payoff 
matrix is show in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3: Battle of the Sexes Payoff Table 
 Left Right 
Left 2,1 0,0 
Right 0,0 1,2 
 
In studying climate change negotiations DeCanio et al show the applicability of games similar 
in structure to the Battle of the Sexes (DeCanio & Fremstad, 2011). 
The fact that this game models both coordination and competition makes it interesting for 
Cultural Algorithms where a coordinated outcome may be desired for KS selection. 
Matching Pennies 
This is a zero-sum game where one player wins by matching the action of another player 
whereas the other player wins by picking something different. In the canonical version of the game 
each player chooses either heads or tails from a coin with the payoff matrix shown in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4: Matching Pennies Payoff Matrix 
 Head Tail 
Head 1,-1 -1,1 






This game is important in the study of behavior over repeated play. For example, an innovative 
company such as Apple can do well by trying to define new products and markets. Established 
players such as Microsoft can do well by matching the innovations of its competitor. 
Hawk – Dove 
In this game, the players may adopt two types of actions predatory (Hawks) or peaceful (Doves) 
when competing over the same resource. This game was first described by Maynard Smith (who 
is well known for biological games) and Price (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973) and has been used 
to model aspects of animal behavior in many species. A possible payoff matrix is as follows in Table 
4-5. 
Table 4-5: Hawk-Dove Payoff Matrix 
 Hawk Dove 
Hawk -2, -2 6,0 
Dove 0,6 3,3 
 
Many competitive business situations can be modeled as a Hawk-Dove game, for example a 
competitor entering a market currently dominated by an existing player. The existing player can 
chose to fight by lowering prices or other marketing spending or acquiesce some market share to 
the new player. Anderton (Anderton, 2003) has studied competitive behavior in developing 
economies using Hawk-Dove models. 
4.4 Repeated Games 
The taxonomy of games is extensive. One important categorization is that between one-shot 
and repeated games. In repeated games, players remember the history of interaction and respond 





emerges is tit-for-tat where a player will defect if the opponent defected in the past otherwise 
cooperate. Unlike the one-shot version, the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma can lead the players to 
cooperation, resulting in higher utility for both (Holland, 1992). The notion of repeated games 
with possibly continuous actions is utilized as the basis for Knowledge Distribution in CA and is 
discussed in the next section. 
Repeated games are an important subclass of Competitive games that can prove useful in 
modeling many real-world phenomenon (Harrington & Zhao, 2012). Repeated games pose a 
challenge because the strategy space can be very large or even infinite. At any game stage, the 
players know the history of the game thus far; i.e. the actions all players have taken to get to the 
current stage. Thus, the actions taken at the current stage can depend on the history of the game 
that can become intractably large very quickly. 
An approach to solving repeated games is based on average or payoff. The Folk1 Theorem 
(Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009) is useful for determining an equilibrium based on feasible and 
enforceable payoff profiles. The basic idea is that in an infinitely repeated game the average payoff 
attainable in an equilibrium is the same as the Nash equilibrium in a single stage game. The 
constraint is that each player must obtain at least the minmax payoff. 
Formally, 
let 𝐺 = (𝑁, 𝐴, 𝑢) be a normal form game and 𝑟 = (𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑛) be any payoff profile. 
𝑣𝑖 = min max 𝑢𝑖(𝑠
−𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖) is the player 𝑖′𝑠 minmax value, i.e. the payoff 𝑖 receives when other players play 
minmax strategies against 𝑖 
𝑟 is feasible i.e. it can be constructed from the individual payoffs in the game 
𝑟 is enforceable 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑣𝑖  ∀ 𝑖  
 
 
1 The Folk Theorem is named as such because like a folk song it has been generally known for a long time but no one 






By the Folk Theorem1 r is the payoff profile for some Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated 
game G with average payoffs. 
Consider the knowledge distribution game, one can take the position that the same game will 
be played repeatedly between the same network individuals, over many generations, so one can 
analyze the game as an infinitely repeated game to find a solution or an equilibrium. 
4.5 Continuous Action Games 
The vast majority of games in Game Theory are restricted to discrete action choices, as they 
are easier to analyze, however, game actions can also be continuous real values. Veelen and Spreij 
have analyzed games in the continuous action space (Veelen & Spreij, 2009). 
To study a wide variety of possible game-based knowledge distribution mechanisms, it was 
deemed necessary to support both discrete as well as continuous action spaces. For example, a 
game may be structured such an individual could choose an action from a discrete set, e.g. 
Cooperate or Defect. Whereas in a different game, the chosen action can be continuous, e.g. the 
fitness of the player. The same general mechanism can be used for both discrete and continuous 
action games. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
Game Theory is a vast and deep subject area. The core ideas of this research are inspired by 
games in classical and evolutionary game theory. This chapter provided a brief overview of Game 
Theory with enough terminology and formalism to understand the abstract game framework 
presented in the next chapter. This framework is the basis of the games implemented and tested 






CHAPTER 5 GAMES AS MECHANISMS FOR KNOWLEDGE FLOW IN CULTURAL ALGORITHMS 
5.0 Introduction 
The CATGame system was developed with a general mechanism for injecting arbitrary games 
for knowledge distribution. The general mechanism is abstract and requires a concrete game to 
be operational. 
Recall that each Knowledge Source is a certain type of search strategy (Chapter 2) and that the 
Cultural Algorithm functions as a hyper-heuristic in order to select the appropriate metaheuristic 
in each context. At the macro level, a desirable property of the KD mechanism is to achieve a 
dynamic balance between the various KS, as the CA proceeds in exploring the problem landscape. 
One notion of balance is that the mix or proportion of KS in the population can be varied in order 
to best facilitate search space exploration and exploitation at a given phase of the problem-solving 
process. Another assumption is that all of the KS maintain at least some presence in the population 
and is not crowded out completely by a dominant KS.  
Games are a convenient way to balance the conflicting demands of exploration and 
exploitation at the macro and micro levels. The general premise here is that individuals in the 
population have the ability to either cooperate or compete for knowledge. The next section 
describes the abstract mechanism for injecting games for knowledge distribution. The structure 
defined here is leveraged in Chapter 6 that defines the mechanisms of the concrete games studied 





5.1 Abstract Game Mechanism 
The minimal terminology given in the previous section is leveraged now to describe the 
abstract structure of the game theoretic KD mechanism.  This mechanism is structured in terms 
of the following components: Actor; Play; Action; Payoff; Payout; and Outcome: 
Actor Population individual linked to other players via network. (terms 
‘individual’, ‘agent’, ‘player’ and ‘actor’ are used interchangeably in 
this document). 
Play function A function that produces the Action or ‘hand’ that a player plays 
against its neighbors. This function may take utilize the current and 
historic states of all players in addition to other available 
environmental information. 
Payoff function A function that produces the Payout structure – which represents 
the utility to a player – given its own Action and those of its neighbors 
in the game. 
Outcome function Given the population’s collective Actions and Payouts, this 
function produces the updated population where each individual is 
assigned a KS based on the results of the collective game play. 
 
The general mechanism abstracts out the common steps in game play. Specific game types can 
be injected into the mechanism by supplying a game instance which is a record of three functions: 





implementations of these three functions are defined and grouped into a record structure. Such 
a record can be accepted by the general game mechanism. Mutual compatibility means that the 
data structures produced and consumed by these functions are consistent. For example, the Play 
function produces a list of Actions that are consumed by the Payoff function. The general game 
does not care about the details of the Action data structure as long as the Payoff function can 
accept it. The Action and Payout data structures produced and consumed by these functions are 
defined by the concrete game. The general game mechanism abstracts over these details and 
operates at a higher level and is depicted schematically in Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1: Abstract game interface 
The high-level flow of the mechanism is described next and the corresponding pseudocode is 
given in Listing 5-1. There are two distinct phases. In the first phase, the Play function, supplied by 
the concrete game, is used to play games between an individual and its network neighbors. The 





instantiation of the CA. This phase produces a list of Actions for each player; each Action in this 
list is directed towards a neighbor. The first phase where an agent plays its hands against each of 
its neighbors is pictorially depicted in Figure 5-2. 
 
Figure 5-2: In the 1st phase each network individual 
plays actions against its neighbors, utilizing current and 
historic information 
 
Figure 5-3: In the 2nd phase, actions played by an 
individual’s neighbors are collected to determine payout 
In the second phase, all Actions are aligned so that all Actions pertaining to a single individual 
are grouped together. These are the Actions the individual played against each of its neighbors 
and the Actions the neighbors played only against the said individual (Figure 5-3). From each such 
group the Payout for each individual is determined by using the Payoff function given by the 
concrete game. The general game mechanism then takes the Payouts for all individuals and passes 
them to the Outcome function (also supplied by the concrete game). The Outcome function 






game = {Play, Payoff, Outcome}  
 
GameKD (Pop, Network, game) 
  Actions  Empty  
  Payouts  Empty 
   
  “1st phase – determine and play actions against each neighbor” 
 
  FOR p in Pop DO 
     neighbors  Network(p)  
     Actions[p]  game.Play (p, neighbors)   
  END FOR 
 
  “2nd phase – determine payout based on actions neighbors played against 
   indidvidual in 1st phase” 
 
  FOR p in Pop DO 
     neighbors  Network(p) 
     neighborActions  [FOR j in ns → Actions[j]]  
     Payouts[p]  game.Payoff(p, pAction, neighborActions) 
  END FOR 
 
  Pop  game.Outcome(Pop, Payouts, Actions) 
  Return Pop   
Listing 5-1 Pseudocode for a general game mechanism for Knowledge Distribution 
To enable a truly abstract mechanism, the data types of the Action and Payout structures are 
also determined by the injected game. This is achieved via generic programming capability of the 
implementation language F# (Microsoft Corporation). The abstract mechanism is able to deal with 
any data structures that the injected game chooses to use. For example, the Actions produced by 
Play may be single values (e.g. fitness of the individual) or may be tuples (e.g. fitness with some 
other score). The general game mechanism is unaffected as long the corresponding Playoff 
function can accept the same structure. The main rationale for using generic programming is to 
allow for a wide variety of games to be studied under the general mechanism. This is the strength 
of this approach. The alternative would be to specify a more rigid (and less abstract) mechanism. 






The pseudocode in Listing 5-1 is now elaborated with a simple game for knowledge distribution. 
The game is posed as follows. Each individual plays the action 0 or 1 against its neighbors based 
on whether the individual’s fitness improved since the previous generation or not. Each individual 
looks at its neighbors and adopts the KS that is the most frequent among neighbors who played 
1. If no such neighbors exist, the individual retains its current KS. Ties are broken with random 
selection. Listing 5-2 is the pseudocode for injecting this game into the generic mechanism. The 
central idea is to define the Play, Payoff and Outcome functions and then package them up into a 






Listing 5-2: Pseudocode for a sample game 
//definition: supporting function definition needed by Play 
//returns 1 if fitness improved from the previous generation, 0 otherwise 
fitnessImproved : Indivdual -> {0,1} 
 
//defintion: return the most frequent entry in the list 
//if there are multiple entries with the same count 
//then a random selection from the top most frequent is returned 
//if the list is empty, null is returned 
mostFrequent : (KS list) -> KS 
 
//define Play function 
def Play (indivdual, neighbors) = 
   action <- fitnessImproved (indvidual)    //decide which action to take 
   actions <- []                              
   //play action against each neighbor (each item is 4-tuple) 
   For n In neighbors Do 
     actions <- actions :: (individual.Id, n.Id, action, indivdiual.KS) 
   End For 
   Return actions      //Action structure is 4-tuple list                                   
 
//define Payoff function 
def Payoff (indvidual, indvidualAction, neighborActions) = 
   ksSelected <- [] 
   For (id,nId,action,KS) In neighborActions Do 
      if action = 1 then 
         oneActions <- oneActions :: KS     //collect KS for action=1 
   End For 
   maxKS <- mostFrequent (ksSelected) 
   newKS <- if maxKS = null then individual.KS else maxKS 
   Return (individual.Id,newKS)            //Payout is tuple of id and KS 
 
//define Outcome function 
def Outcome(pop,payouts) = 
   pop’ <- [] 
   For p in pop do 
     (id,newKS) <- payouts[p.Id] 
     p.KS <- newKS 
     pop’[id] <- p’ 
   End For 
   Return pop’ 
      
game = {Play, Payoff, Outcome}       //game is a record of 3 functions 
                                     //ready to be injected into the  







Note the generic mechanism is flexible because instead of accepting just a data structure (e.g. 
a payoff table) the mechanism can accept both code plus data structures. This makes it versatile 
and able to handle a diverse set of scenarios. 
Much of game theory is concerned with finding a solution to a posed game as the strategy 
adopted by each player. The collective set of player strategies is the solution of the game. 
Assuming rational players, the action played by an agent should be the best response to the best 
responses of its peers, determined jointly, i.e. the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950). For many games, 
finding a solution is a computationally hard, especially for more than 2 players. In the proposed 
framework, each agent is concurrently participating in many games, with usually more than 2 
players per game. To clarify, each agent is playing a game against its neighbors that are in turn 
playing different games with their neighbors. The final result is a set of interlinked games. There 
are no known (computationally tractable) analytical methods for solving such a complex set of 
interlinked games. To address this situation, one takes the view that each agent unilaterally 
decides to take action based on its and its neighbors’ current and prior states, without regard to 
the actions that other agents make take in the current round (i.e. take a hedonic approach). Here 
the interest is in the emergent properties of the system given bounded rationality decisions of the 
agents. 
5.2 Chapter Summary 
This brief chapter explained the abstract game framework that can be used to inject arbitrary 
games for knowledge distribution. It provides the background to understand the concrete games 





general and more-or-less can handle any arbitrary game for knowledge distribution. As such, it 





CHAPTER 6 CATGAME – COOPERATIVE/COMPETITIVE GAMES FOR KNOWLEDGE 
DISTRIBUTION 
6.0 Introduction 
The abstract game mechanism presented in Chapter 5 is exercised with 3 specific games, 
namely: 
• N-Player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma  
• Stag-Hunt 
• Stackelberg 
Each of these games is described in this chapter. For each, the historical background and 
perspective is given first followed by the implementation in relation to the abstract game 
mechanism described in Chapter 5. 
The definition of ‘player’ is required for any game. In CATGame, two perspective can be taken: 
a) the player is a population individual who plays against its neighbors as determined by the 
network topology; or b) the player is a Knowledge Source in the Belief Space playing against other 
Knowledge Sources. Both perspectives are covered by the three studied games here. Competitive 
knowledge distribution is relatively easy to grasp – viz. a ‘winner’ Knowledge Source gets to 
influence the population individual. But what does it mean to cooperate in this context? The 
notion of cooperation is not as clear but is developed and clarified for the 3 games, in the 
respective sections.  
All of the tested game mechanisms implement a concept from simulated annealing where the 





reduced the longer an individual retains Domain from generation to generation up to a configured 
minimum. The influence level is reset whenever an individual is assigned Domain to replace a non-
Domain knowledge. 
6.1 Iterated Prisoners Dilemma – cooperation emerges over repeated interaction 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game is probably the most studied game of the three as its can be 
applied in a number of scenarios (see 4.1) in the social sciences, military strategy, business and 
economics.  The analytical solution for a single-shot (not repeated) Prisoner’s Dilemma is to Defect 
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). However, cooperation can emerge if the game is played repeatedly. 
Evidence that Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) leads to cooperation comes from the fact that the 
winning strategy in Axelrod’s famous tournament was tit-for-tat. Essentially the tit-for-tat strategy 
is: cooperate in the current round if the opponent cooperated in the prior round, defect 
otherwise. Glossing over the many nuances uncovered by years of research on this subject, one 
can justify IPD as a viable game for knowledge distribution when both cooperation and 
competition are desired. 
IPD is usually analyzed as a two-player game but here the multiplayer version – n-player 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD) – is required  as the number of players is more than two for any realistic 
knowledge distribution scenario in CA. A version of NPD is the well-known “Tragedy of the 
Commons” (Chappelow, 2019) that is often used to explain the depletion of common resources.  
The payoff matrix for an NPD game is shown in Table 6-1  (Yao & Darwen, 1994) where the top 
row is number of cooperating players starting. The 2nd and 3rd rows are rewards for cooperation 





Table 6-1: Payoff Matrix for n-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma  
No. of 
Cooperators 
0 1 … x … N-1 
Cooperate 𝐶0 𝐶1 … 𝐶𝑥 … 𝐶𝑛−1 
Defect 𝐷0 𝐷1 … 𝐷𝑥 … 𝐷𝑛−1 
 
The matrix is the same for every player (i.e. the game is symmetric). N is the total number of 
players in the game and so N-1 is the number of players other than the player whose perspective 
is represented by the matrix, denoted as 𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟.  Each of the N players play their hand: Cooperate 
or Defect. If x other players cooperate (where x is between 0 & N-1) then the payoff for 𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟 will 
be 𝐶𝑥 if 𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟 decides to cooperate and 𝐷𝑥 otherwise. The following conditions need to hold for 
the game to be considered NPD: 
• 𝐷𝑥 > 𝐶𝑥 (defection provides a higher reward than cooperation) 
• 𝐷𝑥+1 > 𝐷𝑥 (the more cooperators there are the higher the reward for defecting) 
• 𝐶𝑥+1 > 𝐶𝑥 (same applies for cooperators) 
• 𝐶𝑛−1 > 𝐷0 (if everyone cooperates, the reward is higher for each than if everyone defects) 
To summarize, the reward for both cooperators and defectors increases with the number of 
cooperators but for any individual player the reward for defection is always higher. And total 





While such a payoff matrix may be constructed for any given scenario, usually the matrix is 
compressed into a payoff function by making some simplifying assumptions. The key 
consideration is that depending on how 𝐶𝑥  and 𝐷𝑥  are determined, there may be 𝑥, 𝑦 (𝑥 < 𝑦) 
where 𝐶𝑥 > 𝐷0 and 𝐷𝑦 < 𝐶𝑛−1 which implies that the number of cooperators are between x and 
y for such a scenario. 
The scheme for IPD based knowledge distribution is adapted from the NPD game. However, to 
use IPD for knowledge distribution, further details are required such as who are the players in the 
game; how should the players choose their actions; what happens when cooperating or defecting 
players receive their payoff (i.e. what should the knowledge distribution outcome be); etc. These 
are provided in the next section. 
6.1.1 IPD Adaption for CATGame Knowledge Distribution 
The IPD game for knowledge distribution is structured as follows: 
• Players: Population individual and its immediate (1-hop) network neighbors 
• Action: Cooperate if player’s fitness was worse from prior generation, defect otherwise 
• Outcome: Player choose defection for knowledge distribution if average defection reward 
is above a certain threshold, cooperation otherwise. 
Note that in the case of CA population network, each player is playing a different game with its 
neighbors. As well, each player is participating in as many different games as there are neighbors 







Figure 6-1: In n-player Iterated Prisoners Dilemma each individual chooses to either Cooperate (C) or Defect (D) against all its 
network neighbors 
Recall the phases of game play outlined in Chapter 5. In the first phase, a population individual 
chooses to play D (for defect) if its fitness improved since prior generation, C (for cooperate) 
otherwise. A player can choose only one of the two actions. D implies that an individual will want 
retain a Knowledge Source as it is improving – there is no incentive to cooperate. Otherwise the 
player will want to cooperate but the final outcome for the player is determined by the player’s 
action and those of its neighbors. This is where the payoff matrix in Table 6-1 comes into play. 
How many of the neighbors also want to cooperate? The detail decision process is described later 
in Listing 6-2 but in general if enough neighbors are cooperative, the player will be classified as 
cooperator. Otherwise it will be classified as a defector. Knowledge assignment (i.e. the outcome) 
depends on this classification (i.e. the payout). As an illustration, Figure 6-1 depicts an individual 





an individual’s neighbors (C or D) (Figure 6-2) are collected to make the final determination about 
the payoff and the its implication for knowledge distribution.  
If the individual is classified as a defector, it retains its current knowledge assignment. If is 
classified as cooperator then it gets an assignment based on its ‘social rank’ among its peers. If the 
player is performing relatively well in terms of fitness as compared to its peers (neighbors), it will 
be assigned a relatively exploitative KS otherwise a relatively exploratory one. All knowledge 
sources are ordered on the explorative-exploitative scale. The ‘social rank’ of the player (relative 
to its neighbors) determines which KS is chosen from the ordered set of KS. Thus, cooperation in 
the context of IPD means behaving according to “your rank in society”. If the individual is not doing 
well (relative to its neighbors) then it should try harder by adopting a relatively exploratory 
strategy. If the individual is doing well relatively then it should adopt a more exploitative strategy. 
Under cooperation the individual does not make a unilateral (egoistic) decision. It looks at the 
(bounded) context and decides on what is the best for the collective as a whole. 
To utilize the generic mechanism defined in Listing 5-1, a concrete game needs to be supplied 
that is a tuple (or record) of three functions – Play, Payoff and Outcome. These functions are 
formally defined using mathematical notation in this section. Listing 6-1 is a set of supporting 







Figure 6-2: The payout for the individual is jointly determined by the individual and neighbors' actions. The payout 
determines whether the individual will adopt cooperative or comptetitive behavior for knowledge distribution with respect 
to its neighbors 
Listing 6-1: Definitions to support game-based knowledge distribution 
𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒 = (𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦, 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓, 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) From Listing 5-1 a game is a triple of 3 
functions 
 
𝐾 = {𝐻, 𝑆, 𝑁, 𝑇, 𝐷} Set of Knowledge sources 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑝 = {(𝑘, 𝑓, 𝑗) | 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑓 ∈  ℝ, 𝑗 ∈ ℤ +}  
 
𝑃𝑜𝑝′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑝 
 
 
Population is a triple of k=Knoweldge 
Source, f=fitness and j=number of 
generations the indivudal had the same 
k. Assume the triple has a unique 
identity not shown here 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 →  ℝ Function that provides the fitness in 
the prior generation of a population 
individual (its implementation is 
context dependent) 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠, 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 ⊆ 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ Network function definition 
 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
Play function defintion. The function 
takes a population indivdual and the 
network function to produce a set of 
actions played by the individual 






𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 →  𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 Payoff function definition - computes 
the payout for a population indvidual 
given its own action and those of its 
neighbors towards the individual 
 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡′ → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ → 𝑃𝑜𝑝′  Outcome function definition - takes 
the population the payouts and actions 
for all individuals and returns an 
updated popultation with new KS 
assignements  
 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = < 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 > 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 = < 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 > 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 
The Actions are Payout structures for 
each game is definded by each game 
individually. Here they are defined 
generically to complete the type 
signatures required for injected 
games. 
 
Given the supporting definitions in Listing 6-1, the implementation of the IPD knowledge 
distribution is in Listing 6-2. 
Listing 6-2: IPD game definition 
𝐴 = {𝐶, 𝐷} 
 
The set of actions 
players play in the 1st 
phase 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = {(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑎) | 𝑝1 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑝2 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴)} 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
IPD Actions is a triple 
of values representing 
the action played by an 
individual against its 
neighbor 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = {𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡} 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 = {(𝑝, 𝑑) | 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛} 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 
 
Payout structure is a 
set of tuples that maps 
to a decision taken by 
each indivdual in the 2nd 
phase, after all games 
have been played and all 
actions known 
 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 (𝑝)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) = 
    𝑎 ← {
𝐷 : 𝑝. 𝑓 > 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑡(𝑝)
𝐶 : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
    𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 ← 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝) 
    𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ← {(𝑝, 𝑛, 𝑎) | 𝑛 ∈ 𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 }  
    𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
Play implementation for 
IPD 
 
p.f is short hand for 
the fitness value of a 
population individual 
triple 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 (𝑝) (𝑎) (𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) = 







    𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ← {𝑑 | 𝑑 ∈ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑 = 𝐷} 




    𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ←  {
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 : 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 > 1.0
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
    𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
ALPHA = 1.5 
 
If enough neighbors are 
defecting (i.e have 




By using ALPHA > 1 the 
game is biased towards 
defection 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) (𝑝𝑜𝑝) (𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠) (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) =  
    𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝 ← {𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑝) (𝐷𝑠𝑐𝑛(𝑝) (𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠)), 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝)) | 𝑝 ∈ 𝑝𝑜𝑝} 
    𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝 
Outcome function 
implementation. It 
relies on supporting 
functions Dist and Dscn 
that are given below 
𝐷𝑠𝑐𝑛 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡′ → 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 Function definition to 
return a decision 
(cooperate or defect) 
made by population 
individual given the 
decisions (payouts) for 
all individuals 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝 Function definition for 
returning an updated 
population individual 
given its decision (to 
cooperate or not) and 
its neighbors  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝)(𝑑)(𝑛ℎ𝑏𝑟𝑠) = 
  (𝑘, 𝑓, 𝑗) ← 𝑝 
  𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾 = {
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝) (𝑛ℎ𝑏𝑟𝑠) : 𝑑 = 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑝) (𝑛ℎ𝑏𝑟𝑠) : 𝑑 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
 
  𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐽 =  {
𝑗 + 1 : 𝑘 = 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾
0 : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
  𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃 = (𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾, 𝑓, 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐽) 
  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃 
Dist function 
implementation. It 
relies on several 
functions that are 
defined and described 
below 
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 →  ℤ 
 
Given a population 
indivdual and its 
neighbors this funtion 
returns the rank of the 
indivdual among its 
neighbors based on 
relative fitness 
𝐾𝑆𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶  ℤ → 𝐾 
 
Given an integer rank 
from the SocialRank 
function, this function 
returns a Knoweldge 
Source. The Knowledge 
sources are ordered from 
explorative to 
exploitative. A low rank 
is associated with 
(relatively) explorative 






premise is that if an 
individual is performing 
comparatively well, it 
should continue to 
exploit the local region 
it is in. This is a 
configurable value to 
enable the provision of 
different rankigns of KS 
for different problem 
types. 
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∘ 𝐾𝑆𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 Cooperative 
distribution: Function 
composed of SocialRank 
and KSForRank determines 
K when individal decides 
to be Cooperative 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 → 𝐾 Competitive 
distribution: Function 
that determines K when 
individual decides to be 
Competitive. Here the 
locally dominant 
Knowledge Source is 
returned using weighted 
average fitness to rank 
the Knowledge Sources of 
individual and its 
neighbors. 
𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒 = (𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦, 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑓𝑓, 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∘ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) The game tuple for IPD 
game injection. Note 
that to match the 
required definition for 
the Outcome function for 
game injection, the 
Outcome function defined 
above is composed with 
the Network function so 
the type signatures 
match. 
 
In summary, IPD knowledge distribution is an adaption of the n-player IPD. In the 1st phase, 
players unilaterally play defect (A=D) if their current fitness is better than prior fitness. In the 2nd 
phase, if enough players did defect in a player’s neighborhood, the outcome for the player is the 





Source assigned is based on the ‘social rank’ of the agent and the exploitative-to-explorative 
ordering of the Knowledge Sources. For Defect, the agent just keeps the current assignment. 
Reusing some of the definitions in Listing 6-1, the Stag-Hunt game is defined next. 
6.2 Stag-Hunt – Cooperation by default 
Stag-Hunt can be considered an extension of IPD with an explicit notion of time involved. The 
players by default cooperate to hunt a stag but as time goes by and no stag is sighted, the players 
become impatient and can defect to hunt a rabbit. Stag-Hunt comes from evolutionary game 
theory (Weibull, 1995) whereas IPD is well studied in both classical and evolutionary game theory. 
Contemporary evolutionary game research is usually performed with computer simulation (Dong, 
Xu, & Fan, 2019) (Wang, Luo, Ding, & Wang, 2018) because the dynamics can be complex and not 
always capturable analytically, as is possible for classical games. A payoff matrix type formulation 
thus is not very instructive for n-player evolutionary games. 
While IPD is a series of single-shot games, Stag-Hunt is a game that is played over some units 
of time. The useful notion of time in CA is generations (i.e. when a new population is generated). 
For CA knowledge distribution, the Stag-Hunt game is played continuously across generations till 
the optimization run is terminated. For CA knowledge distribution, there is a configured number 
of cooperative generations followed by an evaluative one. This is pictorially depicted in Figure 6-3; 






Figure 6-3: In Stag-Hunt individuals cooperate for a fixed number of generations and then evaluate – a pattern that is 
repeated till max number of generations is reached 
During the cooperative phase, all individuals cooperate – where the notion of cooperation is 
very similar to the altruistic one used in IPD (section 6.1) i.e. one based on ‘social rank’. Note that 
Stag-Hunt is cooperative by default. All individuals are cooperating in the cooperative generations 
whereas in IPD the decision to cooperate or defect is made individually by each player at each 
generation. 
 In an evaluative generation, each individual evaluates whether to continue cooperation or to 
defect. If the individual’s fitness is improved since the last evaluative generation (or the initial 
fitness), it defects by keeping its current knowledge assignment. Otherwise it cooperates but 
instead of choosing a KS based on social rank, it chooses the locally dominant KS. Here “locally 
dominant” means the KS that has the highest weighed average fitness among the individual’s 
current KS (direct influence) and those of its neighbors.  
Under Stag-Hunt there are two types of cooperation. First is based on social rank and is similar 
to the one in IPD. This type is used by all individuals in a cooperative generation. Second is based 
on adopting a strategy that is performing the best overall in the local neighborhood (bounded 
context).  It is used in an evaluative generation under the decision to cooperate. The structure of 





6.2.1 Stag-Hunt Adaptation for CATGame 
The Stag-Hunt game is structured as follows: 
• Players: The population individual and its immediate (1-hop) network neighbors 
• Action: The players play their fitness value as the (continuous) action in the 1st phase, 
regardless of cooperative or evaluative generation. The actions are used later in the 2nd 
phase to determine how knowledge is distributed.  
• Outcome: In a cooperative generation, a cooperative strategy is used for every player 
where the KS assigned is determined from the player’s social rank (similar to IPD), as 
depicted in Figure 6-4. Each player receives the fitness values of the neighbors as the 
actions taken by the neighbors. It then determines its social rank by comparing its own 
fitness with those of the neighbors’. Based on the rank it adopts a KS from an ordered set. 
If the rank is relatively low it will adopt a relatively exploratory KS and vice-a-versa. In an 
evaluative generation a player defects by keeping its current KS, if the player’s fitness 
improved since prior evaluation otherwise the player accepts the locally dominant KS 
(Figure 6-5). As explained earlier, the locally dominant KS is the one with the highest 
weighted average fitness in the neighborhood. This is still a type of cooperation but one 






Figure 6-4: In a cooperative generation, the individual is ranked between the fitness of its highest and lowest fit neighbors on 
a continuous scale. Based on its rank, the individual is assigned the best matched KS from a ranked list 
 
Figure 6-5: In an evaluative generation, individual is assigned a KS that has the best weighted fitness among individual and 
neighbors, if the individuals fitness has not improved 





Listing 6-3: Stag-Hunt game definition 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = {(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑎) | 𝑝1 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑝2 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑎 ∈ ℝ)} 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
Stag-Hunt Actions 
structure is a triple of 
values representing the 
action played by an 
individual against its 
neighbor. Here the 1st 
phase action is the 
fitness value (which is 
continuous) 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡′ = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ 
The payout structure is 
the same as the Actions 
structure in Stag-Hunt 
game. 
 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 (𝑝) (𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) =  
 
     𝑎 ← 𝑝. 𝑓 
 
  𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 ← 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝) 
 
  𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ← {(𝑝, 𝑛, 𝑎) | 𝑛 ∈ 𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 }  
 
  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
Play implementation for 
Stag-Hunt 
 
p.f is short hand for 
the fitness value of a 
population individual 
triple 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 (𝑝)(𝑎)(𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) = 
 
  𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 ← {𝑎} ∪ 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 
 
  
Payoff function in Stag-
Hunt passes the 
collected actions for 
each individual as the 
Payout structure to be 
used in the outcome 
function. These are 
actions that the 
individual played 
against each of its 
neighbors and those that 
the neighbors played 
against just this 
individual. It 
represents all the 
actions pertaining to a 
single individual 
 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) (𝑝𝑜𝑝) (𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠) (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) =  
    𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝 ← {𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝)(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑣𝑝 (𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠))(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘)| 𝑝 ∈ 𝑝𝑜𝑝} 
    𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝 
Outcome function 
implementation. It 
relies on supporting 
functions Dist and 
IndvPayouts that are 
given below 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑣𝑃 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡′ → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 Function definition to 
return the Payout for 





from the Payouts 
collected for all users. 
The generic game 
mechanism (Chapter 5) 
packages all payouts 
into a single collection 
for all users. This 
function seperates out 
the ones for the supplie 
d user as that is 
required in the Outcome 
function 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 → 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝 Function definition for 
returning an updated 
population individual 
given its Payout 
structure 
  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) = 
  (𝑘, 𝑓, 𝑗) ← 𝑝 
  𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾 = {
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) : 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐺𝑒𝑛( )
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
  𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐽 =  {
𝑗 + 1 : 𝑘 = 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾
0 : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
  𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃 = (𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾, 𝑓, 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐽) 
 
 
  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃 
Stag-Hunt Dist function 
implementation. It 
relies on several 
functions that are 
defined and described 
below 
𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐺𝑒𝑛 ∶ {𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒} Supporting function that 
returns true if the 





𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 →  ℤ 
 
Stag-Hunt version of 
social rank Given a 
population indivdual and 
its neighbors and the 
payout, this funtion 
returns the rank of the 
indivdual among its 
neighbors based on 
relative fitness (see 
Figure 6-4) 
 
𝐾𝑆𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶  ℤ → 𝐾 
 
Given an integer rank 
from the SocialRank 
function, this function 
returns a Knoweldge 
Source. The Knowledge 
sources are ordered from 
explorative to 





is associated with 
(relatively) explorative 
KS and high rank with 
exploitative. The 
premise is that if an 
individual is performing 
comparatively well, it 
should continue to 
exploit the local region 
it is in. This is a 
configurable value to 
enable the provision of 
different rankigns of KS 
for different problem 
types. 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 → 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 → 𝐾 Cooperative distribution 




𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) = 
   𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 ← 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝) 
   𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾 ← (𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∘ 𝐾𝑆𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)(𝑝)(𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡) 
  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾 
 
Implementation of the 
cooperative distribution 
function defined above 
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 → 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 → 𝐾 Evaluative distribution: 
Function that determines 
K in an evalutive 
generation  
 
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) =  
   𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 ← 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝) 
   (𝑘, 𝑓, 𝑗) ← 𝑝 
   𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾 ← {
𝑘 : 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑡(𝑝) < 𝑓
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝐾(𝑝𝑜𝑝)(𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠)(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡) : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 





𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝐾 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑠 − 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 → 𝐾 Function defintion to 
return the locally 
dominant K given the 
indviduals, it neighbors 
and Payout (see Figure 
6-5) 
𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒 = (𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦, 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑓𝑓, 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∘ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) The game tuple for Stag-
Hunt game injection. 
Note that to match the 
required definition for 
the Outcome function for 
game injection, the 
Outcome function defined 
above is composed with 





that the type signatures 
match. 
 
Stag-Hunt can be considered a version of IPD where the element of time is explicitly considered. 
Unlike IPD where cooperation emerges over repeated interaction, Stag-Hunt is cooperative by 
default. Individuals periodically check to see if they want to defect or not but generally cooperate. 
In terms of knowledge distribution, cooperative behavior is very similar to that for IPD’s in that an 
individual will obtain a new KS as a function of its social rank among peers. 
6.3 Stackelberg – A structured model for cooperation 
The structure of this game is modeled after Stackelberg pricing model in microeconomics 
(Evans, 2014). Stackelberg, Cournot, and Bertrand are related models of oligopoly market 
competition. Unlike perfect competition (where participants have no control over prices) or 
monopoly (where there exists complete pricing power), in oligopoly, the firms have a degree of 
pricing power, determined by their “strategic complementarities” (Julien, 2011). But importantly 
for CA knowledge distribution, the market interaction can give rise to implicit cooperation as 
production (and pricing) decisions emerge from the inherent market structure. 
In the classic Stackelberg model (Julien, 2011)  there are two firms – a leader (or first-mover) 
and a follower. The leader firm moves first to set production and target price by taking into 
account the reaction of the follower firm. It knows how the follower will react and so it sets 
production and price that is at the expected equilibrium between the two firms. The leader has 
the first-mover advantage and will be able to command a higher price as a result, especially if the 





Unlike the previously discussed two games (IPD and Stag-Hunt), the Stackelberg game is played 
between the Knowledge Sources that reside in the Belief Space. The adaption of Stackelberg for 
CA knowledge distribution is described next. 
6.3.1 Stackelberg Adaptation for CATGame 
The application of the Stackelberg concept for CA knowledge distribution is as follows: 
• Players: Knowledge Sources in the Belief Space 
• Action: Knowledge Source play their strength in terms of their current weighted average 
fitness represented in the population 
• Outcome: The strongest Knowledge Source moves first and acquires the top n/k players in 
the population where n is the number of population individuals and k is the number of 
Knowledge Sources. The next KS takes the next strongest n/k player and so on 
Here the Knowledge Sources act as firms in the Stackelberg model. The first-mover is the 
Knowledge Source that is the strongest in the current generation; it acquires the best performing 
individuals. Other Knowledge Sources take turns in order of their strength and acquire remaining 
individuals in a step-by-step manner. The overall population is equally divided among the available 
Knowledge Sources. This process is conceptually represented in Listing 6-4 and schematically in 
Figure 6-6. 
Listing 6-4 Knowledge Sources assignments under Stackelberg 
𝑃 = < 𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑖, … , 𝑝𝑛 >   is ranked list of population indviduals by 
fitness 
 
𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖  is the fitness of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ individual 
 












 ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖| 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘
𝑖
 
is the relative weight of each KS in the 
population 
 
∑ 𝑊𝑘 = 1
𝑘
 the total weight for all KS sums to 1 
 
𝑅 =< 𝑘1, 𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑞 > ,    𝑘 ∈ 𝐾  is a ranking of KS by weight; strongest KS first 
 
𝑆 = < 𝑃1, 𝑃2, … , 𝑃𝑞 >  is a partitioning of the population into q 




) to be exact] except for the last one that 
consists of the remaining individuals after 𝑞 − 1 
partitions have been taken, respecting the 
ranking in P 
 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝 𝑖𝑛 𝑃1 → 𝑝. 𝐾𝑆 ← 𝑅1  
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝 𝑖𝑛 𝑃2 → 𝑝. 𝐾𝑆 ← 𝑅2 
… 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑞 → 𝑝. 𝐾𝑆 ← 𝑅𝑞 
The top performing indviduals get the top KS and 
so forth for each partition 
 
 
Figure 6-6: In Stackelberg the fittest KS takes the top 1/kth of the population and so on, where k is the number of configured 
KS 
While the true players are Knowledge Sources in the Stackelberg game, the game still has to be 
structured in a manner to be injectable into the generic game described in Chapter 5. The formal 
specification for Stackelberg follows a model similar to the specifications of other games described 





Listing 6-5: Stackelberg game specification 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = {(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑎) | 𝑝1 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑝2 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑝, 𝑎 ∈ ℝ)} 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
Stackelberg Actions 
structure is a triple of 
values representing the 
action played by an 
individual against its 
neighbor. Here the 1st 
phase action is the 
fitness value (which is 
continuous). Eventually 
these will be funneled 
into calculating the 
weighted fitness for 
Knowledge Sources. The 
game framework requries 
information to come from 
population individuals, 
which this structure 
contains. 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡′ = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠′ 
The payout structure is 




𝐼𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑛: {𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒} In Stackleberg, 
knowledge distribution 
is performed after a 
configured number of 
generations. This 
utility function 
provides whether the 
current generation is 
for distribution 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 (𝑝)(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) =  
   𝑎 ← 𝑝. 𝑓 
   𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 ← 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝑝) 
   𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠 ← {(𝑝, 𝑛, 𝑎) | 𝑛 ∈ 𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑠 }  




   𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
Play implementation for 
Stackelberg 
 
p.f is short hand for 
the fitness value of a 
population individual 
triple. Actions are only 
collected during a 
distributive generation 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 (𝑝) (𝑎) (𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) = 
    𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑡 ← {𝑎} ∪ 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 




    𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 
 
  
Payoff function in 
Stackelberg returns an 
empty set if its not a 
distributive generation. 
Othewise it passes the 
collected actions for 
the given individual as 
the Payout structure (to 





function). These are 
actions that the 
individual played 
against each of its 
neighbors and those that 
the neighbors played 
against just this 
individual. It 
represents all the 
actions pertaining to a 
single individual 
 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (𝑝𝑜𝑝) (𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠) (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) =  
    𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝 ← {
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑝𝑜𝑝, 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠) : 𝐼𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛( )
𝑝𝑜𝑝 : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
    𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑝 
Outcome function 
implementation. It 
relies on the Dist 
supporting function 
given below 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ → 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡′ → 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ Fuction definition to 
return an updated 
population (with new 
Knowledge Source 
assignments) given 
current population and 
all the payouts from the 
game 
  
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐾𝑆 ∶ 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡′ → < 𝑘 | 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 > Function definition to 
provide an ordered set 
of Knowledge Sources – 
denoted with <…> - given 
the Payouts from all 
individuals in the 
population. The 
Knowledge Sources are 
ranked by the sum of the 
fitness values of the 
indivduals they control 
 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑝: 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝐾𝑠 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ → < 𝑠𝑝 | 𝑠𝑝  ⊆ 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ >  Function definition to 
return ordered set of  
subsets (chunks) of the 
population. The number 
of chunks is the number 
of KS in the system. The 
first chunk contains the 
most fit individuals and 
so on 
 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐾𝑆: 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ → 𝐾 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝′ 
 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐾𝑆(𝑝𝑜𝑝, 𝑘) = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 {𝑆𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 (𝑝) (𝑘) | 𝑝 ∈ 𝑝𝑜𝑝} 
 
Function definition and 
implementation to assign 
new Knowledge Source to 






𝑆𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆: 𝑃𝑜𝑝 → 𝐾 → 𝑃𝑜𝑝 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆(𝑝)(𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾) = 
    (𝑘, 𝑓, 𝑗) ← 𝑝 
    𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑗 ←  {
𝑗 + 1 : 𝑘 = 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾
0 : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
    𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐾, 𝑓, 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐽) 
 
Function definition and 
implementation to assign 
a new Knowledge Source 
to a population 
individual 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝𝑜𝑝)(payouts) = 
   rankedKs ← RankKS(payouts) 
   rankedChnks ← RankPop(|𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑠|, pop) 
   𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑠 = < 𝑘1, 𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑖, … |  𝑖 = 1 . . |𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑠| > 
   𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑛𝑘𝑠 = < 𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑖, … |  𝑖 = 𝑖 . . |𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑠| > 
   𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑛𝑘𝑠 ← < 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐾𝑆(𝑐𝑖)(𝑘𝑖) | i = 1. . |rankedKs| > 
   pop2 ←  ⋃ 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑛𝑘𝑠 
   newPop ←  {
𝑝𝑜𝑝2 : 𝐼𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛( )
𝑝𝑜𝑝 : 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
  return newPop 
 
 
Stag-Hunt Dist function 
implementation. It 
relies on several 
functions that are 
defined and described 
below 




6.4 Chapter Summary 
The three game-based knowledge distribution mechanisms that are implemented and tested 
in this research were described in detail in this section. These mechanisms are inspired by the 
following: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma from classical Game Theory; Stag-Hunt from evolutionary 
Game Theory; and Stackelberg from microeconomics. All use the game framework defined in 
Chapter 5. Stackelberg is a model where implicit cooperation emerges as a property of the market 
structure. The Stackelberg inspired game for CA knowledge distribution has Knowledge Sources 
taking turns to claim the best performing individuals in order or their strength. When compared 
to IPD and Stag-Hunt, Stackelberg is more structured in that the population individuals are 
generally evenly divided among the Knowledge Sources. It can be likened to a more centrally 





IPD and Stag-Hunt, the decisions are made locally by each individual based on the individual’s 
social rank among its peers. From an economic perspective, IPD and Stag-Hunt – in the context of 





CHAPTER 7 EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING SYSTEM LEARNING IN 
DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS 
7.0 Introduction 
CA is meant for knowledge-driven problem solving in complex environments. An example of 
such is the multi-objective systems modelling of prehistoric environments (Stanley S. D., 2020). 
For the numerical optimization system CATGame, the Cones World dynamic environment 
generator is used. Cones World is an adaptation of the DF1 generator (Morrison & De Jong, 1999) 
for use in Cultural Algorithms. The landscapes generated by Cones World are periodically modified 
with a sequence generator based on the logistic equation (Eq 7-2). This serves as a mechanism to 
create dynamic environments. The complexity is controlled by the ‘a’ multiplier (henceforth 
referred to as A or A value) of the logistic equation. This process is explained in greater detail in 
section 7.1. 
The testbed allows the performance landscaped to be replaced with a new one while the 
optimization is underway. This is akin to pulling the proverbial rug from under the system. The A 
values control how hard the rug is pulled (on a periodic basis). A robust system should be able 
adapt quickly to changing environmental conditions. A resilient system should be able to 
withstand even large shocks without leading to system collapse (Figure 7-1). The testbed system 
is run with varying degrees of shocks applied to understand the behavior of the knowledge 
distribution mechanisms under different levels of dynamic complexity. The metric that captures 
the overall system performance is the number of generations to find optimum after each 





Operation of the Knowledge Sources – i.e. how they guide the population individual through 
the search landscape is constant across the different distribution mechanisms tested. Since the 
performance difference is only due to how knowledge is distributed via the network, several 
metrics related to characteristics of the ‘social’ network are collected. These include diffusion 
(section 7.3); Schelling’s segregation index  (section 7.4); and others related to capturing the flow 
of knowledge in a graph e.g. Page-Rank (Wills, 2006)(section 7.5). The social metrics are intended 
to shed a brighter light into the emergent patterns of knowledge flow with respect to complexity 
changes. 
 
Figure 7-1: Resilience and robustness of complex systems 
The main question that this research addresses is whether the hitherto unapplied cooperative 
approach to CA knowledge distribution is effective for certain categories of complex problems. As 





numerical optimization problems and hierarchical complexity for deep learning models; the 
former is addressed by CATGame and later by the CATNeuro system. As this chapter relates to 
numerical problems, the hypotheses arising from the primary question for numerical problems 
are posed in this chapter. A labeling scheme is defined to refer to hypotheses with the pattern ‘Hy 
Chapter-#’. To start, hypothesis Hy 7-1 reflects the primary research question with respect to 
dynamically complexity for numerical problems. 
Cooperative knowledge distribution is effective for problem solving in 
dynamically complex environments 
  Hy 7-1 
 
The following sections describe the experimental testbed and the metrics collected in more 
detail. Several other hypotheses are posited in the following sections in proximity with the 
description of the said metrics. The analysis and interpretation of the experimental data collected 
with the testbed, are presented in Chapter 8. 
7.1 Cones World with Dynamic Landscapes 
The Cones World test problem generator is a relatively simple method of constructing real-
valued optimization problems of arbitrary complexity for benchmarking purposes. Complexity is 
controlled via the various parameters of the Cones World such as number of cones; the ranges of 
their heights; range of the radii; and the number of dimensions. A sample 2-D Cones World 






Figure 7-2: Cones World sample (source: CA papers) 
The Cones World landscape consists of a set of superimposed cones. The height of the 
landscape is the value of the fitness function; it is given by  Eq 7-1. The input to the fitness function 
is an n-dimensional point location in the problem hyperspace. Thus, the number input parameters 
is equal to the number of dimensions chosen for the Cones World testbed. All testing was done 
with 2D landscapes that are easier to visualize and therefore analyze than higher dimensional 
ones. The problem can always be made sufficiently complex by choosing appropriate values of 
other parameters such as the number of cones (i.e. the number of local maxima). 
Cones World surface 










 Eq 7-1 
 where 𝑓 returns the height of the landscape surface at 
the given coordinates 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛; 𝑘 is the number of 
cones; 𝑛 is the dimensionality; 𝐻𝑗 is the height of the 
cone 𝑗; 𝑅𝑗 is the radius of cone 𝑗; and 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the 







To create a sequence of landscapes needed for the testbed, the Cones World uses a sequence 
generator based on the logistic equation (Eq 7-2) (Langton, 1990).  The logistic equation is a 
recursive function. 
Logistic equation: 𝒙𝒊 = 𝑨 ∗ 𝒙𝒊−𝟏 ∗ (𝟏 −  𝒙𝒊−𝟏)   Eq 7-2 
 
Figure 7-3 shows the sequence of values generated from the logistic equation. To get the next 
value in the sequence, the previous value is fed back into the equation. The change between the 
two values is controlled by the A multiplier (also known as the ‘r’ multiplier). In Figure 7-3, the x-
axis is the sequence number, y-axis is the value of the output at that position and each ribbon 
corresponds to a different ‘r’ or A values. Values of A between 1 and 3, produce almost flat ribbons 
– i.e. there is linear change between successive values. As r increases the change between 
successive values becomes larger and more unpredictable. The system switches to non-linear at 






Figure 7-3: Logistic function behavior by A-Value (source: CA papers) 
The values generated from the logistic sequence generator are used to modify the heights of 
the cones in the Cones World landscape to produce a new landscape for the testbed when 
required. For a particular run, the A value is kept fixed for landscape generation. To test with 
different levels of complexity – i.e. shocks to the system – the experimental runs are conducted 
with four different A values namely 1.0, 3.1, 3.6, and 3.9. 
7.2 Generations-to-Solution the Basic Performance Metric 
Using the dynamic landscape generation system described earlier, the basic metric to measure 
the response of the system to change or shock is the number of generations to solution. Say the 
system is in some state. Now change is introduced. The peak point (optimum) shifts to some 
unknown position. The CA system scrambles to locate the new peak. How long does it take? The 
number of generations to solution or G2S is the primary measure of performance used to compare 





complexity factors. Cooperative mechanisms are expected to show better resilience than 
competitive mechanisms (Hy 7-2). 
Cooperative knowledge distribution exhibits better robustness than 
competitive distribution 
  Hy 7-2 
 
In general, the shorter the average G2S value the more robust the system. However, it could 
be more instructive to plot the G2S values obtained from a sequence of landscape changes, to 
better understand performance over time. 
 
Figure 7-4: Generations-to-solution curve depicting possible responses to system change 
Figure 7-4 shows the possible responses of three different hypothetical knowledge distribution 
mechanisms to illustrate the performance patterns that may emerge. The KD1 system starts out 
































worse over the progression of landscape changes (i.e. it takes increasingly longer to find the 
solution). Such a mechanism may be well suited to problem solving in static environments. The 
KD2 mechanism seems to adapt quickly and tracks the changes well. By contrast KD3 is a slow 
learner; its performance gradually becomes better over the progression. 
The way a mechanism responds to change over time is a useful characteristic as it can provide 
guidance for where best the mechanism may be applicable.  
7.3 Social Stress or Diffusion 
Social Stress or Diffusion, as the name implies, is a social metric. It is an attempt to measure 
the duress in the system. In all knowledge distribution mechanisms, the immediate neighbors 






Figure 7-5: Social tension is reflected by how far apart are network neighbors in parameter space 
Diffusion is measured as the Euclidean distance between two neighbors averaged over the 
population.  Pictorially, distance is represented in Figure 7-5 and the distance equation is Eq 7-3. 
Euclidean distance 
in search space: 





 p1 and p2 are the parameters of two population individuals 
 i = 0,1, 2, … (n-1) indexes the parameter array, n is the number 
of dimensions  
 Eq 7-3 
 
As with G2S (previous section) the Diffusion metric for each run is plotted over the progression 





higher for more complex environments – i.e. landscape sequences generated with higher A values 
(Hy 7-3). The maximum parameter distance is 2 [range of landscape location in each dimension is 
(-1, +1) and n=2] and therefore the maximum value is 2.0 for two neighbors by Eq 7-3. However, 
the observed average Diffusion values for the population are in the 0.5-1.0 range. 
Diffusion is higher for more dynamically complex environments   Hy 7-3 
 
7.4 Segregation Index 
In a seminal work, Thomas Schelling (Schelling, 1971) showed that the racial segregation in 
large cities (like Chicago) could be explained by slight biases in peoples preferences about what 
type of neighborhood, in terms of racial mix, they would prefer to reside in. Computer simulations 
conducted by Schelling showed that even slight biases in racial preferences lead to stark 
segregation at the city level. 
Following Schelling’s work, a test knowledge distribution was constructed to see if such 
segregation could be observed in the CA population space. The test knowledge distribution run 
results are shown Figure 7-6. Under this mechanism, each individual has a slight bias to be 
surrounded by individuals that have the same KS as the individual does. This results in a highly 
segregated population overall. Figure 7-6 is a view of the population arranged in a regular hexagon 
topology. Each individual thus has six neighbors and the topology is toroidal (i.e. it wraps around 
to form a sphere). Each circle is an individual where the color represents the Knowledge Source 
acquired via the Schelling-like rule. The key at the bottom of the figure provides a mapping from 
color to KS. This side experiment provides visual evidence that segregation as studied by Schelling 






Figure 7-6: Stark segregation of Knowledge in population due to application of Schelling-like rule 
The core idea behind Segregation Index is measuring the imbalance in proportions of 
subgroups in a local neighborhood with respect to proportions in the population at large. For 
example, say US population can be divided into two subgroups 𝑅  and 𝐷 where the overall 
proportion is 0.50/0.50. Divide US into smaller regions geographically. For each region can test 
how far the proportions of 𝑅 and 𝐷 are from the ideal 0.50/0.50. This will be the measure of 
segregation in that region. Table 7-1 shows the calculation of Schelling’s Segregation Index for 






Table 7-1: Calculation of Regional Segregation with Different Subgroup Proportions 
Neighborhood 
proportions 𝑹𝒏 and 𝑫𝒏 
Segregation 
 
|𝑹 −  𝑹𝒏|  + |𝑫 − 𝑫𝒏| 
Comment 
𝑹𝒏 𝑫𝒏 
0.50 0.50 |.5 – .5| + |.5 – .5| = 0 The neighborhood 
proportion is ideal 
0.0 1.0 |.5 – 0.0 | + |.5 – 1.0| = 2.0 Max value is 2 
.70 .30 |.5 - .7| + |.5 - .3| = 0.4  
  
The first example has the 𝑅𝑛/𝐷𝑛 at 0.5/0.5 same as for the overall population and segregation 
index works out to be zero. The second example represents extreme segregation where 𝑅𝑛/𝐷𝑛 is 
0.0/1.0 and that produces a value of 2.0. Thus, the Segregation Index ranges from 0.0 to 2.0. The 
third example with a 0.7/0.3 split produces an intermediate value of 0.4. The calculation of 
Segregation Index for a CA population configuration is given in Eq 7-4. 
CA Population 
segregation: 
𝐏𝐨𝐩 𝐒𝐞𝐠 =  
𝟏
𝒏





𝒊 indexes the Knowledge Source 
𝒓 indexes the population individual 
𝑷𝒊 is the proportion of the 𝒊
𝒕𝒉 Knowledge Source in the CA run 
(usually its 1/5 as there are 5 KS) 
𝒑𝒓𝒊  is the proportion of the 𝒊
𝒕𝒉  Knowledge Source in 𝒓′𝒔 
neighborhood 
𝒏 is the number of population individuals 







Figure 7-7: An example of low segregation network 
 
Figure 7-8: An example of a high segregated network 
Also, Figure 7-7 (low segregation population) and Figure 7-8 (high segregation population) are 
examples of segregation index represented visually over a population of 36 individuals. The inner 
circle represents the population individual and its color the Knowledge Source. The outer ring 
corresponds to the segregation index for that individual’s neighborhood. “Seg. Scale” is the key 
for decoding Segregation Index color. As expected, low segregation population individuals are 
surrounded by a greater variety of Knowledge Sources, in contrast with high segregation 
individuals. 
It is difficult to judge a-priori the levels of segregation manifested by the tested knowledge 
distribution mechanisms with respect to the complexity factors. However, expect that the 
segregation level will be higher for higher complexity environments due to the greater level of 





Segregation is higher for higher complexity environments   Hy 7-4 
 
Also, in general it is expected that Stag-Hunt and IPD mechanisms will produce higher 
segregation than WTD (Hy 7-5). This comes down to the mechanics of these mechanisms. The 
WTD mechanism requires compensation for lost Knowledge Sources that evens out the 
knowledge assignments somewhat. If this is not done, some Knowledge Sources entirely could be 
removed from the population, never to be regained. The WTD mechanism injects back Knowledge 
Sources that have been driven out after each distribution. Twenty percent of randomly selected 
individuals (from the total population) receive Knowledge Sources that were excluded in the 
natural assignment step. There are no such compensating mechanisms for IPD or Stag-Hunt – 
assignments are all due to the natural process followed. Both mechanisms allow Knowledge 
Sources to be regained even if they are driven out in some generation. As a result, the segregation 
will likely be higher as some Knowledge Sources may be absent in some generations. 
Stag-Hunt and IPD distributions will produce higher segregation than 
WTD distributions 
  Hy 7-5 
 
Following similar reasoning, it is expected Stackelberg should produce the lowest segregation 
of all (Hy 7-6). Stackelberg – for CA knowledge distribution – is a somewhat structured approach 
where each Knowledge Source takes turns to acquire a piece of the evenly divided population pie 
and so, as a result, all Knowledge Sources are expected to be present in every generation. Note 
that even if all Knowledge Sources are represented in a population, segregation could still be high 





Stackelberg produces lowest segregation among the mechanisms tested   Hy 7-6 
 
Both Diffusion and Segregation are metrics that pertain to entire populations – i.e. are 
aggregate metrics. While these are analyzed with respect to time in Chapter 8, information could 
be lost due to aggregation at each timestep. To understand the mechanism of knowledge 
distribution at a finer grained level, an approach is required that captures the dynamics of 
knowledge flow over time. The next section explains some methods derived from network analysis 
that should provide further insight into the inner workings of the knowledge distribution 
mechanisms. 
7.5 Understanding the Dynamics of Communal Knowledge Flow 
The CA population exists in the context of a social network (or fabric) of some topology (usually 
regular). The knowledge distribution mechanisms leverage the social connections for distributing 
knowledge. The flow of knowledge over the network, driven by the workings of the knowledge 
distribution mechanisms, is thus of high interest. Patterns of knowledge flow should highlight the 
differences between how the mechanisms operate. 
The tools used for analyzing knowledge flow come from a variety of disciplines. First off is the 
Frequent Pattern Growth algorithm (Agrawal, Imieliński, & Swami, 1993). It is used to find 
communities of Knowledge Sources in a population. Its formulation and use are explained in 
section 7.5.1 .  Then, a method related to visualizing weighted graphs is discussed in 7.5.2 . Finally, 
the famous Page Rank (Wills, 2006) algorithm from Google is discussed in 7.5.3 ; and its use for CA 





7.5.1 Frequent Pattern Growth - A mechanism for Community Detection in Social Networks 
There are many community detection methods in graphical networks (Lancichinetti & 
Fortunato, 2009), however a simple and effective approach is to use market basket type analysis 
to detect local communities in the network. Kumar, et al from IBM (Kumar, Raghavan, 
Rajagopalan, & Tomkins, 1999) first described the use of such methods for mining communities in 
cyber space. For CA community detection, a method is required that can find clusters for 
Knowledge Sources. This is based on the type of the node rather than the link strength between 
nodes – the premise for most other community detection methods. 
There are two primary algorithms for market basket analysis – apriori (Wu, et al., 2007) and 
frequent pattern growth (FPG). FPG is faster than apriori as it first constructs a tree and then mines 






Figure 7-9: Combination of History (Dark Blue) and Situational (Red) Knowledge forms the dominant community type is this 
network as indicated by the colored outer ring 
The idea of using FPG for community detection is to find what Knowledge Sources are present 
in a local neighborhood – i.e. around a population individual. For the population, count all the 
instances of the unique patterns that occur around each individual and take the top n patterns as 
the strongest communities.  
FPG is an efficient way of counting such the patterns (called frequent itemsets). Figure 7-9 is 
an example of the application of this method for community detection in graphs. Here only the 
top community detected, comprised of History and Situational Knowledge Sources, is marked with 
a light blue outer ring. Note that this method does not preclude an individual to be part of several 
communities at the same time. For example, in Figure 7-9 another dominant pattern is pairing of 





in Domain-Situational. One example of an individual who is part of both communities is 3rd from 
the left in the top row.  
Also, community size (number of unique Knowledge Sources in the community) may be 
between 1 to the number of Knowledge Sources in the system. For example, if all individuals have 
the same Knowledge Source then there is only one community comprising of the single Knowledge 
Source. The possible number of distinct communities is 32 for 5 Knowledge Sources. 
 
Figure 7-10: Timeline of community memberships of a single pop. Individual 
The emergence of communities, especially if communities persist over time, is an insight into 
how a knowledge distribution mechanism is functioning for a given level of complexity. However, 
community analysis can be taken a step further by tracking change over time. It is very likely that 
an individual is part of several communities in one generation, several others in the generation 
after, and so forth. This pattern is pictorially represented in Figure 7-10. The letter pattern 





patterns can be similarly deciphered. Figure 7-10 is a view from the point of view of single 
individual over time. It shows the community-to-community transitions for that individual. 
 
Figure 7-11 - Community membership transitions for a single individual over n generations can be folded into a weighted 
graph where the arc weights represent the number of corresponding transitions observed in the run 
The sequence of community-to-community transitions for an individual can be folded into a 
single weighted graph (Figure 7-11). The nodes represent communities and arcs the transitions. 
The weight of the arcs is the number of times that transition occurred in the sequence of 
generations for a particular run. The graph is a compact view of the entire dynamic process of 
knowledge flow for a single individual. This construction is really a stepping stone towards the 
construction of a population-wide weighted graph and is not very useful by itself. All such graphs, 
each corresponding to a population individual, can be merged together to form a single view. This 





7.5.2 Crystalizing Knowledge Flow Dynamics as a Weighted Graph 
If one merges the community-to-community transition graphs across all individuals, one can 
obtain a weighted graph that is a compact, emergent view of a knowledge distribution 
mechanism’s operation. 
 
Figure 7-12:  A weighted graph of community-to-community transitions aggregated across entire population presented as a 
‘chord’ diagram. Such a diagram captures the dynamics of communal knowledge flow in a single view 
Figure 7-12 is a representation of a weighted graph as a ‘chord’ diagram (Jalali, 2016). This 
particular view was generated from the Microsoft Power BI (Microsoft, 2019) tool using the Chord 





based on the ordering of the labels (communities in this case) arranged in order of importance in 
a counter-clockwise manner, starting from the top. If two similar charts have slightly different 
node orderings, the colors selected for the two charts will be very different. Thus, the node colors 
are way of differentiating charts quickly. 
The community labeling scheme for the chord diagrams, and others explained later, is as 
follows: 
• ‘D’ = Domain 
• ‘H’ = History 
• ‘N’ = Normative 
• ‘S’ = Situational 
• ‘T’ = Topographic 
• Composite communities are labeled with the letter assignments joined by underscores 
(‘_’), e.g. ‘D_N_T’ = combination of Domain, Normative and Topographic  
• For composite communities, alphabet ordering is maintained so ‘D_N_T’ will always 
appear as such and not as ‘T_D_N’, for example. 
In the chord diagram, the graph nodes are the segments around the circumference. The greater 
the importance of the node, the longer the length of the corresponding segment. The arcs are 
represented as the ‘chords’ between the nodes. The thickness of the arc represents its combined 





inflow. Self-loops are represented as stubby arcs. The arcs connected to a node (segment) are 
ordered in a counter-clockwise manner relative to the outgoing weight. 
In Power BI the chord diagrams are interactive.  Charts allow for interactive filtering that can 
be used to remove infrequent transitions. This feature can considerably reduce visual clutter. Also 
hovering the mouse over different parts of the chart provides more detail.  
The weighted community transition graph, represented by the chord diagram, can be 
considered to be the signature of a distribution mechanism. As such one can expect the diagrams 
to appear to be quite different for each of the distribution mechanisms tested (Hy 7-7). While it is 
hard to hypothesize about any particular feature of the graphs as these are emergent 
phenomenon, it can be argued that if the mechanisms were to operate more or less in the same 
way, their graph signatures would also be similar. 
The community transition weighted graphs for the tested knowledge 
distribution mechanisms are visibly distinguishable from each other 
  Hy 7-7 
 
This reasoning can be extended to the reaction of the distribution mechanism when it is 
subjected do environments of varying complexity – as controlled by the A value. For different 
levels of complexity one can expect the mechanism to respond differently with discernable 
manifestations in the corresponding weighted transition graphs (Hy 7-8). 
The community transition weighted graphs for a tested knowledge 
distribution mechanism are appreciably different for different A values  






Weighed transition graphs, as visualized by chord diagrams, may be useful but still a weak 
differentiator of knowledge distribution mechanisms as one is asked to rely on somewhat 
subjective visual judgement. Using additional methods, the case for signature-based 
differentiation can be made stronger. This is discussed in the next section. 
7.5.3 Page Rank for measuring Community Influence in Knowledge Flow Graphs 
Community-to-community transition graphs, presented in the previous section, are seen as a 
means of providing a unique signature for each of the tested distribution mechanisms. However 
apart from visual differentiation, these views do not provide much useful information.  
 
Figure 7-13: The importance of communities in a communal knowledge-flow graph can be extracted via Google’s Page-Rank 
algorithm. Here, example results are presented in a ‘tree’ chart 
A further refinement of the weighted graph approach helps to extract more useful information 
for comparative analysis. The arc weights in the prior weighted graphs are transition counts. These 
weights can be normalized so that they represent transition probabilities. This means that the 
weights for all outgoing arcs for any node sum to 1.0. Such a graph can be treated as a Markov 
chain and as such is amenable to analysis via the Page Rank (Wills, 2006) (Wu, et al., 2007) 
algorithm.  
Page Rank is an iterative method of computing the stationary distribution of a Markov Chain. 
The significant outcome, however, is that the graph nodes are ranked in terms of importance. 





widely used in many areas where the problem involves graph analysis, e.g. biology (Gong, et al., 
2014); natural language processing (Pershina, He, & Grishman, 2015); and sociology (Lu, Wang, 
Gao, & Liu, 2015).  
Applying Page Rank to a normalized community transition graph nets the ranked list of 
communities. Such a list can be visualized as a ‘tree’ chart as shown in Figure 7-13. The 
communities are ordered by importance. Here importance means the proportion of time the 
individuals in a population are found to be in such a community. The area of the box representing 
a community in the tree diagram is proportional to the importance weight calculated by Page 
Rank. The color of the box represents the exploratory factor of the community. Red hues 
represent communities comprised of exploratory knowledge sources and Green hues represent 
exploitative ones. 
The Page Rank derived tree chart provides a clearer view of the signature of a distribution 
mechanism than the chord diagram. First the communities are clearly ranked in order and it 
should be easy to spot the differences between diagrams of different mechanisms, if such 
differences exist. Second, the information contained in the tree charts for a given mechanism, for 
different A values can be stacked together into another useful view. Figure 7-14 is an example of 
such a view. It is a ‘parallel chords’ diagram. It shows the rank of each community with respect to 
each A value. Horizontal lines connect each community across the A value vertical lines. As such it 
allows one to easily spot changes in community rank ordering with respect to environmental 
complexity. 
Apart from providing a visual signature for the distribution mechanisms, the tree diagram also 





from such views can be extracted and related to the G2S performances of different distribution 
mechanisms, to provide further insight. This graph can be used to measure whether the 
community rankings for the tested distribution mechanisms are different from each other, 
reflecting their different internal mechanisms (Hy 7-9). 
Community importance weights for the tested distribution mechanisms 
are different from each other, reflecting their different operational 
characteristics 







Figure 7-14: Changes in community rank with respect to change in A-value (complexity) - presented as a ‘parallel coordinates’ 
chart. 
Further, the tested distribution mechanisms should respond differently to varying levels of 
environmental complexity. This should be reflected in the community rankings across the tested 





Community importance rankings for the tested distribution mechanisms 
vary by environmental complexity 
  Hy 7-10 
 
Another view of responsiveness to varying complexity can be created based on changes in the 
explorative-exploitative balance of each mechanism with respect to changes in A values. Here the 
32 possible communities are collapsed into 3 categories, Explorative, Neutral and Exploitative. The 
method used is as follows: 
• Assign each Knowledge Source a numerical rank based on where it falls on the explorative-
exploitative scale 
• Average the ranks for Knowledge Sources within a community to obtain the community 
rank 
• Bin each community into 1 of 3 categories based on the calculated rank and set thresholds 
for Explorative, Neutral and Exploitative categories. 
Listing 7-1 : Community categorization 
𝑇 = 5, 𝑁 = 4, 𝐷 = 3, 𝐻 = 2, 𝑆 = 1,
∗= 0 
Rank assigned to each Knowledge Source 
based on where it places on the 
explorative-exploitative continuum. 
‘*’ represents the no community found 
case (very rare) 
 
D_H_T = (3 + 2 + 5) / 3 = 3.33 Example calculation of exploratory-
exploitative ranking for a community 
comprimising of 3 Knowledge Sources 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦(𝑟) =  {
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟 > 3
𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑟 = 3




Function to categorize a commnity as 
Explorative, Neutral or Exploitative 






Listing 7-1 shows the supporting calculations for the method of ranking and categorization 
described above. With just 3 categories to work with, it is easier to perform meaningful statistical 
tests for the response of a distribution mechanism in the face of environmental complexity – a 
process that is explained next. 
The underlying community-to-community transition counts are aggregated into category-to-
category transitions (Figure 7-15). For a particular A value then there are only three nodes in the 
network namely, Explorative, Neutral, and Exploitative. An arc between say Explorative → Neutral 
represents the transitions from all explorative communities to Domain (which is the only neutral 
category); and so forth for the other arcs. 
 
Figure 7-15: Category-to-category transition graph constructed by aggregating community-to-community transition counts 
The counts underpinning an arc are collected from several sample runs. Hence, for each arc, 
the mean and standard deviation are available. Consider the arc Explorative → Neutral for some 
distribution mechanism when A = 1. Now consider the corresponding arc for the transition graph 








Are the means significantly different for the Explorative → Neutral arcs when A = 1 and when A = 
3.1? This is an answerable question; the data are available. 
Two-sample t-tests are performed to test for statistical differences between corresponding 
arcs, for successive A values – 1 → 3.1; 3.1 → 3.6; and 3.6→3.9. These are significant transitions 
in complexity. The 1 → 3.1 transition is from linear changes to non-linear changes; 3.1 → 3.6 is 
from non-linear to highly non-linear; and 3.6→3.9 is from highly non-linear to near chaotic 
changes. Such tests can answer the question whether or not the distribution mechanisms are 
responsive to varying levels complexity, with statistical rigor. 
The information from a) statistical significance testing and b) changes in arc transition weights 
can be combined into a single, compact view with the help of a ‘Sankey’ diagram - see Figure 7-16. 
Admittedly, this chart is a little confusing at first glance, so detailed explanation is provided next. 
 






First a quick word about Sankey diagrams (Riehmann, Hanfler, & Froehlich, 2005). These are 
generally used to visualize flow but really are a way of visualizing multiple linked graphs 
simultaneously. Figure 7-16 has 3 distinct sections separated by vertical ‘posts’ (gray bars). The 
left most set of posts are for A=1 and from left-to-right the posts are for A=3.1, A=3.6 and finally 
A=3.9. There are 3 posts in each set; these are for the three types of nodes Explorative, Neutral 
and Exploitative. The posts are labeled, e.g. “Explorative 1.0”, “Neutral 3.1”, etc.  The first part of 
the name is the node type and second part the A value. 
The links between vertical posts represent the change in the transition rates between 
corresponding arcs for adjacent A values. For example, consider the arc from “Explorative 1.0” to 
“Neutral 3.1”. It represents the change in the Explorative→Neutral arc weight between A=1.0 
graph and A=3.1 graph. If the change is positive, the arc is Blue otherwise its Red. The width of the 
arc represents the amount of change. Finally, if the change is not statistically significant, the arc is 
drawn as a thin line. 
The Sankey chart as conceived for this analysis is information rich. It is a compact way of 
capturing a distribution mechanism’s response to environmental complexity.  The Sankey chart, 
while informative for a single distribution mechanism, is not suitable for comparing multiple 
mechanisms together. One issue with the chart is that the scale is relative to the chart so different 
charts are not comparable. However, a Sankey chart is still useful for judging whether or not a 
mechanism is responsive to changes in environmental complexity (Hy 7-11 & Hy 7-12 below). For 
example, if most of the arcs are thin lines (i.e. the changes are not statistically significant) the 






The tested distribution mechanisms are responsive to changes in 
environmental complexity 
  Hy 7-11 
 
Cooperative distribution mechanisms are more responsive to changes in 
environmental complexity than competitive mechanism 
  Hy 7-12 
 
The Sankey chart depicts the significant changes in exploration/exploitation balance via arc 
thickness however it is difficult to determine the exact magnitude of the change – especially net 
effects. And because of relative scale, it is difficult compare the different mechanisms together. 
Nevertheless, the information contained by the Sankey chart is transformable into a shape that 
makes the goal comparing distribution mechanisms achievable. 
From the information developed for the Sankey chart, the net changes in the explorative-
exploitative balance can be tracked. Consider for example the Explorative category and the change 
1.0 → 3.1 in A. The net change to Explorative is calculated by summing the significant flows in and 
out of Explorative category as shown in Listing 7-2. Generalizing, the net flows for all categories, 
for all adjacent A value can thus be calculated. 
Listing 7-2: Example - net changes to Explorative A: 1.0 → 3.1 
𝐸 = {𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒, 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒} 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑎1→𝑎2 =△ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑎1→𝑎2 −△ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑎1→𝑎2  
 
=  ∑ 𝑒𝑎1 → 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑎2
𝑒 ∈𝐸










Net changes are simpler quantities, easier to visualize and compare. A sample visualization is 
provided in Figure 7-17. 
 
Figure 7-17: An example of  Net flow changes by adjacent A values for a hypothetical distribution mechanisms 
The tracking of net flows (Figure 7-17) is one way to relate the performance of distribution 
mechanisms to how these mechanisms respond to changes in environmental complexity. For 
example, a mechanism that responds by consistently increasing resources to explorative 
communities as A is increased can expected to perform better (Hy 7-13). 
Better performing distribution mechanisms will exhibit consistent 
responses to changes in environmental complexity 
  Hy 7-13 
 
Net flow thus is one of the analytical tools, along with other tools discussed in this chapter, to 
peer into the workings of the distribution mechanisms and draw insights that might be useful for 










1.0 -> 3.1 3.1 -> 3.6 3.6 - 3.9







drive the design of experiments at the conceptual level. The detail setup of experiments, the 
configurations used and the data collected is described next. 
7.6 Experimental Setup 
The primary goal of the thesis is to understand the performance of knowledge distribution 
mechanisms that encompass cooperation with those that are purely competitive. The inspiration 
for cooperative mechanisms comes from classical and evolutionary Game theory. The purely 
competitive mechanism selected is Weighted Majority, which is the default for Cultural 
Algorithms. 
Table 7-2 provides the detail settings of the experimental parameters employed to test the 
hypotheses given above. 
Table 7-2: Parameter Settings for Experimental Runs 




Iterated Prisoner Dilemma 
(IPD) 
Stackelberg (STK) 
Weighted Majority (WTD) 
In the experimental 
analysis section, the KD 
mechanisms are 
referenced via the 
abbreviations used here 
A – values 1.0, 3.1, 3.6, 3.9  





Network topology Hexagonal  
Cones World number of 
cones per landscape 
1000 All KD mechanisms 
were tested on the exact 
same landscapes 
generated in the 
sequence, to make the 
performance differences 
more meaningful 
Number of generations per 
landscape 
2500 The system was 
allowed to run for a fix 
number of generations 
per landscape.  
Number of landscapes in 
sequence per run 
50 Number of 
generations per run = 
50*2500 = 125000 
Number of runs (sample 
size)  
200 per KD-A combination  







Cone parameters modified 
for landscape sequence 
Height Modifying height is 
equivalent to relocation 
cones as the peak can 
move 
 
Detailed data was collected for each generation into a log file. The format of the log file is in 
Table 7-3. Over 1 Terabyte of log data was collected and analyzed. 
Table 7-3: CATGame Log File Format 
Column Description 
Sample Sample number, 1, 2, …, 200 
KD Distribution mechanism WTD, SHS, IPD, STK 
EnvSnsty Not used 
LandscapeNum The sequence number of the landscape in the sequence, 1, 2, …, 50 
A 1.0, 3.1, 3.6, 3.9 
GenCount Population generation counter resets after landscape change, 1,2, …, 2500 
Best Height of the best cone found thus far 
Max Ground truth best for the landscape 






Dffsn Average Diffusion for the population at the end of the current generation 
Net Network topology (Hexagon) 
IndvSeg Segregation index of each population individual, delimited by ‘|’ 
IndvDffsn Diffusion of each population individual, delimited by ‘|’ 
IndvKS Knowledge source for each population individual, delimited by ‘|’ 
 
All experimental runs were performed on the Wayne State’s grid computing environment. 
Details of the configuration used are provided Table 7-4. 
Table 7-4: Wayne State Grid Computing Environment Particulars 
Category Value 
Environment Wayne State grid computing environment 
Number of jobs (that can run in parallel) 1600 = num KD * num A * num samples  
= 4 * 4 * 200  
Hardware requirements for grid resource 4 cores with 500MB RAM 
Size of log data collected 1.04 Terabyte 
 
Experiments were conducted in line with the experimental framework presented in this section 






7.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter described the experimental framework used to test and compare the three game 
distribution mechanisms vs. the stalwart Weighted Majority, for the CATGame system. The core 
idea is to observe the performance and the ‘social’ behavior of the CATGame system when 
configured with each of the four mechanisms. The testbed is a dynamic environment generator 
created by hybridizing the Cones World system with the logistic equation (Eq 7-2). The logistic 
equation is used as a sequence generator to modify the height of the cones periodically to 
generate new landscapes, while the performance optimization is still underway. The main 
performance metric is the average number of generations to reach solution for each change in 
the landscape. 
CA has a social aspect due to the networked population. The social network is leveraged by the 
KD mechanisms. The ‘social’ response of the system to varying levels of dynamic complexity can 
be studied with the help of social metrics. Diffusion and Segregation capture static aspects of the 
network. To understand dynamic aspects, Markovian methods that track patterns of communal 
knowledge flow over time, are also described. The next chapter analyzes the data collected under 






CHAPTER 8 CATGAME EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR CONES WORLD BENCHMARK 
8.0 Introduction 
Following the experiment designs detailed in Chapter 7, experiments were conducted on the 
Wayne State’s grid computing environment. A total of 1600 jobs were run and over a terabyte of 
log data collected for analysis. Log data analysis results are presented in the sections of this 
chapter. In the charts presented the tested KD mechanisms are referred to by short names. The 
mapping is a follows: WTD → Weighted Majority; IPD → Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma; SHS → Stag-
Hunt; and STD → Stackelberg. 
Section 8.1 contains the results of basic performance analysis – mean generations-to-solution 
(G2S) – for each distribution mechanism, by A value and by landscape sequence number. Note: 
the sample size is 200 – i.e. each combination of A value and distribution mechanism is run 200 
times to obtain statistically significant results. For each A value, first a chart is presented that 
compares the mean G2S over the 50-landscape sequence. And then a table that gives detailed 
values by landscape and also provides the two-sample t-test results for the hypotheses that IPD, 
SHS and STK mean G2S are less that WTD mean G2S, respectively. Section 8.2 presents analysis 
for the Diffusion statistic for each A value-KD combination. The diffusion statistics are also 
obtained from log results. Section 8.3 looks at the Segregation patterns obtained from the log data 
for A value-KD combinations. Representative samples of high and low Segregation population 
snapshots are also provided for qualitative assessment.  Charts showing overall trends of 
Segregation by landscape are presented. The aggregate view of Segregation for A value-KD 
combinations is presented as the final chart of this section. Section 8.4 focuses on the dynamic 





mechanisms and in response to changes in environmental complexity.  Here an analysis of the 
community-to-community transition graphs is presented. Several types of visualizations are 
discussed:  
• Chord diagram views of weighed graphs 
• Tree diagrams for Page Rank results 
• Parallel-chords diagrams for tracing rank changes with respect to A values 
• Sankey charts for statistically significant changes in knowledge flow in response to 
environmental complexity 
• Net flow changes in explorative-exploitative balance by A values 
Finally, section 8.5 presents the summary of the analytical results and draws conclusions about 
the hypotheses posed in Chapter 7. 
8.1 Performance Analysis 
The base performance results are presented for each of the A-value-KD combinations in this 
section. The results are organized by A value so the performance of the distribution mechanisms 
can be directly compared for a given level of environmental complexity.  
Trend charts for each A value are presented in Figure 8-1, Figure 8-2, Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4. 
All charts are drawn to same scale for easier comparative analysis. Detailed numerical data for 
each A value is provided in Table 8-1, Table 8-2, Table 8-3 and Table 8-4. The tables include two-
sample T-Test results performed for each landscape in the sequence (1 … 50). As mentioned 





the game KDs is less than that of WTD – i.e. one-tail.  In other words, the performance of game KD 
is expected to be better than WTD for every landscape in the sequence.  The T-Test columns in 
the table show the outcomes based on p<=0.05 (95% confidence) for the tests. If T-Test p <= 0.05 
the column contains +1 otherwise it contains -1. These column values are converted to ‘check 
mark’ and ‘cross’ icons (using Excel’s conditional formatting option) to visually highlight the 
results. 
Analysis by landscape sequence is more interesting and informative as the performance of the 
mechanisms varies over the progression of the sequences. For A = 1, the environment’s dynamic 
complexity is very low. The change is gradual. The trend lines in Figure 8-1 show that WTD settles 
down to competitive performance after about 10 landscapes. WTD’s G2S value equals that for IPD 
after 10 landscapes. STK on the other starts out well but then steadily its performance worsens – 
i.e. STK is not tracking environmental changes well. SHS (Stag-Hunt) starts well and then performs 






Figure 8-1: Mean generations to solution A=1 
The data underlying the chart in Figure 8-1 is listed in Table 8-1. As can be expected from 
inspecting the chart, IPD performs significantly better in early landscapes but then is on par with 
WTD. This is borne out by the T-Test results for IPD vs WTD. STK is statistically significantly better 
than WTD in the first 2 generations but then the one-tail T-Test is not significant. And in fact, the 
performance is much worse than WTD as depicted in the corresponding chart. SHS is statistically 
better than WTD for all landscapes except for landscape #16. The corresponding chart also shows 





Table 8-1: A=1, Two Sample T-Tests (P<0.05), Mean G2S: {IPD,SHS,STK} < WTD, by Landscape Sequence # 
 
Landscape WTD Mean WTD Stdv. IPD Mean IPD Stdv.
TTest 
IPD < 
WTD SHS Mean SHS Stdv.
TTest 
SHS < 




1 766.915 809.699 175.380 353.271 1 117.235 269.411 1 250.085 394.635 1
2 311.985 587.532 96.130 277.886 1 35.590 218.089 1 192.425 494.579 1
3 237.930 508.694 94.685 234.787 1 27.250 196.698 1 195.955 478.257 -1
4 168.480 394.045 53.795 97.606 1 20.500 103.186 1 251.495 560.880 -1
5 168.320 454.257 57.310 83.744 1 11.860 60.101 1 274.315 638.700 -1
6 151.880 405.286 67.180 158.407 1 10.700 58.607 1 304.785 681.366 -1
7 94.400 219.313 57.985 159.700 1 12.605 52.419 1 290.540 665.886 -1
8 92.975 242.981 60.195 120.779 1 14.315 53.889 1 324.040 679.655 -1
9 95.585 261.194 61.195 186.537 -1 16.290 76.520 1 250.010 607.030 -1
10 77.645 222.615 61.325 198.225 -1 15.555 78.984 1 314.220 703.343 -1
11 62.150 109.071 53.545 101.937 -1 12.000 56.169 1 308.000 689.352 -1
12 81.850 239.262 47.620 77.715 1 11.815 91.045 1 335.430 726.295 -1
13 65.135 151.502 57.685 132.556 -1 10.275 36.392 1 348.850 755.467 -1
14 57.510 99.048 52.365 105.558 -1 7.075 50.772 1 356.295 739.290 -1
15 56.565 94.609 67.760 164.902 -1 7.810 44.638 1 389.800 788.860 -1
16 68.255 195.146 66.735 194.164 -1 36.850 209.586 -1 333.425 723.865 -1
17 73.015 214.724 44.735 67.405 1 9.230 50.401 1 399.040 794.970 -1
18 54.155 95.076 48.665 100.362 -1 14.120 58.049 1 400.135 799.080 -1
19 73.515 206.798 40.900 54.909 1 10.650 45.635 1 427.960 821.356 -1
20 54.595 92.785 39.035 54.829 1 7.125 29.240 1 388.375 778.656 -1
21 59.445 122.924 42.720 80.201 -1 6.770 25.162 1 418.800 829.890 -1
22 48.065 87.186 44.635 85.559 -1 20.415 111.899 1 432.670 827.644 -1
23 67.695 210.112 43.730 76.334 -1 5.050 22.180 1 423.580 819.541 -1
24 63.110 153.568 50.590 113.320 -1 12.170 76.801 1 429.130 822.740 -1
25 61.825 181.462 42.130 58.530 -1 7.590 38.211 1 400.265 788.196 -1
26 54.865 131.300 49.635 118.743 -1 8.930 49.148 1 425.455 835.117 -1
27 61.175 193.732 44.640 64.723 -1 7.830 46.940 1 416.540 833.842 -1
28 51.260 96.820 42.400 57.954 -1 14.530 93.808 1 442.715 836.251 -1
29 55.780 184.012 51.110 107.175 -1 10.895 80.185 1 443.605 853.336 -1
30 56.850 188.138 51.005 86.323 -1 10.165 44.853 1 487.470 887.364 -1
31 39.645 56.592 44.675 66.962 -1 7.535 37.571 1 407.220 793.622 -1
32 54.805 187.584 52.100 107.935 -1 8.020 56.719 1 409.035 809.620 -1
33 46.670 81.155 40.930 73.247 -1 10.935 56.621 1 409.100 827.707 -1
34 42.555 63.685 37.035 47.971 -1 10.110 57.554 1 449.255 831.573 -1
35 49.650 142.008 41.435 76.443 -1 2.415 10.846 1 463.365 848.689 -1
36 42.175 94.815 48.745 85.739 -1 14.065 107.412 1 458.950 854.459 -1
37 50.325 180.067 42.640 74.990 -1 8.585 51.533 1 440.250 828.141 -1
38 48.830 97.362 46.545 85.299 -1 4.250 15.639 1 451.650 851.897 -1
39 54.005 138.554 42.680 62.202 -1 5.700 30.381 1 485.135 883.463 -1
40 40.335 66.468 46.980 75.602 -1 10.020 50.878 1 446.300 856.528 -1
41 35.815 53.205 43.045 82.252 -1 3.790 13.968 1 455.805 858.635 -1
42 37.520 63.592 39.100 80.622 -1 15.275 123.612 1 506.525 907.526 -1
43 46.445 114.691 48.595 125.638 -1 9.695 48.977 1 477.570 877.761 -1
44 48.500 145.577 55.315 118.305 -1 5.910 22.290 1 476.375 886.260 -1
45 48.725 115.337 46.805 78.842 -1 5.085 22.909 1 466.600 877.711 -1
46 44.400 70.695 43.885 93.234 -1 6.795 31.698 1 502.450 906.193 -1
47 33.210 51.469 43.565 82.566 -1 7.980 36.514 1 468.965 883.215 -1
48 49.800 127.121 60.550 189.036 -1 2.065 8.790 1 472.620 874.147 -1
49 42.195 63.700 38.755 68.907 -1 4.550 23.560 1 443.865 819.473 -1






Figure 8-2: Mean generations to solution A=3.1 
For A=3.1 the corresponding chart and table are in  Figure 8-2 and Table 8-2. At A=3.1 a simple 
cycle is introduced. Here again WTD settles down to stable performance but it takes longer – 
landscape 20 (in contrast to 10 for the previous A value). Also, the settled G2S value is higher than 
for A=1. 
At A = 3.1, IPD separates itself from WTD.  As shown in Table 8-2, the T-Test results for IPD are 
all positive except for a single landscape - #18. Although IPD is biased towards defection, 
cooperation can emerge over repeated interactions. The fruits of limited cooperation become 





Table 8-2: A=3.1, Two Sample T-Tests (P<0.05), Mean G2S: {IPD,SHS,STK} < WTD, by Landscape Sequence # 
 
Landscape WTD MeanWTD Stdv. IPD Mean IPD Stdv.
TTest 
IPD < 
WTD SHS Mean SHS Stdv.
TTest 
SHS < 




1 634.640 753.930 198.815 358.242 1 136.905 315.152 1 206.245 314.660 1
2 906.265 919.400 237.005 283.683 1 152.055 347.956 1 539.820 783.832 1
3 669.555 865.619 179.920 343.975 1 153.360 345.446 1 512.210 804.292 1
4 494.730 689.906 243.295 430.012 1 128.800 243.500 1 665.680 926.064 -1
5 390.150 585.016 188.510 331.550 1 127.955 283.396 1 622.845 935.369 -1
6 336.685 511.467 172.520 307.199 1 137.245 312.991 1 714.145 974.085 -1
7 316.385 494.257 200.165 381.172 1 143.165 328.881 1 714.660 976.989 -1
8 333.235 473.662 194.675 359.921 1 191.235 410.370 1 782.630 1009.315 -1
9 280.735 417.607 158.660 230.399 1 111.010 195.150 1 833.985 1045.860 -1
10 287.480 436.747 195.440 348.006 1 124.605 278.760 1 851.115 1041.465 -1
11 312.550 382.584 167.085 250.802 1 126.385 253.439 1 817.960 1029.492 -1
12 245.170 328.444 168.605 309.381 1 132.865 298.523 1 881.270 1061.412 -1
13 318.970 438.738 180.805 317.272 1 125.415 312.027 1 870.005 1064.697 -1
14 261.585 394.754 198.670 338.686 1 115.880 273.901 1 859.420 1045.630 -1
15 240.635 338.770 165.185 261.520 1 93.055 200.881 1 900.260 1076.293 -1
16 298.365 408.174 189.860 333.687 1 118.965 315.876 1 892.520 1061.965 -1
17 259.615 355.368 145.315 290.919 1 121.610 300.744 1 880.500 1070.456 -1
18 257.780 313.938 216.045 395.194 -1 140.485 341.639 1 930.925 1058.405 -1
19 261.330 267.105 174.920 293.128 1 98.520 216.401 1 881.575 1089.975 -1
20 288.005 358.051 194.745 380.384 1 134.355 295.908 1 922.680 1089.942 -1
21 256.540 328.159 156.505 310.191 1 107.205 303.285 1 946.325 1095.166 -1
22 230.010 294.379 156.485 263.583 1 103.915 232.261 1 976.625 1115.042 -1
23 288.375 372.178 145.010 199.659 1 108.710 262.208 1 936.410 1117.774 -1
24 284.210 379.634 185.455 286.977 1 121.085 251.163 1 1016.125 1109.854 -1
25 229.200 307.376 173.825 300.785 1 108.525 218.248 1 988.855 1090.862 -1
26 270.995 333.403 167.200 265.443 1 149.105 375.619 1 978.450 1109.479 -1
27 260.125 337.739 161.385 344.419 1 90.695 244.261 1 976.850 1134.055 -1
28 290.840 378.233 216.130 316.582 1 149.745 386.325 1 1020.145 1113.572 -1
29 255.415 299.437 126.885 267.769 1 85.575 178.614 1 978.540 1112.065 -1
30 285.845 363.202 213.520 373.054 1 184.945 423.834 1 980.095 1110.086 -1
31 263.360 341.957 149.130 299.261 1 80.195 195.042 1 978.195 1120.450 -1
32 316.450 404.714 229.550 419.036 1 125.450 267.915 1 1030.410 1127.200 -1
33 253.415 339.655 187.690 389.285 1 127.250 344.475 1 1001.610 1137.683 -1
34 274.080 361.972 153.825 307.644 1 112.425 303.851 1 984.125 1129.468 -1
35 213.850 274.986 121.690 230.028 1 103.945 275.889 1 1087.690 1158.428 -1
36 247.105 325.090 174.490 239.626 1 94.815 199.958 1 1071.925 1144.100 -1
37 228.960 284.929 122.420 241.249 1 71.680 108.891 1 1076.190 1142.302 -1
38 250.200 276.726 164.080 278.756 1 142.800 354.376 1 1083.085 1149.561 -1
39 238.390 308.158 157.650 286.012 1 95.860 153.230 1 1050.255 1149.602 -1
40 308.155 367.380 224.705 443.522 1 166.000 436.341 1 1143.940 1147.126 -1
41 276.150 371.125 140.755 200.309 1 103.250 255.636 1 1072.080 1135.136 -1
42 307.670 413.476 222.065 418.457 1 129.280 313.803 1 1088.015 1133.865 -1
43 261.770 367.902 165.005 352.106 1 96.870 225.662 1 1055.780 1121.037 -1
44 266.070 320.002 137.500 253.560 1 95.450 169.421 1 1062.575 1152.055 -1
45 282.525 327.201 116.605 217.012 1 105.165 253.010 1 1090.665 1134.082 -1
46 306.870 405.512 179.355 336.770 1 123.585 311.118 1 1151.260 1163.228 -1
47 281.740 368.820 157.645 318.990 1 99.840 223.751 1 1081.025 1147.262 -1
48 266.390 297.291 145.355 214.023 1 116.885 284.526 1 1133.885 1134.958 -1
49 236.920 297.533 137.930 219.518 1 71.525 130.835 1 1087.180 1142.061 -1






Figure 8-3: Mean generations to solution A=3.6 
For A=3.1 the corresponding chart and table are in  Figure 8-2 and Table 8-2. At A=3.1 a simple 
cycle is introduced. Here again WTD settles down to stable performance but it takes longer – 
landscape 20 (in contrast to 10 for the previous A value). Also, the settled G2S value is higher than 
for A=1. 
At A = 3.1 when the signal becomes non-linear, IPD separates itself from WTD.  As shown in 
Table 8-2, the T-Test results for IPD are all positive except the for the 18th landscape in the 
sequence. Although IPD is biased towards defection, cooperation can emerge over repeated 





moderately complex. SHS still performs the best at A=3.1, without any caveats.  Also, all 
distribution mechanisms settle at a higher G2S as expected due to higher level of dynamic 
complexity at A=3.1 vs. A=1.0. 
The general trend, seen with A=1 and A=3.1 continues, with A=3.6 (Figure 8-3 & Table 8-3). At 
A=3.6 the change is nonlinear and thus the environmental dynamic complexity is much higher 
than with A=3.1. IPD clearly performs better than WTD but the difference seems to be a little less 
than with A=3.1. In A=3.6, IPD is not significantly better than WTD in 3 out of 50 landscapes (#31, 
#44 & #46). Whereas, with A=3.1, IPD was significantly better than WTD in all but 1 landscape. 
SHS is significantly better across the board. STK is better for the first landscape and then 
progressively its performance deteriorates. As well, due to greater environmental complexity, 






Table 8-3: A=3.6, Two Sample T-Tests (P<0.05), Mean G2S: {IPD,SHS,STK} < WTD, by Landscape Sequence # 
 
Landscape WTD MeanWTD Stdv. IPD Mean IPD Stdv.
TTest 
IPD < 
WTD SHS Mean SHS Stdv.
TTest 
SHS < 




1 678.355 806.743 226.205 443.161 1 163.535 414.050 1 252.820 408.300 1
2 703.350 781.262 272.985 420.238 1 94.875 135.917 1 616.600 857.887 -1
3 587.275 767.052 193.685 349.120 1 141.070 303.592 1 631.115 885.759 -1
4 512.735 714.996 179.980 276.945 1 139.545 277.266 1 799.085 980.432 -1
5 506.420 700.092 191.200 316.653 1 149.040 318.002 1 766.490 969.206 -1
6 416.230 567.251 204.725 367.145 1 124.205 201.621 1 843.140 1031.689 -1
7 352.415 513.681 202.275 366.366 1 170.265 352.338 1 832.755 1019.471 -1
8 303.515 432.498 185.925 318.015 1 153.735 341.717 1 811.630 1034.849 -1
9 295.675 403.588 175.635 325.565 1 158.250 378.039 1 906.250 1065.279 -1
10 302.820 440.483 194.080 347.544 1 131.720 287.249 1 899.990 1070.563 -1
11 254.050 359.478 173.585 295.989 1 129.085 299.050 1 863.675 1071.202 -1
12 311.440 418.643 175.825 241.652 1 138.790 215.337 1 966.600 1089.462 -1
13 291.435 421.853 155.245 262.907 1 128.940 283.490 1 899.915 1063.163 -1
14 284.130 399.136 160.580 257.073 1 118.770 235.150 1 958.110 1078.424 -1
15 296.345 398.085 170.640 300.263 1 130.595 359.534 1 913.245 1091.829 -1
16 285.925 370.783 220.230 358.542 1 113.245 280.344 1 1001.805 1095.050 -1
17 264.370 357.814 142.815 199.473 1 115.165 278.183 1 982.515 1105.724 -1
18 315.440 459.060 204.245 352.107 1 133.645 285.919 1 1008.450 1100.266 -1
19 303.905 390.982 197.725 341.859 1 110.270 206.846 1 1022.515 1100.841 -1
20 309.225 377.867 201.330 295.030 1 150.195 329.300 1 1020.780 1110.377 -1
21 283.635 384.917 127.525 179.687 1 122.810 299.968 1 1005.320 1110.695 -1
22 282.675 360.463 149.510 207.418 1 116.670 238.737 1 1052.775 1112.949 -1
23 267.210 326.100 141.190 291.094 1 109.745 262.474 1 1109.990 1145.379 -1
24 225.360 285.573 158.550 237.865 1 107.630 252.929 1 1001.910 1131.247 -1
25 285.830 375.117 179.035 306.953 1 119.315 229.931 1 1040.365 1135.070 -1
26 259.550 307.056 190.360 341.653 1 123.645 306.516 1 1124.675 1142.822 -1
27 249.730 329.600 184.705 308.088 1 137.030 321.605 1 1062.240 1133.042 -1
28 310.700 430.214 154.845 177.569 1 158.740 351.032 1 1135.610 1134.730 -1
29 284.815 359.878 170.175 295.158 1 117.895 259.020 1 1162.385 1159.136 -1
30 268.275 334.069 187.245 338.320 1 126.335 279.549 1 1149.165 1148.168 -1
31 231.540 293.565 182.805 300.537 -1 114.995 271.305 1 1124.195 1148.748 -1
32 271.400 343.463 180.565 336.429 1 100.270 257.214 1 1160.180 1148.057 -1
33 324.445 355.557 140.840 248.271 1 93.585 244.944 1 1086.490 1134.842 -1
34 270.765 383.771 194.760 297.568 1 124.620 343.534 1 1174.625 1158.750 -1
35 307.525 385.738 184.925 324.526 1 86.495 145.250 1 1148.200 1146.618 -1
36 261.755 356.352 170.130 286.679 1 110.450 290.062 1 1156.165 1154.519 -1
37 294.745 399.426 142.475 258.205 1 97.725 254.225 1 1202.240 1162.205 -1
38 311.000 404.321 143.375 228.957 1 109.140 170.767 1 1159.020 1159.761 -1
39 289.030 390.274 178.905 376.293 1 98.230 232.736 1 1213.340 1173.599 -1
40 265.245 364.760 185.985 286.676 1 101.380 235.880 1 1154.605 1148.657 -1
41 216.425 279.654 135.590 211.719 1 124.835 389.038 1 1116.180 1136.277 -1
42 295.485 390.751 181.745 322.566 1 94.755 218.543 1 1242.485 1150.237 -1
43 292.635 355.951 144.755 242.122 1 96.305 202.990 1 1138.920 1149.368 -1
44 270.245 330.704 219.555 389.882 -1 158.765 346.930 1 1159.085 1142.769 -1
45 287.020 372.742 134.385 174.694 1 94.205 213.422 1 1153.400 1152.112 -1
46 262.460 317.709 215.275 417.042 -1 132.375 258.831 1 1166.145 1156.556 -1
47 270.810 366.029 152.710 238.173 1 119.710 287.569 1 1182.225 1159.406 -1
48 347.495 474.985 206.270 374.717 1 118.890 259.253 1 1211.020 1156.954 -1
49 245.190 292.021 130.855 253.260 1 101.625 183.823 1 1187.960 1163.997 -1







Figure 8-4: Mean generations to solution =3.9 
At A = 3.9 the environment’s dynamic complexity is on the edge of chaos. The trends 
established with lower values of A continue with A=3.9 (Figure 8-4., Table 8-4). Statistical tests in 
Table 8-4 show that IPD mostly performs better than WTD at A=3.9. STK performs statistically 
better than WTD very early on then its performance progressively worsens. SHS consistently 





Table 8-4: A=3.9, Two Sample T-Tests (P<0.05), Mean G2S: {IPD,SHS,STK} < WTD, by Landscape Sequence # 
 
Landscape WTD MeanWTD Stdv. IPD Mean IPD Stdv.
TTest 
IPD < 
WTD SHS Mean SHS Stdv.
TTest 
SHS < 




1 658.125 738.335 232.470 469.185 1 172.670 395.331 1 264.490 457.034 1
2 778.990 852.226 164.525 224.830 1 123.285 280.323 1 541.000 809.937 1
3 622.170 750.684 152.090 202.376 1 111.360 200.598 1 641.685 882.553 -1
4 495.915 685.381 198.140 365.820 1 207.895 480.219 1 715.150 942.862 -1
5 478.155 661.925 176.405 279.389 1 105.860 233.076 1 714.845 955.912 -1
6 429.610 612.780 205.630 363.744 1 115.675 244.865 1 738.905 982.533 -1
7 360.280 478.720 153.150 221.530 1 99.090 145.590 1 729.710 979.655 -1
8 393.185 574.334 146.210 229.752 1 139.885 360.769 1 817.100 1022.064 -1
9 345.265 512.110 198.655 378.997 1 94.750 183.120 1 803.995 1046.507 -1
10 319.010 431.579 142.550 268.464 1 109.780 273.393 1 837.310 1052.451 -1
11 278.080 415.575 133.185 181.987 1 127.500 303.290 1 809.780 1031.316 -1
12 269.840 384.726 236.990 379.933 -1 185.945 423.787 1 892.145 1056.615 -1
13 263.475 314.551 151.560 221.917 1 115.795 260.736 1 803.750 1036.633 -1
14 268.400 372.968 214.550 396.312 -1 143.785 378.652 1 888.950 1078.127 -1
15 302.710 410.775 161.150 310.784 1 140.335 378.433 1 873.145 1053.503 -1
16 287.490 353.976 170.605 322.213 1 114.315 262.136 1 876.180 1064.710 -1
17 239.310 356.938 215.390 424.734 -1 147.170 349.422 1 932.710 1071.828 -1
18 276.985 352.255 170.040 309.080 1 83.860 127.849 1 890.005 1067.872 -1
19 264.955 337.042 143.350 209.021 1 97.005 213.145 1 962.115 1096.631 -1
20 247.170 285.171 167.810 274.940 1 111.780 237.390 1 934.825 1084.664 -1
21 274.505 366.359 201.155 428.644 1 91.120 260.109 1 888.800 1092.058 -1
22 238.035 301.154 153.995 271.352 1 111.480 282.977 1 948.195 1094.160 -1
23 278.875 338.613 156.360 241.431 1 117.555 230.563 1 906.185 1077.485 -1
24 260.810 344.514 111.085 214.082 1 104.805 284.772 1 929.700 1088.808 -1
25 276.235 341.515 132.690 223.165 1 69.845 112.674 1 941.165 1091.861 -1
26 295.100 372.720 157.620 281.807 1 97.385 182.604 1 983.525 1110.013 -1
27 276.600 381.810 134.570 180.922 1 108.955 294.696 1 979.830 1099.626 -1
28 306.950 379.238 166.965 274.936 1 89.615 202.504 1 977.950 1113.934 -1
29 284.425 353.618 141.015 226.911 1 89.280 138.102 1 1060.655 1130.608 -1
30 302.830 385.269 131.905 235.492 1 120.450 277.559 1 1021.735 1119.163 -1
31 254.365 328.916 118.810 166.633 1 71.730 161.467 1 1040.530 1144.690 -1
32 287.945 335.622 178.445 306.456 1 111.310 263.640 1 1061.255 1106.323 -1
33 287.270 420.029 156.395 320.850 1 106.940 170.897 1 1045.715 1136.995 -1
34 260.505 339.803 160.980 297.446 1 100.945 247.726 1 1065.185 1136.721 -1
35 348.905 489.428 150.080 295.892 1 90.230 230.574 1 1072.615 1147.182 -1
36 290.055 373.703 161.900 237.958 1 113.165 262.112 1 1041.025 1145.788 -1
37 244.125 264.003 149.480 315.497 1 65.775 91.103 1 1079.160 1145.213 -1
38 245.295 342.091 171.650 267.471 1 101.475 254.092 1 1098.910 1142.119 -1
39 259.855 315.545 134.090 188.440 1 100.305 251.171 1 1078.815 1150.752 -1
40 288.695 374.682 159.515 253.543 1 103.190 265.159 1 1088.695 1135.440 -1
41 319.800 466.599 153.255 321.555 1 129.180 330.752 1 1058.355 1155.785 -1
42 277.655 347.013 137.935 184.991 1 108.430 296.037 1 1133.150 1154.890 -1
43 288.045 440.326 141.895 223.071 1 89.155 232.627 1 1118.665 1144.351 -1
44 253.755 310.214 138.020 226.154 1 113.710 325.007 1 1132.665 1141.417 -1
45 276.335 345.992 179.095 321.316 1 124.640 313.564 1 1117.275 1139.332 -1
46 282.660 351.702 205.875 380.063 1 107.465 252.657 1 1127.210 1133.731 -1
47 248.065 317.842 125.925 186.678 1 101.925 288.568 1 1151.380 1158.025 -1
48 293.170 386.899 149.055 251.481 1 94.430 244.561 1 1130.625 1152.795 -1
49 274.050 292.353 130.600 192.523 1 78.605 91.004 1 1139.400 1150.857 -1





In summary, game-based distribution mechanisms that encompass cooperation, generally 
perform better than WTD – the purely competitive mechanism – however, the game-based 
mechanisms don’t get a blanket pass. STK cannot seem to be able to track changes well in a 
dynamic environment, even if its initial performance is always better than WTD. The WTD 
mechanism takes some time to learn to respond to environmental changes. Its initial performance 
is quite off the mark but it settles down into a steady rhythm in later stages. However, from the 
observed data the best mechanism SHS is statistically better than WTD in almost all cases. SHS 
finds the solution in about 100 less generations than WTD does, for A>=3.1.  Subsequent sections 
in this chapter analyze the properties of the distribution mechanisms from different perspectives 
to try to develop insights into the observed performance characteristics. 
8.2 Social Stress / Diffusion Analysis 
In section 8.1, the focus was on performance characteristics of the distribution mechanisms 
which are analyzed qualitatively and with statistical rigor. The rest of the sections are focused on 
the emergent properties manifested by the distribution mechanisms, reflecting their inner 
workings in some way. Qualitative & quantitative analysis and a variety of visualization techniques 
are leveraged to try to derive useful insights in these mechanisms. 
The charts presented in Figure 8-5, Figure 8-6, Figure 8-7, and Figure 8-8 are Diffusion trends 
for A = 1, 3.1, 3.6 and 3.9, respectively. Each chart contrasts the values of Diffusion for each 
distribution mechanism, over the landscape sequence. From the charts, it is clear that each 
mechanism operates within a set range. STK has the lowest diffusion, followed by WTD, SHS and 
then IPD. These patterns persist for all tested A values. Statistical tests for the difference in means 





charts. The mean value of WTD for each A and each landscape in the sequence is statistically 
different from the corresponding means of the other mechanisms, for almost all landscapes. Some 
exceptions are seen for the first few landscapes in each sequence. While statistical tests are not 
performed for the pairwise difference between two mechanisms, for all possible pairs, the sample 
size is large enough at 200 to impart confidence in the mean values. This is because the standard 
deviations are fairly low compared to the means, in the tables presented in Appendix II. 
 






Figure 8-6: Diffusion A=3.1 
 






Figure 8-8: Diffusion A=3.9 
One can infer a weak relationship between Diffusion and performance characteristics of the 
distribution mechanisms. STK seems to stress its population individuals the least and it also 
performs the worst in terms of G2S as discussed in the previous section. The better performing 
mechanisms IPD and SHS place the highest stress on individuals. However, there may be an 
optimal level of stress as IPD places greater stress than SHS but still performs worse in terms of 
G2S than SHS. 
The charts in Figure 8-9, Figure 8-10, Figure 8-11 and Figure 8-12 are Diffusion values grouped 
by distribution mechanism to allow comparison of Diffusion for the same mechanism at different 
A. Diffusion is not appreciably different for the different A values for the same mechanism. For 
each mechanism, two-sample t-tests in general are not significant for the difference in means 





(Figure 8-9). Here the Diffusion for A = 1 is statistically than for A=3.1 for 18 out of 50 landscapes 
(see Appendix III.V). Another observation is that for WTD the Diffusion starts low and settles to a 
steady level at about landscape 10. This corresponds to the initial learning by WTD as seen in the 
G2S charts presented in the previous section. 
 






Figure 8-10: IPD diffusion by complexity 
 






Figure 8-12: Stackelberg diffusion by complexity 
For SHS, there is a marked cycle in the Diffusion values over the landscapes. The cycle 
corresponds to the existence of cooperative and evaluative generations in the SHS mechanism’s 
repertoire (see 6.2).  
Diffusion for STK is not only the lowest among all tested distribution mechanisms, there is also 
a slight downtrend in Diffusion across all A. Otherwise, there is no appreciable difference between 
Diffusion for the different A values. 
To summarize, the Diffusion values for the game mechanisms are statistically different from 
those for WTD (with minor exceptions – see Appendix II). For each mechanism, Diffusion is not 
statistically different between successive A changes (for almost all landscapes). The exception is 
for WTD for A=1→A-3.1 (linear to non-linear transition) where statistical difference exists for 





results show that each mechanism places a different level of stress but that level does not vary 
much by changes in environmental complexity. 
8.3 Segregation Analysis 
Diffusion is a measure of the spatial diversity of a node’s neighbors. In contrast Segregation 
Index (also referred to as segregation in this document) is a measure of clustering or grouping of 
Knowledge Sources among neighbors (7.4).  The next four charts – Figure 8-13, Figure 8-14, Figure 
8-15 and Figure 8-16 – show segregation by the tested A values, allowing one to compare the 
distribution mechanisms together for each A. Statistical testing shows that the segregation values 
for the  game mechanisms are statistically different from WTD’s for the majority of the landscapes, 
across the tested A values (Appendix III).  
The general pattern followed by the distribution mechanisms for each A value is about the 
same for segregation. On average, WTD shows the lowest segregation. STK shows a steady 
increase from very low segregation to high of about 0.8 (range is 0.0-2.0, Table 7-1). SHS reaches 
highest segregation levels and shows a pronounced cycle due to periodicity of cooperative and 
evaluative distributions (section 6.2). The SHS peaks correspond to evaluative generations when 
some individuals may defect to keep their current knowledge assignments causing higher 
segregation. In cooperative generations the knowledge assignments are more varied due to the 
‘social rank’ based allocation, leading to comparatively lower segregation. IPD shows steady 
segregation around 0.7 with a slight upward trend for A > 1.0. WTD is purely competitive and gives 
a rather flat line across all A values. In contrast, the cooperative mechanisms show higher 
segregation. Although not evident here, the analysis of social dynamics presented in the next 





segregation shown by the game mechanisms is due the aforementioned biases as these result in 
preponderance of certain types of KS over others. 
 






Figure 8-14: Segregation A=3.1 
 






Figure 8-16: Segregation A=3.9 
Given that the range is between 0.0 and 2.0 for Segregation, at the aggregate level (i.e. 
averaged over 200 samples) Segregation stays below 0.9 for all distribution mechanisms. This 
shows that all mechanisms maintain a healthy diversity of knowledge in local neighborhoods. 
Segregation close to 0.0 means all Knowledge Sources are evenly distributed in the population. 
Whereas a value close to 2.0 means that only one or two Knowledge Sources cover the entire 
population. 
The fact that SHS performs the best in terms of G2S, implies that a segregation level towards 
0.8 may be ideal. In addition, however, maintaining a steady level of segregation may not be best 
as WTD does that and still does not perform as well (in terms of G2S) as IPD or SHS. It may well be 





The next set of charts are organized by distribution mechanism. Segregation trend for each 
distribution mechanism by A shows each mechanism’s response to A in terms of the level of 
segregation. Also provided for each distribution mechanism are representative samples of 
population snapshots of low and high segregation, by A. These are provided for qualitative 
assessment and to show some examples of the mechanisms at work. The snapshots are randomly 
selected from population sets that are +/- 1 standard deviations away from the mean segregation 
of the mechanism.  
As a baseline, WTD (Figure 8-17) shows a steady level of segregation around 0.65 that does not 
seem to vary much as A increases. Statistical testing for the difference in segregation levels 
between successive A values (e.g. A=1 → A=3.1, etc.) shows that for almost all landscapes there 
is no statistical difference. WTD’s low segregation and unresponsiveness to A is likely because the 
Knowledge Sources that have been driven out by the voting mechanism are added back in to 20% 
of the population, at random (section 7.4). Samples of population snapshots showing low and high 






Figure 8-17: WTD segregation by complexity and landscape sequence 
 






Figure 8-19: WTD low segregation landscape examples 
Figure 8-20 show the Segregation Index trends as A increases for IPD. Unlike WTD, here there 
is a clear separation between segregation at A = 1 and A > 1. It shows that IPD is responsive when 
environmental complexity changes from linear (A=1) to non-linear (A =3.1).  This difference is 
statistically significant (see Appendix III.e) for almost all landscapes. Changes in segregation levels 
for other transitions (i.e. A=3.1→3.6; A=3.6→3.9) are not statically significant (by landscape) 
except for a few landscapes (Appendix III.e). Also, for non-linear environmental complexity IPD 
shows a slight positive slope in the trend lines. 
High and low segregation snapshots given in Figure 8-21 and Figure 8-22, respective, show a 
dominance of Topographic knowledge. By contrast, equivalent figures for WTD (Figure 8-18, 





on the context (like stem cells in Biology). These show that IPD allocates more resources to 
exploration because Topographic is an explorative Knowledge Source. 
 






Figure 8-21: IPD high segregation landscape examples 
 





Segregation trends for SHS (Figure 8-23) shows that segregation levels for all A values is are 
close. Statistical testing showed no difference for segregation levels between successive A, per 
landscape, except for a few landscapes. High and low Segregation snapshot examples (Figure 8-24, 
Figure 8-25) show dominance of Topographic and Domain knowledge in the population. This 
shows neutral to exploratory bias for SHS resource allocation. 
 






Figure 8-24: Stag-Hunt high segregation landscape examples 
 





STK (Figure 8-26) starts with very low Segregation Index at 0.45 and then steadily rises to 0.8.  
Segregation is seen as plateauing at 0.8 as the slopes of the trend lines are flatting out towards 
the end of the landscape sequence. This is no discernable difference in segregation levels by 
landscape for the different A values. Statistical testing also validates this visual assessment. For 
STK no landscapes were found where segregation is significantly different between successive A 
values. This shows that STK is not responsive to changes in environmental complexity. From the 
population snapshots (Figure 8-27, Figure 8-28) for STK, it can be seen that STK  is allocating much 
resources to exploitation in high segregation cases as compared to WTD (Figure 8-18). 
 













Figure 8-28: Stackelberg low segregation landscape examples 
Thus far the analysis was focused on Segregation Index trends by landscape sequence. It was 
found that cooperative mechanisms have higher segregation in general on a per landscape basis. 
Also, in general, except for the IPD A=1 → 3.1 case, none of the mechanisms show statistically 
significant changes in segregation levels for successive A transitions, on a per landscape basis. The 
trend lines still provide useful insights such as the cyclic nature of segregation in SHS (Figure 8-23), 
flat and low segregation for WTD (Figure 8-17) and the increase in segregation levels by landscape 
for STK (Figure 8-26). 
Now the analysis is focused on overall segregation by KD-A ignoring the landscape sequence, 
i.e. the aggregate segregation levels for each KD-A combination. The sample size for each mean 
value (segregation by KD-A) is very large. Each mean is based on close to a billion data points 





in sequence = 200 * 36 * 2500 * 50 = 900M). And therefore, difference between any two mean 
values is statistically significant. The mean segregation values are shown in Table 8-5 and t-tests 
for significance between successive A for each KD in Table 8-6. Figure 8-29 shows average 
segregation with +/- 1 standard deviation bands for each KD-A combination. 
Table 8-5: Average Segregation by KD and A 
KD A Mean Std. Deviation 
WTD 3.9 0.63804 0.136789738 
WTD 3.6 0.637074 0.136375862 
WTD 3.1 0.637499 0.136509734 
WTD 1 0.635276 0.135036359 
STK 3.9 0.698276 0.161027065 
STK 3.6 0.703175 0.158131383 
STK 3.1 0.707844 0.157221999 
STK 1 0.706842 0.157270233 
SHS 3.9 0.727804 0.155380488 
SHS 3.6 0.71921 0.154454508 
SHS 3.1 0.719512 0.154879267 
SHS 1 0.702398 0.150377916 
IPD 3.9 0.740624 0.131153711 
IPD 3.6 0.726136 0.131002041 
IPD 3.1 0.731641 0.132611557 
IPD 1 0.676802 0.127004235 
 
Table 8-6: T-Tests for Difference in Segregation between Successive A values by KD 
KD From A To A p value, t-test for 
difference in means 
WTD 1 3.1 0.000 
WTD 3.1 3.6 0.002 
WTD 3.6 3.9 0.000 
STK 1 3.1 0.000 
STK 3.1 3.6 0.000 
STK 3.6 3.9 0.000 
SHS 1 3.1 0.000 





SHS 3.6 3.9 0.000 
IPD 1 3.1 0.000 
IPD 3.1 3.6 0.000 
IPD 3.6 3.9 0.000 
 
 
Figure 8-29: Schelling index summary for each KD and A value combination 
Due to the large sample size, all means are close to true means and any differences are 
significant statistically. As per Table 8-5 all mechanisms show a slight decrease in segregation for 
the transition A=3.1 to A=3.6. The is likely due to the underlying harmonics of the data generating 
process. Since segregation is an emergent property the exact reason for this anomaly cannot be 





WTD shows a very slight but overall positive increase in segregation levels as A increases. As do 
IPD and SHS. IPD shows the most difference, followed by SHS. STK on the other hand shows an 
overall negative relationship with A. The data shows that better performing mechanisms (in terms 
of G2S) are responsive to changes in A by increasing segregation levels in the population for the 
distribution of knowledge. In contrast, the worst performer STK decreases segregation in response 
to increase in environmental complexity. However, the aggregate level data masks other useful 
features such as the modulation in segregation levels by the best performing mechanism SHS, 
which is apparent in the landscape-sequence view of the data. One can surmise that under 
conditions of stress (high environmental complexity), increased segregation is the valid response. 
This is borne out by the analysis performed in the next section. 
8.4 Communal Knowledge Flow Analysis 
In this section the focus is on the dynamics of knowledge flow, as outlined in section 7.5. This 
section starts with the chord diagrams for the weighted graphs representing community-to-
community transitions. Then Page Rank based charts are presented – tree and parallel chords 
charts by A. After that are presented Sankey charts that show statistically significant changes or 
deltas in knowledge flow due to A. Finally, a summary of view of knowledge flow deltas captures 
useful insights relating knowledge flow to performance characteristics. 
Note that the analysis presented here has a natural progression; data underlying chord 
diagrams represents raw transition counts. For Page Rank and community rank this data is 
normalized to a Markov Chain. For the Sanky charts, the raw count data is converted to mean and 






For the chord diagrams, the transition weights are the count of transitions across all 200 
samples with 50 landscapes each. The total number of transitions for a KD-A combination is in the 
order 1 billion: 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 200 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 ∗ 50 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑠 ∗ 2500 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗ 36  𝑝𝑜𝑝. ≅
1𝐵. Note that an individual may be part of several communities at the same time (Figure 7-10). 
The transitions are counted from community-to-community. So multiple transitions may be 
generated from one individual depending on the before and after communities the individual is 
part of. To make the charts more readable, only links with transition weights over 100K are shown. 
The labeling scheme described in section 7.5 is used but as an example, ‘D_T’ is a community 
composed of Domain and Topographic Knowledge Sources. The WTD chord diagrams for 
community-to-community transitions are shown in Figure 8 30, Figure 8 31, Figure 8 32, and Figure 
8 33. Each chart is for a specific A value. The charts are in order of decreasing community 
importance, in a counter-clockwise arrangement. For WTD, the strongest community is ‘D’ (for 








Figure 8-30: WTD A=1 communal knowledge flow graph 
All the charts for WTD show more-or-less the same pattern of community dominance. The ‘D’ 
community has a large self-loop that indicates that individuals tend to retain ‘D’ across 
generations. The self-loops of the other major communities (‘D_T’, ‘D_N’, ‘D_H’, etc.) are much 
smaller that tells that individuals in these tend to switch to other communities in the next 
generation, relatively speaking. The top 5 transitions (arcs) all involve Domain knowledge, ‘D’. This 
indicates that WTD allocates considerable resources to Domain. Domain is placed in the middle of 
the exploratory-exploitative scale and can function on both sides of the divide. However, excessive 






Figure 8-31: WTD A=3.1 communal knowledge flow graph 
 






Figure 8-33: WTD A=3.9 communal knowledge flow graph 
The chord diagrams for IPD are in Figure 8-34, Figure 8-35, Figure 8-36 and Figure 8-37. Here 
the dominant communities are ‘T’ (Topographic) and ‘D_T’. Both have large self-loops and are also 
strongly inter-connected. The next one down is ‘D’ by itself. It is strongly connected to the other 
two as well. IPD allocates relatively more resources to Topographic and Domain knowledge with 
a bias towards Topographic. 
Unlike, WTD, IPD shows some sensitivity to A as the community ordering changes from A=1.0 
to A=3.1. The change is detectable towards the tail end of the chord diagram. From A=3.1 and 
onward there is no change in ordering.  
Note that the chord diagrams are drawn using Microsoft PowerBI tool. The color scheme is 
based on the counter-clockwise order of the labels (communities). Charts with the same pattern 





charts. The color scheme is a quick way of assessing if two charts have the same order of 
community dominance. 
 






Figure 8-35: IPD A=3.1 communal knowledge flow graph 
 






Figure 8-37: IPD A=3.6 communal knowledge flow graph 
For SHS, the community-to-community transition charts are given in Figure 8-38, Figure 8-39, 
Figure 8-40 and  Figure 8-41, for the different A values. The charts show a clear dominance Domain 
knowledge paired with Topographic Figure 8-41(‘D_T’).    Unlike for WTD and IPD, where a single 
letter community is dominant (‘D’ for WTD and ‘T’ for IPD), a paired community is dominant for 
SHS.  
As with IPD, SHS also shows strong inter-connections between ‘D_T’, ‘T’ and ‘D’ communities. 
However, the self-loops are slightly smaller for SHS than IPD, means that there are more 
transitions between communities there. Also, for SHS the links from the top 3 communities to the 
next level down – ‘D_N_T’ - are also stronger when compared with IPD. These facts indicate that 





regional exploration (Topographic) and local exploration (Domain). Considering the ‘social rank’ 
based knowledge distribution for SHS (section 6.2), the indication is that individuals are moved 
over long distances in the search space under Topographic influence and then (if they are 
performing relatively well) explore the local landscape under the Domain influence to find the 
local peak. This seems to suggest that SHS is balancing exploration and exploitation well. 
 






Figure 8-39: Stag-Hunt A=3.1 communal knowledge flow graph 
 






Figure 8-41: Stag-Hunt A=3.9 communal knowledge flow graph 
 





The STK chord diagrams (Figure 8-42, Figure 8-43, Figure 8-44, Figure 8-45) visually are very 
distinct from those for WTD, IPD and SHS. Situational is now the dominant knowledge but another 
exploitative knowledge, History, is also ranked high. The diagrams show that STK allocates 
relatively more resources to exploitation when compared with WTD, IPD and SHS, respectively. 
Like WTD and SHS, STK also does not show any differentiation with respect to A values, in the 
chord diagrams.  
Another aspect for STK is that the allocation of resources is more or less evenly divided between 
the top communities – ‘S’, ‘N’, ‘H’, ‘T’ and ‘D’. The allocation among the top communities of other 
distribution mechanisms is more varied. For STK, the self-loops and the arcs between communities 
are relatively even. This indicates that rates of transitions between top communities are quite 
balanced. 
While the STK chord charts indicate a more even allocation between Knowledge Sources (with 
slight priority for exploitation), this does not translate to better performance in terms of 
generations-to-solution. A plausible explanation is that under STK, knowledge distribution is 
structured like in a centrally planned system. Thus, the allocation of resources is not based on local 
needs and as a result the whole system is relatively inefficient when interacting with a dynamic 
environment. IPD and SHS by contrast make adjustments by utilizing local knowledge and are 






Figure 8-43: Stackelberg A=3.1 communal knowledge flow graph 
 






Figure 8-45: Stackelberg 3.9 communal knowledge flow graph 
The chord diagrams provide a good sense of community dominance and interaction among 
communities (arc links). Page Rank, however, provides a more robust answer to community 
importance questions. The iterative Page Rank algorithm settles the weight or importance of each 
community with convergence and so is more definitive in this regard. Page Rank determined 
community weights can be visualized as tree charts – that depict relative mass – and as parallel 
chord charts – that, combined with A values, provide a clear view of the changes in community 
rank by A. Chord charts capture the dynamics more explicitly; by contrast, Page Rank output is a 
static view that implicitly incorporates dynamics. 
As explained in section 7.5, the data for Page Rank is derived from the data used by the chord 
charts. The chord charts are based on raw transition counts. These are normalized such that the 





Also as noted earlier (section 7.5) Red hues in the tree charts indicate relatively exploratory 
communities and Green relatively exploitative. The boxes in a tree chart are ordered by weight, 
left to right. 
Comparing the chord charts with Page Rank derived charts, it is evident that Page Rank is a 
more sensitive mechanism for ranking communities. As an example, consider the chord charts for 
WTD (Figure 8-30, Figure 8-31, Figure 8-32, Figure 8-33) with the corresponding tree charts in 
Figure 8-46 and parallel chord chart in Figure 8-47. The Page Rank based charts capture 
community rank changes that are not evident in the chord charts. The parallel chord chart shows 
the changes in rank only without considering the relative weight or importance of each community 
– which is captured by the tree chart. Combined, the two charts provide a useful view of the inner 
workings of distribution mechanisms in terms of allocation of compute resources and sensitivity 
to A. 
For WTD, the tree charts in Figure 8-46, show a strong dominance of Domain (‘D’) knowledge. 
Almost 25% of the mass is allocated to ‘D’ alone.  Combined with Normative and Topographic, 
Domain occupies almost 45%-50% of the total allocation.  The color hues show that WTD allocates 







Figure 8-46: WTD Page-Rank determined community importance by A value 
Some A-driven community rank changes are discernable in WTD tree charts (Figure 8-46) but 
these are progressively harder to spot moving from left to right. The parallel chord diagram in 
Figure 8-47 shows all changes clearly.  
WTD shows considerable sensitivity in terms of community rank changes between A=1 and 
A=3.1 i.e. transition from linear to non-linear phase. It is relatively inert between A=3.1 and A=3.6 
(non-linear → highly-non-linear). And then shows sensitivity between A=3.6 and A=3.9 (highly 
non-linear → chaotic) but less than that for the linear → non-linear transition. Since all A value 
changes are accompanied by community rank changes, it is surmised that WTD is a mechanism 
that is responsive to changes in environmental complexity. Note that even low-weight community 






Figure 8-47: WTD changes in community rank by A value 
IPD and Stag-Hunt are related since Stag-Hunt is an evolutionary game theory variant of IPD 
that is from classical game theory. Also, both use ‘social rank’ as a mechanism to distribute 
knowledge. IPD is biased toward competitive behavior where Stag-Hunt is more cooperative inf 






Figure 8-48: IPD Page-Rank determined community importance by A value 
 





The tree charts for IPD and SHS are in Figure 8-48 and Figure 8-49, respectively; the parallel 
chords charts are in Figure 8-50 and Figure 8-51. Domain and Topographic knowledge are 
dominant in both, with IPD allocating slightly more to Topographic. As noted earlier, SHS provides 
more mixing of knowledge due to having smaller self-loops than IPD, noticeable in the 












Figure 8-51: Stag-Hunt changes in community rank by A value 
When compared with WTD (Figure 8-46), both IPD (Figure 8-48) and SHS (Figure 8-49) allocate 
more resources to exploration. IPD and SHS show 60%-70% allocation to exploratory communities 





From the community rank perspective, IPD shows greater sensitivity to increases in A  (Figure 
8-50) than SHS (Figure 8-51). SHS shows changes in community rank for A=1 to A=3.1 (linear → 
non-linear) transition but thereafter it is not responsive; no rank changes are present for other A 
transitions. How can it be that SHS performs well in terms of generations-to-solution but is 
relatively inert to A? The answer is that rank changes are but one view into responsiveness to A. 
Another method of gauging responsiveness is through Sankey chart analysis, which is discussed 
later in this section. SHS is sensitive to A but not enough to affect community rankings at higher 
levels of A. 
For both IPD and SHS, the ranks of the top communities remain stable as A increases (Figure 
8-50, Figure 8-50). This indicates that IPD and SHS have found stable allocations for top 
communities that work well for the tested levels of environmental dynamic complexity. 
 





As seen earlier, STK (Figure 8-52) knowledge allocations are quite different from the rest. Here 
the single letter communities are dominant and the allocations are relatively even between them. 
The changes in community ranking due to A are quite discernable even with the tree chart view.  
By contrast to WTD, IPD and SHS, STK allocates more resources to exploitation. The tree chart 
(Figure 8-52) for STK shows a roughly even split between explorative and exploitative 







Figure 8-53: Stackelberg changes in community rank by A-value 
The parallel chord chart (Figure 8-53) shows that STK is very sensitive to A as is evident by the 
significant number of rank changes across the board. While STK seems to be responsive to 
environmental dynamic complexity, its diminutive generations-to-solutions performance 





and SHS mechanisms show stable ranks, at least for the top communities. It can thus be concluded 
that STK is overly responsive and is not able to find a stable footing to tackle dynamic 
environments.  
Community rank order changes is one gauge of responsiveness to A increases. However, as was 
discovered for SHS, it is not a sensitive enough gauge. SHS seems inert to A at higher levels – as 
per the parallel chords diagram for SHS (Figure 8-51). SHS performs the best in terms generations-
to-solution and hence a more sensitive mechanism to track responsiveness is required. Going back 
to the raw transition counts collected for the chord diagrams, the counts are transformed in the 
following ways (see section 7.5 for details): 
• The transitions counts are grouped into Explorative, Neutral and Exploitative ‘categories’ 
(for each A-KD combination) using the explorative index for each community (see Listing 
7-1). Three categories are easier to reason with than 32 communities, for sensitivity 
analysis 
• Sample mean and standard deviation (over the 200 samples per A-KD combination) are 
calculated to enable statistical significance testing. For each A-KD combination there are 9 
means (and associated standard deviations) as follows: 
o Explorative → Explorative 
▪ I.e. count of transitions from Explorative communities back to Explorative 
communities in the next generation 
o Explorative → Neutral 





o Neutral → Neutral 
o Neutral → Explorative. 
o … 
• Statistically significant deltas or change in transition counts are calculated with respect to 
each A increment  
o Consider the transition Explorative→Neutral, for A=1 → A=3.1  
o Are the means for Explorative→Neutral transition significantly different from 
under A=1 and A=3.1? 
o This is answerable by performing a two-sample t-test (for the difference in means) 
o For each A step (e.g. A=1 → A=3.1; A=3.1 → A=3.6; …) measure the changes in 
transition counts for each of the 9 transitions where the change is statistically 
significant 
• The above transformations yield a series of weighted graphs – one for each A increment 
o The nodes are categories: Explorative, Neutral Exploitative 
o The arcs represent changes in transition counts (or net change in flow) 
o Each arc weight is the actual difference in counts for adjacent A values, if the 
change was statistically significant, otherwise its zero 
The 3 graphs for the 3 increments (1 → 3.1; 3.1 → 3.6; 3.6 → 3.9) can be viewed in a single 
Sankey chart as some of the nodes are shared between the graphs. For example, the “Explorative 





are flattened out. Because the graphs share some nodes, they can be compactly viewed in the 
same chart. 
The Sankey charts, constructed as described above, are shown in Figure 8-54, Figure 8-55, 
Figure 8-56 & Figure 8-57 for WTD, IPD, SHS & STK, respectively. These are all considered together 
as they are useful gauges for comparing responsiveness to A changes, for the tested distribution 
mechanisms. Statistically significant changes to increased entropy are represented by colored 
arcs. Red arcs represent decrease in transition counts and Green increase. For not statistically 
significant changes the corresponding arcs are drawn as thin Black lines. The magnitude of the 
change (either positive or negative) is represented by an arc’s thickness.  
 







Figure 8-55: IPD - changes in explorative-exploitative balance due to complexity changes 
 






Figure 8-57: Stackelberg - changes in explorative-exploitative balance due to complexity changes 
The title of each chart shows the total number of statistically significant changes made as A 
increases. Each Sankey chart is the profile of responsiveness to A for the corresponding 
distribution mechanism. The charts show that all tested mechanisms are responsive to changes in 
environment dynamic complexity. Somewhat surprisingly WTD is the most responsive with 23 
statistically significant changes followed by STK (22), SHS (20) and IPD (15).  Sankey chart for SHS 
(Figure 8-56) shows that SHS is responsive to all A increments; this is not picked up by community 
rank changes in Figure 8-51. 
There is a responsiveness story embedded in the deltas of the knowledge flows as depicted by 
the Sankey charts but it’s hard to extract that as such. One reason is that the charts are not 
comparable with each other as each chart is scaled relative to itself. Squeezing the information 





The Sankey charts show changes in transition rates with respect to A increments, between all 
combinations of the 3 categories (Explorative, Neutral, Exploitative). Projecting the net changes 
(in and out) for each category onto a separate view allows one to compare the responsiveness 
behavior of the different mechanisms on an equal footing (see section 7.5 for additional details). 
The net flow changes for Explorative,  Exploitative and Neutral categories are provided in Figure 
8-58, Figure 8-59 and Figure 8-60, respectively. Compare the net change in transition counts for 
Explorative communities (Figure 8-58) across the A increments and for the tested distribution 
mechanisms. SHS at 1→3.1 exhibits the largest influx. This shows that when environmental 
complexity increases from static to linear, SHS responds by diverting the most resources to 
exploration.  Also, for other increments, (3.1→3.6 and 3.6→3.9) SHS is consistent in further 
increasing allocation to exploration. All of the other mechanisms are not consistent in that they 







Figure 8-58: Net flow changes for Explorative communities by KD and A 
 





For SHS, the opposite is true in the case of Exploitation (Figure 8-59 Figure 8-58). SHS 
consistently diverts resources away from exploitation as A increases, as does IPD. The other 
distribution mechanisms do not respond consistently. 
The balance of flow changes come from the Neutral category (Figure 8-60). The results are 
mixed for all but the chart shows that SHS diverts resources from Neutral communities for 
exploration for the 1→3.1 change. 
 
Figure 8-60: Net flow changes for Neutral communities by KD and A 
This section focused on the dynamics of knowledge flow grounded on the formation of 
knowledge communities and community-to-community transitions of the population individuals, 
across generations. The goal was to shed light on the inner workings of the distribution 





dynamic complexity. Through graph-based analytical methods, insights were derived on the 
allocation of compute resources and the responsiveness of the mechanisms to complexity. The 
next chapter summarizes the goals and findings of this research and draws conclusions about the 
hypotheses posited in Chapter 7. 
8.5 Summary and Conclusions 
Knowledge distribution is a key determiner of CA performance and is an active area of research 
in Cultural Algorithms (Al-Tirawi & Reynolds, 2018) (Reynolds & Kinnaird-Heether, 2013). The 
knowledge distribution mechanisms researched thus far have all been competitive mechanisms. 
The goal of this research is to investigate mechanisms that also span cooperation. The rich field of 
Game theory is used as the source and inspiration for new distribution mechanisms.  Three new 
game-based distribution mechanisms are devised and tested namely, Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, Stag-Hunt and Stackelberg.  
A new CA software system, CATGame, is constructed for this purpose. The system supports a 
generic mechanism to inject and use arbitrary games for knowledge distribution. The game 
distribution mechanisms leverage this framework. The new mechanisms are benchmarked against 
the default CA mechanism Weighted Majority. CATGame is meant to solve numerical optimization 
problems. A separate system, CATNeuro, is also constructed to understand the effectiveness of a 
competitive/cooperative distribution mechanism in the domain of neural architecture search. 
Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 are dedicated to CATNeuro software system. 
Here the performance of the distribution mechanisms in CATGame are tested via a modified 
Cones World test benchmark that incorporates the logistic equation (Eq 7-2) to create dynamic 





The design of experiment and research hypotheses are documented in Chapter 7. Analysis of the 
data collected from experimental runs is provided in the prior sections of this chapter. 
Briefly, section 8.1 analyzes the base performance of the tested mechanism in terms of 
generations-to-solution. Section 8.2 contrasts the Diffusion metric for the distribution 
mechanisms. And, 8.3 comprehends the segregation of the population under the different 
mechanisms and in response to environmental dynamic complexity. Finally, 8.4 looks at the 
dynamics of knowledge flow in the ‘social’ network under the various mechanisms to uncover the 
resource allocation patterns in response to the rate of environmental change.  
Each of the hypotheses posed in Chapter 7 are now taken up. Each of these are discussed next 
and inferences are drawn about whether these holds and what are the caveats, if any. 
Hy 7-1 “Cooperative knowledge distribution is effective for problem 
solving in dynamically complex environments” 
{holds with 
exceptions} 
 The performance characteristics of the distribution mechanisms 
(Table 8-1, Table 8-2, Table 8-3 and Table 8-4) clearly indicate that at 
least two of the mechanisms – that are inclusive of cooperation – 
perform well when compared with the default competitive 
mechanism WTD. Stag-Hunt supports the most cooperation and also 
performs the best. However, Stackelberg (as interpreted for 
knowledge distribution) performs well for static environments but 
cannot keep up with others in dynamic environments. Stackelberg 
employs a structured model of cooperation that does not 
incorporate local knowledge and consequently is less efficient in 
resource allocation. Comparatively speaking, Stackelberg allocates 
more resources to exploitation (Figure 8-52) than others. By 






allocates progressively more resources to exploration as complexity 
increases (Figure 8-58). Thus, the hypothesis holds for the type of 
cooperation that incorporates local knowledge into decision making. 
If the decision making is centralized or oblivious of local conditions, 
it does not seem to hold. 
Hy 7-2 
 
“Cooperative knowledge distribution exhibits better robustness 
than competitive distribution” 
{holds with 
exceptions} 
 Robustness is about how quickly a system adjusts to change. The 
basic performance charts (Figure 8-1, Figure 8-2, Figure 8-3, Figure 
8-4) show that two of the 3 cooperative mechanisms (IPD and Stag-
Hunt) are robust as they settle to a base rate of performance 
relatively quickly in the face of periodic environment change. WTD, 
the competitive mechanism, take longer to settle as A values 
increase. For mild complexity (A=1) WTD is on par with the best 
after 10 landscapes. However, as complexity increases, WTD takes 
increasing longer to settle. Stackelberg is the contrarian cooperative 
mechanism and in fact is not robust at all as its performance 
becomes progressively worse, at least for the 50-landscape horizon 
used in the experiment. As the Page Rank derived tree charts show 
(Figure 8-46, Figure 8-48, Figure 8-49, Figure 8-52) Stackelberg 
allocates more resources to exploitation where the better 
performing mechanisms devote more to exploration. Once again it 
can be surmised that cooperative systems that incorporate local 
knowledge are more resilient than ones that are centrally planned. 
Also, competitive mechanisms are less resilient in general but still 
more than those with oligopolistic cooperation. 
 






 The Diffusion trend charts for each KD (Figure 8-9, Figure 8-10, 
Figure 8-11, Figure 8-12) show that the only mechanisms that shows 
some sensitivity to A is WTD. The Diffusion for WTD is distinctly 
lower for A=1; for non-linear A values is no discernable distinction. 
In general, this hypothesis does not hold but there are exceptions. 
 
Hy 7-4 “Segregation is higher for higher complexity environments” {holds with 
exceptions} 
 The segregation trend-by-landscape charts for each KD (Figure 8-17, 
Figure 8-18, Figure 8-19, Figure 8-21) show that IPD exhibits some 
separation in segregation with respect to A whereas SHS, WTD and 
STK do not. However, at the aggregate level, Figure 8-29, both IPD 
and SHS show a distinct response to increasing A with increasing 
segregation levels. It seems that higher performing mechanisms 
tend to increase segregation in response to complexity.  
Consequently, this hypothesis partially holds. It holds for ‘social 
rank’ based distribution mechanisms (IPD, Stag-Hunt) and not for 
the oligopolistic one. 
 
Hy 7-5 “Stag-Hunt and IPD distributions will produce higher segregation 
than WTD distributions” 
{holds} 
 This hypotheses holds and clear evidence exists in Segregation trend 
charts Figure 8-13, Figure 8-14, Figure 8-15, and Figure 8-16. The 
Segregation levels for IPD and Stag-Hunt remain consistently higher 
than those for WTD. The reason for this is that in WTD the 
Knowledge Sources that are forced out due to the voting 
mechanisms, are added back to 20% of the randomly selected 
population that lowers overall Segregation. This is done to protect 
against the “tyranny of the majority” (Moeckli, 2018). The US 






provision, certain types of knowledge could be lost at some point 
and not regained. The cooperative mechanisms on the other hand 
are self-adjusting and don’t need a similar provision. 




 Given that Stackelberg uses a structured model of cooperation, it 
was expected that it would maintain low segregation levels as all 
Knowledge Sources get an equal share, albeit in the order of their 
relative strength (section  6.3). However, what emerges is a picture 
of increasing Segregation over the sequence of 50 landscapes 
(Figure 8-26). For all complexity values, Stackelberg does start with 
low Segregation levels (at 0.45) but these continue to rise and are 
seen to reach 0.8 at the end of the landscape sequence. 
Considering, that Stackelberg does not perform well in dynamic 
environments (Figure 8-1, Figure 8-2, Figure 8-3, Figure 8-4) its 
continually changing Segregation levels suggest that it does not find 
an equilibrium state of knowledge levels, at least within the test 
limit of 50 landscapes. Thus, it can be concluded that this hypothesis 
does not hold. 
 
Hy 7-7 “The community transition weighted graphs for the tested 
knowledge distribution mechanisms are visibly distinguishable 
from each other” 
{holds} 
 The community-to-community transitions graphs for the different 
distribution mechanisms are: WTD Figure 8-30, Figure 8-31, Figure 
8-32, & Figure 8-33; IPD Figure 8-34, Figure 8-35, Figure 8-36 & 
Figure 8-37; Stag-Hunt Figure 8-38, Figure 8-39, Figure 8-40 & Figure 
8-41; and Stackelberg Figure 8-42, Figure 8-43, Figure 8-44& Figure 






the corresponding mechanisms. These diagrams crystalize the 
dynamics of the knowledge flow for each KD-A combination into a 
single view. The chord diagrams show that each mechanism 
operates distinctly. The patterns are very similar within a 
mechanism across the different A values but quite distinct between 
the mechanisms. Consequently, it is concluded this hypothesis holds 
without caveats. 
Hy 7-8 “The community transition weighted graphs for a tested 
knowledge distribution mechanism are appreciably different for 
different A values” 
{does not 
hold} 
 Hy 7-8 is related to Hy 7-7 discussed above. Here the supposition 
was that the chord charts for the different A values for the same 
mechanism are also visibly distinct from each other. As mentioned 
in the analysis for Hy 7-7 above, this is not case. There are some 
differences between the chord diagrams of the same mechanism 
but in general it does not hold. The premise underlying this 
hypothesis was that chord diagrams would be sensitive enough to 
allow one to also distinguish the responsiveness of the mechanisms 
to environmental complexity. Given that this hypothesis does not 
hold, additional, more sensitive analytical methods were required to 
understand the responsiveness (see Figure 8-54, Figure 8-55, Figure 
8-56, and Figure 8-57). 
 
Hy 7-9 “Community importance weights for the tested distribution 
mechanisms are different from each other, reflecting their different 
operational characteristics” 
{holds} 
 The page rank derived tree charts (Figure 8-46, Figure 8-48, Figure 
8-49 and Figure 8-52) show that this is indeed the case. It is 






derived from the underlying data used for the chord diagrams and 
so the two support each other. 
Hy 7-10 “Community importance rankings for the tested distribution 
mechanisms vary by environmental complexity” 
{holds with 
exceptions} 
 The parallel coordinates charts (Figure 8-47, Figure 8-50, Figure 8-51 
and Figure 8-53) show that this hypothesis mostly holds but not in 
all cases. Stag-Hunt’s responsiveness is not surfaced in the 
corresponding parallel chords chart. In the strictest sense, this 
hypothesis does not hold, however, since it is true for 3 out of the 4 
cases, one can state it holds but with some exceptions. In fact, the 
lack of sensitivity of the parallel chords analysis also prompted 
development of additional methods to measure sensitivity. 
 
Hy 7-11 “The tested distribution mechanisms are responsive to changes in 
environmental complexity” 
{holds} 
 This hypothesis is a direct statement relating the mechanisms’ 
responsiveness to A. As mentioned above, initial analytical methods 
were not sensitive enough to uncover the A value relationship. 
However, the explorative-exploitation community balance analysis 
clearly indicates that all mechanisms show statistically significant 
responses to A changes, in terms of compute resource allocations. 
See Figure 8-54, Figure 8-55, Figure 8-56 and Figure 8-57. This 
hypothesis holds without caveat. 
 
Hy 7-12 “Cooperative distribution mechanisms are more responsive to 




 Going by the analysis presented in Figure 8-54, Figure 8-55, Figure 






sensitive mechanism is the competitive mechanism WTD in terms of 
the number of statistically significant changes to net flow driven by 
changes in A. 
Hy 7-13 
 
“Better performing distribution mechanisms will exhibit consistent 
responses to changes in environmental complexity” 
{holds} 
 This hypothesis only holds for Stag-Hunt, which is the top 
performing mechanism and shows consistent allocation changes in 
response to A as seen in Figure 8-58 and Figure 8-59. The changes 
are subtle but still statistically significant. While not true for all case, 
this hypothesis holds for the best mechanism tested and so is 
considered to hold for the purpose of this analysis. 
 
  
In summary, CA knowledge distribution mechanisms that span cooperation as well as 
competition perform better than the default competitive mechanism, Weighted Majority, when 
faced with dynamic environments of varying complexity. However, this is not true for all such 
mechanisms. The research concludes that ‘social rank’ based cooperation (IPD and Stag-Hunt) 
performs significantly better overall complexity levels except non-linear (A=1). Here SHS performs 
significantly better but IPD does not. While structured or oligopolistic cooperation, seen in 
Stackelberg, does not perform better that WTD for all complexity levels. 
The Stackelberg model works well for static environments but is not able to track changes in 
dynamic environments. The rigid or centrally planned method of cooperation does not take local 
knowledge into account and hence resource allocation is not optimal. Stackelberg 





The Weighted Majority ‘wisdom of the crowd’ model is competitive in low complexity 
environments (i.e. A=1 / linear) but then is not able to keep up with ‘social rank’ based cooperation 
under IPD and Stag-Hunt, the non-linear complexities tested. 
The best performing mechanism Stag-Hunt is also the most cooperative. Stag-Hunt is a 
variation of IPD. Stag-Hunt is from Evolutionary Game theory while IPD is from classical Game 
theory. Stag-Hunt is biased toward cooperation where IPD is biased towards defection.  
Once it was clear that cooperation improves CA knowledge distribution, a new challenge was 
taken up in order to test cooperative knowledge distribution in a completely different domain 
from numerical optimization.  The next two chapters describe the CATNeuro system that 






CHAPTER 9 CATNEURO – A CA-DRIVEN FRAMEWORK FOR DEEP LEARNING 
9.0 Introduction 
Experimental results with the Cones World show that Stag-Hunt performs well for numeric 
optimization problems, especially in dynamic environments (i.e. where the optima may change 
over time) as compared to the baseline CA knowledge distribution mechanism, Weighted 
Majority. However, to better understand whether game-based, cooperative knowledge 
distribution is indeed a robust addition to the CA family, requires additional evidence. Thus, the 
CATNeuro system was constructed to test how effective cooperative knowledge distribution can 
be in a domain vastly different from numerical optimization. The CATNeuro system optimizes the 
structure and parameters of deep learning models using an implementation of Cultural Algorithms 
adapted for such a task. CATNeuro can be configured to use either Stag-Hunt or Weighted 
Majority distribution mechanism. 
Contemporary deep learning models are multi-layered directed graphs (quite different from 
traditional multi-layer perceptrons) (Goodfellow, Bengio, & Courville, 2016).  Many times, it is not 
clear what is the best architecture for a given problem. Researchers often spend many months 
trying to find the optimal architecture. CATNeuro can assist researchers in optimizing deep 
learning model structures by performing an intelligent search in this space. At the very least 
CATNeuro can out point out promising candidate architectures that researchers can investigate 
further. 
As noted earlier, Cultural Algorithms are better suited to problem solving in complex 
environments (Figure 1-1) because the CA stores and uses more information than other 





working with problems in complex domains. Deep learning model optimization is a very complex 
problem. The training time for a single model is in the order of minutes (if not hours) and therefore 
any CA information overhead is miniscule by comparison. 
This chapter describes the CATNeuro system and the experimental framework used to evaluate 
the effectiveness of CATNeuro with Stag-Hunt and WTD for deep learning model optimization. 
Stag-Hunt was selected since it was the best performing cooperative mechanism and WTD was to 
baseline its performance. 
The test bed problem selected is the construction of a deep learning model that can be used 
as a controller to play a fighting video game. Section 9.1 provides an overview of the FightingICE 
game system used for evaluating CATNeuro. Section 9.2 gives an overview of a neuro-evolution 
methodology named NEAT that provides the inspiration for the CATNeuro search mechanism. The 
detailed description of the CATNeuro system is provided in 9.3. Section 9.5 details the mechanism 
used to train the controller, which relies partly on ideas from the reinforcement learning 
literature. They are used to generate the training data for the neural network. The training 
regimen is described in 9.6. Section 9.7 describes the experimental framework used to evaluate 
the performance of Stag-Hunt and Weighted Majority distribution mechanisms for optimization 
in the space of neural network architectures. The experimental results are analyzed in Chapter 10. 
9.1 ICE Competition Fighting Game 
The FightingICE is a research test bed for AI maintained by Intelligent Computer Entertainment 
(ICE) Lab, Ritsumeikan University, Japan. ICE holds an annual competition for competing AI 





9-1). Each player has 56 actions available that it can play from. The actions are a mix of offense, 
defense and positioning moves. 
 
Figure 9-1: ICE competition fighting game screen capture 
The game controller must supply one of the 56 actions when requested by the game 
framework. The game framework provides access to the game state but its delayed by 15 frames. 
States for both players are provided by the game framework. The AI for the controller is a function 
that essentially maps the game state (current and historical) to an action.  
The game is fast paced so decisions have to be supplied in a timely manner. The rules of the 
games are somewhat complex. The hits between players transfer energy from one player to 
another. Stored energy can be used to throw projectiles with greater damage potential. It takes a 





The championship winning AIs are coded by human experts who understand the game well. 
They know how to exploit different situations in the game and make moves that are precisely 
timed. As per current knowledge no purely machine learned AI has been able to beat a human 
developed AI. 
The controller framework developed to play the game accepts a deep learning model that 
conforms to certain specifications for input and output. The input to the model is 72x1 vector that 
represents current and historical game state (Table 9-2). The output is a 56x1 vector that 
represents a probability distribution over the 56 actions. At each frame, the controller calls the 
configured model with the state vector and samples from the output distribution to select the 
action to play. 
The CA-driven controller is played against two types of opponents that are described below: 
• Jerry Mizuno AI (JM) – is an AI controller supplied with the FightingICE. It is a AI developed 
by academics at Ritsumeikan University (which is the home of FightingICE).  JM uses a 
combination of K Nearest Neighbors (KNN) and fuzzy logic (Chu & Thawonmas, 2017). It 
can be considered a benchmark AI where the fighting decisions are mostly made 
algorithmically. 
• 2018 champion called “Thunder”. Thunder is a championship level AI that is very advanced 
(FightingICE 2018 Championship Results). It was developed by (presumably) an expert 
human player and programmer Eita Aoki who seemingly is well aware of the game rules. 
Thunder is fast and seems to exhibit high-level strategies (e.g. has offense and defense 





repeated, strikes. It was not expected that the controller would be able to beat this 
champion.  However, playing against a strong player is good for differentiating between 
the performances of the underlying models more precisely. As developed, the 
reinforcement learning based CATNeuro AI controller learns from observation. Specific 
game rules were not encoded into the controller (i.e. the controller is not model based). 
In general, it is difficult for a purely AI-driven approach to infer specific game rules given 
limited computed resources.  
The CATNeuro system is configured to evolve models that conform to the input/output 
requirements of the controller framework. The system is free to structure the model however as 
long the input/output constraints are not violated. Also, the graph sizes of the various populations 
(Blueprint and Modules) are limited so that overly large models are not produced through the 
process of graph evolution. 
To evolve the deep learning models, training data is required. The training data should conform 
to the input/output specification – i.e. input should be a 72x1 vector and output a 56x1 vector. 
The construction of the training data is an involved process that takes a day or two to complete 
and is comprised of several steps. The next section provides a brief overview of Reinforcement 
Learning that is the basis for the creation of the training data for the controller models. A more 
detailed description of the process to acquire the training data in provided in section 9.5. 
9.2 Neuro Evolution of Augmented Topologies (NEAT) 
The NEAT methodology was developed by Stanley and Miikkulainen and is described in detail 
in the NEAT paper (Stanley & Miikkulainen, 2002).  NEAT is a population-based methodology 





graphs. These are described later in this section. The core idea of NEAT is to start simple and 
progressively ‘complexify’ the graphs by adding nodes and connections.   
The CATNeuro adaption of NEAT applies the same operations as defined by NEAT but there are 
many differences between the two methodologies. Firstly, NEAT does not have a social network 
that binds the population and thus has no notion of knowledge distribution or Belief Space, etc. 
Secondly, the graph operations are applied randomly in NEAT where the operations are organized 
under the five Knowledge Sources under CA and applied through the workings of the knowledge 
distribution mechanism (see Table 2-1). Thirdly, to manage complex graph structures CATNeuro 
also relies on the topological sort of the graphs whereas NEAT only uses a simpler mechanism 
based on innovation numbers (Stanley, Bryant, & Miikkulainen, 2005). Fourthly, the distance 
metric used to gauge similarity of any two graphs is materially different between CATNeuro and 
NEAT; CATNeuro defines a graph distance metric that is finer grained than the innovation number-
based method used in NEAT. 
9.2.1 Graph Operations under NEAT 
The basic graph operations under NEAT are: 
• Toggle Connection 
• Add Connection 
• Add Node 
• Crossover 





Each graph connection contains a Boolean switch that can be switched On or Off through 
mutation.  The Toggle Connection operation is demonstrated in Figure 9-2. When the switch is off, 
the connection is dropped when the graph is translated into a deep learning model (described in 
the next section).  
Figure 9-2 (and other related figures in this section) show before and after-operation views of 
graphs. The changes are highlighted in Yellow. The number associated with each connection is the 
innovation number (Stanley, Bryant, & Miikkulainen, 2005).  A counter is maintained that is 
incremented whenever a new connection is added. The innovation number can be used to 
determine the order of connections; useful for the crossover operation (described later) among 
others.  
Another counter is maintained for internal nodes (i.e. not input or output). This counter is 
incremented whenever a new node is added. The node numbers are taken from this counter. This 







Figure 9-2: Toggle connection operation - connection #1 switched off 
The Add Connection operation is shown in Figure 9-3. Under this operation the graph is 
mutated by adding a new connection between two previously unconnected nodes. In CATNeuro, 
topological sort is performed in order to ensure that cycles are not introduced when adding a new 






Figure 9-3: Add connection operation - connection #12 add between node ‘3’ and node ‘4’ 
The Add Node operation is demonstrated in Figure 9-4. In the Add Node operation, an existing 
connection is split by adding a new node in between. However, the way this is performed is a little 
involved. First a connection is chosen and it is disabled. A new node is created. Then a new 
connection is added from the source of the disabled connection to the newly created node. Finally, 
a connection is added form the newly created node to the target of the disabled connection. For 
example, in Figure 9-4, the connection #1 between ‘1’ and ‘out’ is selected. The #1 connection is 
disabled and two new connections #8 and #9 are added that connect ‘1’ and ‘out’ via the new 
node ‘5’. Connections are referred to with hash followed by number (e.g. #1) and nodes with 
number within single quotes (e.g. ‘3’). 
Finally, the Crossover operation is demonstrated in Figure 9-5. Here two graphs are merged 





numbers. A merge operation is performed that keeps the common connections from both but 
adds any differences from either graph. Finally, any cycles that could have been introduced are 
removed. 
 
Figure 9-4: Node add operation - node ‘5’ was added between node ‘1’ and node ‘out’ while the existing connection between 






Figure 9-5: Crossover graph operation - merges two graphs 
The Mutate Parameter does not modify the structure of the graph but changes some property 
of one of the non-input nodes. The properties these nodes can hold are discussed in the next 
section. The NEAT inspired graph operations are the basis of the graph evolution under CATNeuro, 
however there are many other operational details for CATNeuro that are covered next. 
9.3 CATNeuro System 
CATNeuro is actually an ensemble of populations. Each individual in every population contains 
a directed graph. These are evolved via the graph operations described earlier. A population is a 
species unto itself. Speciation is used to protect and nurture individuals so that they are not 
eliminated too early from the pool (Howard & Berlocher, 1998).  One population is for Blueprint 
individuals and the rest for Modules - a concept taken from the “CoDeepNEAT” system 





The Blueprint individuals define the macro structure of a deep learning model graph. Each 
internal node of the Blueprint individual is replaced with the graph of an individual selected from 
one of the Module species – when the Blueprint is ‘assembled’ just prior to evaluation. An example 
of such a structure is given in Figure 9-6. The process of assembly is explained later in this section. 
Blueprint internal nodes reference Module species – i.e. they contain the id of one of the 
available Module species that the CATNeuro is configured to run with. Under the Mutate 
Parameter operation, this id is modified to point to one of the available Module species. 
The internal nodes of Module graphs refer to deep learning operations, e.g. Dense Layer, 
Normalization layer, etc. (Goodfellow, Bengio, & Courville, 2016). Under the Mutate Parameter 
operation the parameters of the operation are modified. For example, for the Dense layer, the 
number of dimensions are evolved; for the Normalization layer the type of normalization is chosen 
from either Batch Normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) or Layer Normalization (He, Zhang, Ren, 
& Sun, 2015); etc.. A randomly selected deep learning operation is assigned to a new node when 






Figure 9-6: Two-level graph – ‘Blueprint’ outer graph with embedded ‘module species’ subgraphs – blueprint and species 
populations are evolved separately 
There is no limit to the number of module species. (For the CATNeuro experiment conducted 
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The input and output nodes of the Blueprint species individual’s graph are configured to be the 
input and output required for the task at hand. For example, if the task is binary classification of 
images then the input node would represent the dimensions of the input images, e.g. 224x224x3 
for width x height x number of colors. And the output node would be a 2x1 vector (for the two 
classes). The system allows for multiple input nodes but is restricted to a single output node. 
The input and output nodes for a Module individual’s graph are just connectors. When a 
Blueprint is assembled, its each  of its internal nodes is replaced by a randomly selected Module 
individual’s graph from the Module species that the Blueprint node points to. The input and 
output nodes of the selected Module individual’s graph respectively connect to all the incoming 
and outgoing connections of the replaced Blueprint node. In Figure 9-6, input nodes are 
represented by ellipses with single line borders and output nodes by ellipses with double-lined 
borders. The Blueprint node ‘14’ has the incoming connection #17 that is stipulated to connect to 
‘1’ input node of the embedded Module individual. Similarly, the ‘3’ output node of the embedded 
Module individual is stipulated to connect to #16 – the outgoing connection for Blueprint node 
‘14’. 
Following CoDeepNEAT (Miikkulainen, et al., 2017), all Blueprint nodes that point to the same 
species are replaced with the same randomly selected individual from that Module species. Many 
recent advances in deep learning are attributed to cellular or modular structures that are used 
repeatedly in the network (Szegedy, et al., 2015) (He, Zhang, Ren, & Sun, 2015). The use of 
Modules is there to help find such modular structures. Such structures control the unconstrained 
growth of the neural networks. In addition they can be used to grow or shrink the network capacity 





Before a Blueprint individual can be evaluated, it has to be assembled. A Blueprint individual’s 
internal nodes are replaced with selected Module individuals to obtain a structure called Network 
Assembly.  The Network Assembly is translated into a deep learning model for a particular library 
(e.g. Tensorflow, PyTorch, CNTK, etc.). The translation of a Network Assembly to a deep learning 
model for a specific library is performed by a configurable component called Evaluator. 
When CATNeuro is initialized for a particular task it is configured with an Evaluator. A Network 
Assembly is an abstract representation of a deep learning model. The job of the Evaluator is to 
convert that into a concrete model; train the model using whatever training data the Evaluator is 
configured with; and return the training loss and model size (Figure 9-7). 
The CATNeuro system is multi-objective since it trades off performance (training loss) against 
the model size (number of parameters in the model). The pareto ranking function is also a 
pluggable component. It can be chosen to suite the task at hand. The ‘fitness’ associated with each 







Figure 9-7: Translate Network Assembly to concrete model and train using training data 
After all Network Assemblies have been evaluated, the fitness is assigned as follows: 
• Blueprint individuals are assigned fitness values (loss and model size) returned from the 
Evaluator 
• Module individuals are assigned the average fitness (loss and model size) of all the 
Blueprint individuals where they were used 
By using average fitness for Module individuals, the individuals are protected and not 
eliminated too early in the process. After evaluation and fitness assignment each population is 
evolved following the standard process (Chapter 2): 
• Induct top individuals into the Belief Space via the Acceptance function 
• Update the Belief Space with the Update function 
• Distribute knowledge in the population network and evolve each individual via the 





The Belief Space and any other internal state needed to evolve populations is maintained 
separately for each population. In addition, CATNeuro maintains the top n Network Assemblies 
discovered thus far. The multi-objective ranking of Network Assemblies is done with the 
configured ranking function. Each Network Assembly contains enough information to be 
translatable into a deep learning model when required. The output of the CATNeuro systems is 
the ranked list of best Network Assemblies when it stops. The procedure for running CATNeuro is 
as follows: 
1. Construct Network Assemblies 
2. Evaluate Network Assemblies 
3. Check for termination condition 
4. If terminating then stop else 
a. evolve populations to obtain new generations  
b. go to 1 
The termination condition may be a MAX number of generations or it could be an expression 
such as “stop when no improvement is found in x generations”. 
The Knowledge Sources operate somewhat differently in CATNeuro than in CATGame. Each 
Knowledge Source has two associated functions: acceptance for the induction of the knowledge 
from the population space; and influence for the impartation of knowledge to the next generation. 





implementation can be very different, especially for the influence function. The influence and 
acceptance functions for CATNeuro Knowledge Sources are discussed next. 
9.3.1 Influence Functions 
In numeric optimization problems there is generally good locality – i.e. small changes in 
parameter values lead to correspondingly small changes in fitness. The exploration-exploitation 
balance requires some underlying idea of locality to be meaningful. The cooperative knowledge 
distribution of Stag-Hunt is quite reliant on balancing exploration with exploitation. Such locality 
is harder to establish for graph evolution since the changes that are discreet. For example, adding 
a new connection may potentially make a big difference to the fitness of the model. However, in 
general one would expect adding a connection to be more disruptive than say toggling a 
connection; adding a node to be more disruptive than adding a connection; and so on. 
Using a probabilistic notion of locality, the available graph operations are associated with 
Knowledge Sources with weight distributions (see Table 9-1). The Knowledge Sources can thus be 
ranked on the explorative-exploitative scale. Exploitative Knowledge Sources (e.g. History) are 
biased towards selecting graph operations that will make relatively less disruptive changes. The 
Knowledge Source influence function samples from the associated distribution to select an 
operation to apply when modifying a population individual. The explorative-exploitative ranking 
in CATNeuro however is different from that in CATGame. For example, Normative knowledge is 
considered exploitative in CATNeuro – unlike in CATGame – as it does not modify the graph 
structure; it only modifies the parameters of the graph nodes or some meta parameters 





Table 9-1: Knowledge Source Mapping to Graph Operations with Associated Weights 












The weights associated with each KS are normalized into true probabilities before sampling for 





The weights were selected with limited empirical testing. Future work will include focus on better 
turning of the weights by training networks across a variety of tasks. 
The CATNeuro populations can be configured with some restrictions. The number of nodes can 
be restricted so the graph does not grow beyond a certain size. For Module species, restricting 
graph size is desirable so modular components remain small and reusable and not become too 
specialized. When a graph reaches the allowed maximum size, the Add Node operation is removed 
from the probability distribution of actions (Table 9-1) so that a different operation is selected 
instead. The CATNeuro population also can be restricted to use only a subset of the graph 
evolution operations. This is done in the case of small Module populations so resources are 
focused on more fruitful regions of the search space. 
9.3.2 Acceptance Functions 
The induction of knowledge from the population space into the Belief Space is conceptually 
similar to that in CATGame. Unlike the influence functions however, the acceptance functions are 
generally less affected. Note that since there are multiple populations in CATNeuro the internal 
state needed by Knowledge Sources to operate is separate for each population. For example, 
Normative knowledge maintains separate parameter densities for each population. The CATNeuro 
versions of the acceptance functions for the KS are described next with differences from CATGame 
highlighted.  
Topographic: In CATGame, Topographic knowledge clusters individuals into promising regions 
of the search space using the K-means algorithm and the Euclidean distance metric – inspired by 
BSO (Shi, 2011). Topographic does the same in CATNeuro except that the distance metric used is 





History: History is very similar in both because it just needs to keep track of the best individuals 
over time. 
Normative: In CATGame Normative maintains promising ranges of numerical values.  In 
CATNeuro, Normative is conceptually similar but the implementation is very different. Normative 
in CATNeuro needs to handle categorical (non-continuous) values in many cases (e.g. Module 
species ids). Since there is no natural ordering for ids, the concept of range does not apply. 
Normative knowledge instead maintains probability densities for the parameters it tracks. When 
it needs to evolve parameters, Normative samples from spin wheels for categorical parameters 
and Kernel Density estimates for continuous parameters (Cosma Shalizi CMU, 2009)  (see Figure 
9-8). 
 
Figure 9-8: Examples of probability densities maintained by Normative knowledge for two types of parameters 
The probability values are calculated by incorporating the fitness (training loss only) of the best 
performing individuals across generations. Normative uses this data for the Mutate Parameter 
graph operation. However, with some probability, this operation may also be performed by other 
KS (History and Situational). Normative thus share’s its internal state with other KS so that they 





by the aforementioned innovation numbers. Recall that each connection in the graph is assigned 
an innovation number; it is a global, monotonically increasing value. As a graph evolves the added 
innovation numbers stay the same and therefore can be used as anchors for pinning density 
estimates to. Each estimate applies to the target of the corresponding connection. For example, 
if the target is a node that references modules (in Blueprints) then the density estimates are for 
module ids. These estimates are only sampled when there are enough samples available. Real 




𝑡ℎ the configured range of the parameter. For discrete valued parameters, the system 
maintains non-zero probabilities for all cases so that there is always some chance of selecting any 
available case. 
Situational: Situational maintains a list of top n exemplars in both CATNeuro and CATGame.  
Domain: In CATNeuro, when Domain modifies an individual under its influence, it can either 
mutate the graph of the individual in question or replace its graph with the mutated graph of a 
randomly selected top performer. NEAT is greedy so Domain propagates the current generation 
top performers with a configured probability. Thus, Domain inducts the current generation top 
performers in CATNeuro. In CATGame, Domain does not maintain any state as it uses parameter 
slopes for influence that are calculated at the time the influence function is applied. 
9.3.3 Knowledge Distribution 
Knowledge distribution in CATNeuro is similar to that in CATGame. Weighted Majority uses an 
algorithm that for all practical purposes is the same as for CATGame (see 3.2). The Stag-Hunt 
distribution is slightly different. Due to a stricter requirement around ranking of Knowledge 





cooperative generations followed by one evaluative one. In a cooperative generation individual 𝑖 
behaves cooperatively. In an evaluative generate 𝑖 behaves individualistically. 
Considering the cooperative case, as before (section 3.2) 𝐾  is the set of KS; 𝑖  indexes the 
population; and 𝑗  indexes 𝑖′𝑠  neighbors; 𝐹 = {𝑟|𝑟 ∈ ℝ}  is set of real numbers and 𝐹𝑖 ⊆ 𝐹 =
{𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖1, 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖2, … , 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗, … } be the fitness of 𝑖
′𝑠 neighbors in the current generation. 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶
 ℝ × 𝐹 →  ℤ is function that returns ‘social’ rank of 𝑖 based on its and neighbors’ fitness values; 
𝑠𝑟𝑖 = 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖 , 𝐹𝑖). Let 𝑃: 𝐾 →  ℤ be a probability distribution where ∑ 𝑃(𝑘)𝑘∈𝐾 = 1. 
Also, 𝐾𝑆𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∶  ℤ → 𝑃 return a probability distribution over K given a rank. In CATNeuro the 
Knowledge Source assigned is sampled from the returned probability distribution; defined as 
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒: 𝑃 → 𝐾. The probabilities are constructed so that a low rank will return a probability 
distribution that is biased towards explorative Knowledge Sources. And vice-a-versa for a high 
rank. Since Knowledge Sources are not deterministically explorative or exploitative due to poor 
locality of graph operations, the knowledge assignments are done probabilistically to compensate. 
The new KS assigned to 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒(𝐾𝑆𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑠𝑟𝑖)). 
In the evaluative case, let  𝑂 = < 𝑘0, 𝑘1, … , 𝑘𝑛−1 > be an ordering of KS according to each’s 
explorative potential; 𝑜𝑘  is offset of 𝑘  in this ordering and 𝑂[𝑞] returns the 𝑘  at offset 𝑞 .  Let 
𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒2, . . , 𝑒𝑔, … index evaluative generations and 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑔 be 𝑖′𝑠  fitness in generation 𝑒𝑔 . Then, 
𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤 =  {
𝑂[𝑂𝑘𝑖 − 1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛] 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑔 ≥ 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑔−1
𝑂[𝑂𝑘𝑖 + 1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛] 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 . 
If 𝑖′𝑠 fitness has improved since the previous evaluative generation then it adopts the next 
most exploitative KS in the ladder (and wraps around if at bottom) and vice-a-versa. Here 𝑖 acts 





strategies to comparatively underperforming individuals (as compared to its neighbors) and vice-
a-versa. The exploration-exploitation balance is performed using the local signal of ‘social’ rank.  
In summary, the CATNeuro system optimizes in the space of directed graphs where CATGame 
searches in a real-valued hyperspace. CATNeuro utilizes speciation through multiple populations. 
By contrast CATGame uses a single population. There are many other differences between the 
two systems. However, the knowledge distribution mechanisms are largely similar between the 
two and operate on the same principles. Stag-Hunt was seen to perform well against a complex, 
dynamic environment. Now it is put to test for a hierarchically complex optimization problem. The 
performance of Stag-Hunt in a different domain will provide further insights into whether 
cooperative mechanisms are indeed beneficial for problem solving in highly complex domains. The 
performance of Weighted Majority and Stag-Hunt distribution systems are compared on the 
optimization of deep learning model for a controller to play a fighting game. The fighting game 
used for the experiment is described in the next section. 
9.4 A Brief Overview of Reinforcement Learning 
The deep learning model used for the ICE game controller has to be trained to play the game 
effectively and for this significant amount of training data is required. The most relevant discipline 
for creating data for such a task is the field of Reinforcement Learning (RL). RL is a form of machine 
learning that fits between supervised learning and unsupervised learning. In RL an agent interacts 
with the world or environment to achieve a goal. The agent: 
a. Has a capacity to take actions that affect the environment  





c. Is motivated to achieve a high-level goal through a reward structure  
For the ICE game, the agent would be the deep learning model (embedded in the controller 
application). The model selects an action to take after observing the state of the game at every 
time step. The goal is to win each round by trying to land the maximum number of hits on the 
opponent while protecting oneself from being hit. Such a setup is labeled a Markov Decision 
Process (MDP) (also Markov Reward Process) (Kober, Bagnell, & Peters, 2013) and is commonly 
used in the field of robotics, multi-agent systems, games and control applications. 
An MDP is a 4-tuple (S, A, R, P) where: 
• 𝑆 =  𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  
• 𝐴 =  𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
• 𝑅 ∶  𝑆  𝐴 𝑥 × 𝑆 → ℝ  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
• 𝑃: 𝑆 ×  𝐴 ×  𝑆 → [0,1]𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
A policy Π: S ×  A → ℝ is the probability of tacking action 𝑎 ∈  𝐴 when in state 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, i.e. 
Π(𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑎|𝑠).. In most scenarios, the rewards associated with future time steps is discounted 
by a discounted by a discount factor Υ ∈ [0, 1). The value function V is the expected sum of future 
rewards given an MDP and policy Π and is defined as: 
Value function: 




 Eq 9-1 
 
The goal of Reinforcement Learning is to find the optimal policy 𝜋∗  that maximizes the 
expected sum of future rewards. There are a wide variety of settings and algorithms that can be 





Reinforcement Learning is a vast subject that has a long history (Sutton & Barto, 2018). It has 
recently resurged in popularity due to high profile achievements such as beating the world 
champion Lee Sedol at the game of Go (Silver, et al., 2017). 
Figure 9-9 is a partial taxonomy of RL algorithms. In model-based algorithms the agent is either 
given a model or learns a model of the environment and then operates accordingly to interact 
with the world. A recent example is the AlphaZero (Schrittwieser, et al., 2019) model from Google 
Deep Mind that is a successor to AlphaGo noted earlier. AlphaZero is programmed with explicit 
rules of the game Go.  
 
Figure 9-9: A partial taxonomy of Reinforcement Learning algorithms 
Model-free algorithms don’t have to construct a model of the world but instead focus on what 





based and policy-based. Value-based methods focus on determining the value of states or state-
action pairs from which an optimal policy can be derived as in Eq 9-1.  Policy-based methods 
instead learn the policy directly from experience obtained in interacting with the environment. In 
some situations, the number of states or state-action pairs is prohibitively large and its not feasible 
use value-based methods. RL is an active area of research. The seminal policy optimization 
approach named VPG for (vanilla) Policy Gradient,  was introduced by Sutton  et al. in 1999 
(Sutton, McAllester, Singh, & Mansour, 1999). Since then many variations and improvements have 
been developed such as Trust Region Policy optimization (TRPO) (Schulman, Levine, Moritz, 
Jordan, & Abbeel, 2015) and Proximal Policy optimization (PPO) (Schulman, Wolski, Dhariwal, 
Radford, & Klimov, 2017). 
For completeness, it should be mentioned that the so-called Actor-Critic methods combine 
features of policy and value based approaches together for Reinforcement Learning (Konda & 
Tsitsiklis, 2002). 
One recent breakthrough was in 2015 when Deep Mind published deep Q-network (DQN) 
(Mnih, et al., 2015) that achieved human-level performance on Atari games. DQN used a value-
based method called Q-learning (Sutton & Barto, 2018) but with a deep neural network to 
approximate the value function. The term Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) is used when a 
deep neural network is exploited to approximate the value or policy function. DRL has re-
energized the field of Reinforcement Learning. Other recent development in Deep RL algorithms 
are Hindsight Experience Replay (HER) (Andrychowicz, et al., 2017) and BEAR (Kumar, Fu, Tucker, 





The next section describes the Reinforcement Learning based strategy used for creating the 
training data for the evolution of FightingICE controllers. 
9.5 Training Regime for ICE Game Controller 
A policy-based RL approach is followed for training data creation. (As an aside, a value-based 
approached based on Q-learning was also tried but it did not work well due to the large state 
space involved).  
 
Figure 9-10: Policy table constructed with reinforcement learning provides a mapping from game state to an action policy 
Conceptually the process to acquire training data is as follows: 
1. Create an empty dictionary structure (Policy Table) that maps a 72x1 vector (key) to a 56x1 
vector (value) – see Figure 9-10. This table maps game state to action distribution and will 
be populated as described in subsequent steps 
2. Play 100 or so games using a controller that makes random moves against Thunder AI and 
record raw game frames (non-pixel data only) to obtain a large collection of realistic game 
states. Here P1 (player 1) is designated as the ‘controller’ player and P2 as the opponent. 
Thunder AI was used as the opponent in all subsequent steps 
3. Use the recorded frames to play different scenarios using the ICE provided simulator. (The 





any recorded frame; the starting frame and a sequence of actions for each of the players 
is required to make use of the simulator) 
4. For each scenario (recorded frame), extract the corresponding 72x1 state vector and save 
that into the Policy Table mapped to a uniform 56x1 vector (i.e. any action is equally likely). 
5. Play each scenario 10 times with different randomly chosen sequence of actions for P1 and 
the actual recorded sequence of actions for P2 
6. For each simulated play, note the score and if P1 won, update the Policy Table to increase 
the probabilities of the actions taken using methods from Reinforcement Learning (Sutton 
& Barto, 2018) and vice versa 
7. Iterate over all of the recorded frames repeatedly until the Policy Table converges 
8. The Policy Table is the training data for the neural network models 
9. Train a neural network model using the previous iteration of the Policy Table. Use this 
intermediate model in the controller to play and record new game frames. Now instead of 
taking random actions, the actions are chosen from a model trained with the previous 
iteration of the Policy Table. 
10. Again, use the simulator and the newly recorded frames to update the Policy Table till it 
converges. Now, instead of random actions, the actions for P1 are chosen as follows: 
a. If a state has been played before, then choose actions from the current policy table 
in an epsilon-greedy way. With epsilon probability (e.g. 95%) sample the current 





case) choose a random action. (Epsilon-greedy approach is a way to balance 
exploration with exploitation). 
b. Otherwise choose a random sequence of actions 
11. Repeat the process starting from step #9 an additional n times to get the final Policy Table 
that will be used for evaluation of the distribution mechanisms – see Figure 9-11. The 
number n is chosen till there is no appreciable improvement in game play. Here it was 3 
iterations of the process. 
About 1GB worth of raw game frames were recorded that resulted in a Policy Table of about 
1M rows – i.e. distinct states. It takes about 24 hours for the Policy Table to converge. The Policy 
Table is a discrete mapping from game state to action distribution. The deep learning model 
trained on the Policy Table is a continuous mapping - i.e. it can provide an action distribution even 
if the input state vector does not exist in the Policy Table. The deep learning model is a highly 
compressed representation of the Policy Table – it is usually less than 100KB in size. Thus, the 






Figure 9-11: AI controller is trained on saved game frames; the process is boot strapped with a random AI and iteratively 
improved with better trained AIs 
Table 9-2 provides the layout of the 72x1 input state vector. The information in the input vector 
is the current position and speed of the two players (P1 & P2); players’ scores and energies; 
whether or any attacks or projectiles are active; P2 action history; and P1 and P2 position history. 
Player P1 is being controlled by the CA controller and P2 by “Thunder” AI.  
The 72x1 input vector is sliced into 8 ‘semantic’ units labelled by the “Semantic unit” column 
in Table 9-2. The 8 semantic units are carved up from the 72x1 vector so as to provide more 
context for neural network architecture selection. In deep learning models, one type of learning 
is finding the right representations of the input data that help in solving the problem at hand. 
Usually the lower layers of the network process raw input and find embeddings (Roweis & Saul, 
2000) that capture the semantics of the input in some abstract manner. Dividing up the input into 
logical sections should help this process. A minimal neural network architecture structure with the 





Table 9-2: Policy Table Input State Layout Structure 
Offset Description Semantic unit 
0,1 P1 x y position s1 
2,3 P1 speedX  speedY s1 
4 P1 energy level s1 
5,6,7,8 P1 state: air | stand | crouch | down s1 
9,10 P1 attack: speedX speedX prj1 
11,12 P1 attack: settingSpeedX settingSpeedY prj1 
13 P1 attack: is_projectile prj1 
14 P1 attack: is_active prj1 
15 P1 attack: is_downProp prj1 
16,17,18,19 P1 attack: 4 attack types (THROW_A, THROW_B, 
THROW_HIT, THROW_SUFFER) 
prj1 
20 P1 action: 1 of 56 actions a1 
21-41 P2 state – repetition of P1 state s2; prj2; a2 
42-47 P2 6 historical actions  a2 
48-59 P1 last 6 x,y positions posH1 







Figure 9-12:  Graphical structure of a minimal model – 8 ‘semantic’ inputs, 1 intermediate node and 1 output node 
In order to construct the Policy Table, the raw game frames are read in sequence. A sliding 
window of 10 frames is used so that an input state vector with the required history of P2 actions 






Figure 9-13: Reinforcement learning process to learn policy for discrete states 
The simulator can be configured to simulate a given number of frames starting from the 
provided frame and a sequence of actions for both players. A sequence of 3 actions for each player 
are simulated for 100 frames. The time horizon for a single action is up to 20 frames so 100 frames 
are sufficient to complete all 3 actions. The game is fast paced so a sequence of the next 3 actions 
is sufficient time-horizon for action planning. The simulator completes one action before choosing 
the next action in the given sequence. The action sequence for P2 is taken from the raw game 
frames. The action sequence for P1 are either randomly generated or based on the currently 
available Policy Table. 
The final Policy Table is the data for neural network training. A series of candidate models are 
generated with CATNeuro – configured to run with each of the distribution mechanisms – and 





9.6 Neural Architecture Search with CATNeuro 
A deep learning model trained from the Policy Table is a compact representation of the Policy 
Table. It is faster to use; much more compact; and supports mapping from any game state even if 
the state does not exist in the Policy Table. Therefore, using a derived model is better for game 
play than using the underlying table directly. If the state space of a game is small or can be 
discretized effectively than a Policy Table would be a good choice but here that is not the case. 
With most deep learning models, it is not clear what is the right architecture at the outset. 
Discovering an architecture is a time-consuming process that involves trial-and-error. A neural 
architecture search tool like CATNeuro can assist by shortening the search time or freeing up 
human time by substituting it with machine time. 
The Evaluator component used for this task (see section 9.3) is configured to train models with 
a sample of the Policy Table. This was done to shorten the training time for CATNeuro. A sample 
of 130K rows was randomly selected from the full 1M row Policy Table. With the full Policy Table 
this would have been very time consuming. Even with the small sample, the time to complete 6 
CATNeuro runs was is in the range of 24 to 36 hours on single GPU box. A population size of 36 is 
used so each generation (or time-step) requires 36 graph evolutions and subsequent translations 
and training. The vast majority of the time is consumed by model training. The models have to be 
trained on a Graphical Processing Unit (GPU), which is a limited resource. The current hardware 
configuration is limited to a single GPU and therefore it takes 20-30 minutes per generation. 
However, the training is parallelizable so each model can be concurrently trained on a separate 






The sample Policy Table is further split 70/30 into training and evaluation sets (Figure 9-14). 
This is done to prevent overfitting. The candidate models generated by CATNeuro are trained on 
the training set and tested on the evaluation set. The training is done in iterations called epochs. 
Each epoch is a full sweep of the training set. Each model is tested on the evaluation set after each 
epoch. If the evaluation loss is higher than after a previous epoch, the training is stopped. Training 
further would risk overfitting. 
 
Figure 9-14: CATNeuro neural architecture search process 
The termination condition expression is “stop if no improvement is seen in 10 generations”. 
CATNeuro usually runs for 20 to 60 generations before termination. 
CATNeuro is configured to output the 20 best models per run. The top 10% of the models from 
each run are trained on the full Policy Table (again with 70/30 split to prevent overfitting). The 
fully trained models are then tested in the controller and game statistics are recorded for 





9.7 Experimental Setup and Evaluation Methodology for Game Controller Models 
CATNeuro is run 6 times for each KD mechanism in order to evolve deep learning models using 
a sample of the Policy Table for training.  This process takes 2 or 3 days and therefore the sample 
size was kept quite small. The training is done on an Acer Predator laptop with a mobile version 
of the NVidia GTX 1080 GPU. A GPU is required for training models. The experimental parameter 
settings are given in Table 9-3. 
Top 10% of the models are taken from each run and trained on the full Policy Table and then 
run in the controller to play against the Jerry Mizuno AI and the 2018 champion Thunder. Jerry 
Mizuno is supplied by Ritsumeikan University, the maintainers of FightingICE. It is considered a 
benchmark AI controller where the game decisions are made algorithmically using KNN and fuzzy 
logic (Chu & Thawonmas, 2017). Pertinent data from all played games are recorded in log files. 
The format of the log files is in Table 9-4. Beyond the scores for P1 (CATNeuro controller) and P2 
(Jerry Mizuno and Thunder) and the number of hits to each, the log file data is also used to extract 
the action distribution for P1 and P2. There are 56 actions available to the player. A more versatile 
or general model will have a wider repertoire of responses and therefore should have relatively 
more balanced distribution over actions. A weaker model will tend to overuse certain actions.  
Therefore, the breadth of responses is an important basis of comparison for the models produced 
under the two distribution mechanisms.  
Table 9-3: Parameters Settings for CATNeuro Experiment 








Weighted Majority (WTD) 
 
Population size 36 For all populations 
Blueprint and Modules 
Network topology Hexagonal  
Number of Module species 3  
Blueprint limits 20 total nodes New nodes are not 
added after this limit is 
reached 
Module 1 limits 3 nodes 
Only Mutate Parameter 
operation allowed 
This species is meant 
to support embedding 
functionality (Roweis & 
Saul, 2000)  
Module 2 and 3 limits 4 nodes  
Termination condition Stop if no improvement seen 
in 10 generations 
 
Sample size 6 per KD mechanism 6 runs of CATNeuro 
for each KD mechanism 





Models evaluated with 
game controller 
12 per KD mechanism The top 10% of the 
models produced (i.e. 2 
out of 20 * 6) from each 
run were trained with 
the full Policy Table and 
used for testing in the 
game controller 
Deep learning library Microsoft CNTK The current Evaluator 
only supports CNTK 
(Seide & Agarwal, 2016). 
Future versions are 
planned to include 
Tensorflow and PyTorch 
Game character  Zen  For both P1 and P2 
Number of games played 
per model 
10 Each game has 3 
rounds  
 






P1 Action Action taken by player 1. P1 is played by CATNeuro 
controller 
P1 Last Hit Frame Frame number of when P1 was last hit 
P1 Score P1 score (also called HP) 
P1 Eng P1 energy level 
P2 Action Action taken by P2. P2 is played by 2018 champion 
“Thunder” AI or “Jerry Mizuno” 
P2 Last Hit Frame Frame number of when P2 was last hit 
P2 Score P2 score 
P2 Eng P2 energy level 
 
9.7.1 Basic Performance Analysis 
The log file data is aggregated to measure the basic game performance of the models produced 
by the two KD mechanisms against each of the two opponents, Jerry Mizuno and Thunder. The 
performance comparison is on the basis of: 
• Hits landed on opponent aggregated across all models and by best model by KD 
• Hits received from opponent aggregated across all models and by best model by KD 
• Relative score (player score – opponent score) 
Statistical tests for difference in means are performed by calculating the mean standard 
deviations of the values on a per round basis. Each round is an independent game segment. The 






9.7.2 Relative Action Distribution Analysis 
Figure 9-15 is an example of a 100% stacked column chart that puts the relative action 
distribution of two hypothetical distribution mechanisms head-to-head. In this example, KD1 has 
higher penetration in 3 of the 4 actions shown and therefore is the mechanism that produces 
more versatile models. The relative action distribution charts provide a view into how different 
the strategies of the two players are, on a relative basis.  
 
Figure 9-15: Hypothetical relative action distribution between two models of two distribution mechanisms 
The relative action distribution analysis is a view into the high-level strategies adopted by the 
opposing players. It does not convey the repeated sequence of actions or ‘combos’ that may be 
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9.7.3 Combo Analysis 
The main idea is to find sequences of actions that match the pattern described next. Find 
combinations of 3 distinct actions done in a sequence where the number of frames does not 
exceed 30 between the 1st and 2nd actions & 2nd and 3rd actions. Such sequences are classified as 
combos. The limit of 30 frames is taken from the FightingICE game documentation. Hits landed 
with 30 frames of each other are considered together and can boost the score beyond the sum of 
the individual hit scores. An example is AIR_A → AIR → AIR_DA. It is two air attacks interspaced 
with the AIR action. 
The individual combos are then aggregated into higher level patterns to reduce the data 
complexity and ease analysis. Each action is either offensive (O), defensive (D) or tactical (T). 
(Tactical actions are positioning actions, such as jump, forward walk, etc.). Each combo is binned 
into a category defined by the permutation of the letters from the set {‘O’, ‘D’, ‘T’}. Hence the OTD 
category will contain all combos that have the [offense] → [defense] → [tactic] pattern. 
Permutations where all categories are the same (e.g. OOO) are excluded from consideration. 
For each category the counts are determined by round. The data is then aggregated to find 
mean and standard deviation for each category and KD mechanism over the 360 rounds. This data 
then is used to compare the two KD mechanisms using statistical testing and data visualization. 
9.7.4 Model Properties 
In addition to the log file data, the properties of the models produced by each of the 
mechanism are also analyzed. The CATNeuro system is configured to output the best 20 models 
found during a run. Only the best 2 are used in the controller for game play. However, all 20 are 





of the tested distribution mechanisms. With 6 runs, there are 6*20=120 models available per 
mechanism. The aggregated properties of each mechanism’s models are compared and 
contrasted. These properties are described in Table 9-5. 
Table 9-5: Model Properties Analyzed 
Model metric Comments 
Training Loss The training loss returned by the Evaluator after training 
the model. For the task at hand, loss is the mean squared 
error between the model output and ground truth from the 
training data. It is the 1st value in the fitness vector 
Number of parameter 
weights 
The total number of weights in the deep learning model 
that are optimized in the training. This a measure of model 
size. It is the 2nd value in the fitness vector 
Number of nodes The total number of nodes in the model produced. It 
includes the input and output nodes of the Blueprint 
individual and all of the embedded Module individuals. It is 
another measure of model size. 
 
Maximum path length The length of the maximum path from the input to the 





the path are included in the path length. It is another 
measure of model size – the depth of the model. 
Number of edges The total number of edges in the graph including those 
in embedded Module subgraphs. It is another measure of 
model size 
Generations to discovery The number of generations the after which a ‘best’ 
model was discovered. As noted earlier, a CATNeuro run 
stops when no improvement is discovered for 10 
generations. A mechanism that is continually able to find 
frequent improvements will have ‘best’ models that are 
found in later generations as it will tend to run for longer. 
This is an metric is an important measure of KD 
performance.  
 
Due to the number of samples possible, statistical testing is used to make judgements about 
the differences in parameters listed in Table 9-5. However, an alternative approach is to visually 






Figure 9-16: Sample probability density comparison chart 
A hypothetical example of such a chart is shown in Figure 9 14. This chart can be used to 
compare the distributions of the same parameter type for two different groups. Each density 
curve can be thought of as a smoothed version of a histogram. In the example chart, the KD1 
distribution (Blue) is clearly shifted to the right and seems to be flatter. And KD2’s distribution is 
peakier and shifted to the left. X-axis has the values of the parameter type that is being compared. 
Y-axis is the probability. The area of each curve will sum to 1.0. This chart is a useful way of 
understanding how the ‘mass’ of a group of values is distributed. 
The parameters listed in Table 9-5 are compared with density charts similar to the example in 
Figure 9-16. Conclusions about parameter differences are drawn on the basis of the density curves 
associated with Stag-Hunt and WTD mechanisms. 
Structural and other numeric properties of the graphical models are another quantitative way 
of comparing models produced under Stag-Hunt and WTD. Since the models are directed graphs 





associated with each mechanism are drawn with the help of the Microsoft Automated Graph 
Layout Library (Microsoft Research). This tool produces graph layouts that are human readable, if 
the number of nodes is less than 100 or so. The models produced from the two distribution 
mechanisms are compared and assessed with respect to their visual structure. 
The experimental framework discussed thus far provides a language or basis for postulating 
formal hypotheses about the expected outcomes. These are posited and discussed next. 
Experimental results from CATGame show that cooperative distribution allocates compute 
resources more efficiently when faced with complex, dynamic environments, than the standard 
CA distribution mechanism Weighted Majority. Correspondingly is it expected that cooperative 
distribution will perform better in the hierarchically complex domain of neural architecture search 
(Hy 9-1). 
Cooperative knowledge distribution will yield more versatile models   Hy 9-1 
  
The termination condition used does not the cap the number of generations to a fixed number. 
Instead optimization is allowed to run till no improvement is detected in 10 generations.  Given 
that Stag-Hunt balances resources well between exploration and exploitation, it should be able to 
find small improvements more frequently and should sustain search for longer (Hy 9-2). 
Cooperative knowledge distribution will sustain longer search runs   Hy 9-2 
 
Since NEAT (section 9.1) is largely an additive process it follows that the longer the search 





etc.  (Hy 9-3).  Many of the properties listed in Table 9-5 relate to model size – e.g. number of 
nodes; number of edges; number of tunable parameters; etc. All are expected to be consistent 
with respect to each other. 
Longer search runs produce larger models   Hy 9-3 
 
Given better search performance of Stag-Hunt in CATGame, it is postulated that this 
mechanism will find better models in CATNeuro as well. The prima facia performance measure 
under CATNeuro is the training loss. Training loss is the error between the ground truth of the 
training data the output produced by the model. The game performance is a secondary measure 
because the search process cannot directly optimize that. As mentioned earlier, loss is measured 
as mean square error. A lower value indicates that the model is more faithfully able to match the 
training data (Hy 9-4) and this is a desirable goal. One issue with neural network (and other 
machine learning models) is that they can overfit the training data. To prevent overfitting, the 
models are trained on the training set and then periodically evaluated on the test set. Initially loss 
on the training set and the test set decrease but after a point the training loss continues to 
decrease but the test loss (i.e. loss on the test set) may start to rise. Beyond that point the model 
is in danger of being overfit. In CATNeuro the training is stopped when test loss starts to increase 
and therefore the chance of overfit is low. 






In CATGame, the performance differential between WTD and cooperative mechanisms 
widened with increasing environmental complexity (i.e. higher A-value). In CATNeuro there are 
two levels of environmental complexity faced by the models – the mid-level benchmark opponent 
Jerry Mizuno and the 2018 champion Thunder. It is postulated (Hy 9-5) that the cooperative 
mechanism Stag-Hunt should perform better than the competitive WTD, when faced with the 
more challenging opponent than when facing the benchmark AI. 
Cooperative distribution performs better than competitive distribution 
under more complex environmental conditions 
  Hy 9-5 
 
9.8 Chapter Summary  
This chapter described the CATNeuro system designed to optimize deep learning model 
architectures. Partial inspiration for CATNeuro comes from the NEAT methodology for neuro-
evolution but the two are quite different in many important ways. For example, CATNeuro uses a 
population bound with a ‘social’ network where NEAT does not. Also, being a Cultural Algorithms 
system CATNeuro has a Belief Space component comprised of Knowledge Sources. The Influence 
function distributes knowledge among the population. The population individuals are evolved 
under the influence of the associated Knowledge Sources. By contrast, NEAT uses a randomized 
greedy evolutionary strategy. The particular operations of the Knowledge Source to perform in 
the space of directed graphs are also described in detail. 
CATNeuro has multiple populations to support speciation. The Blueprint population is there to 
evolve macro structures of the deep learning models. Modules are for the evolution of reusable, 





Assemblies that are abstract representation of models. These are then translated into concreted 
models for a particular deep learning library (e.g. Tensorflow) and trained with the training data 
for the optimization task. The training results provide a way of assigning fitness values to all 
population individuals. The fitness values are required by CATNeuro to guide the optimization 
process. 
The implementations of the Stag-Hunt and Weighted Majority distribution mechanisms are 
both described here for CATNeuro. In order to evaluate the performance of Stag-Hunt with 
respect to WTD, the FightingICE game test bed is employed. A reinforcement learning based 
method is used to create the training data required for CATNeuro optimization. The model training 
regimen used is also documented. The models produced via CATNeuro runs are then used in a 
game controller to play multiple games against a benchmark AI and a top-level AI that was the 
2018 ICE champion. Finally, the experimental setup to compare the performances of Stag-Hunt 
and WTD based models is presented to support the testing of specific hypotheses. The next 
chapter analyzes the results of running CATNeuro as per the experimental framework to evolve 
controller models and then using the models to play games against the selected opponent AI. Also 






CHAPTER 10  CATNEURO KNOWLEDGE DISTRIBUTION PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
10.0 Introduction 
As per the experimental framework defined in the previous chapter, CATNeuro was run 6 times 
each for Stag-Hunt and WTD distribution mechanisms. The top 2 (10%) models from each run 
were played against the benchmark “Jerry Mizuno” AI and the 2018 champion “Thunder” AI for 
10 games each. Section 10.1 compares and analyses the performance of the Stag-Hunt and WTD 
models used in game play. The data for the analysis comes from about 100mb of logged data 
collected during game play. The aggregate performance over all models is discussed as well that 
for best models by different metrics.  Section 10.2 compares the action distribution of the Stag 
Hunt and WTD players and those of the opponents when playing against the CATNeuro players. 
Section 10.4 compares the properties of the models produced under the Stag-Hunt and WTD 
mechanisms. Model properties are aggregated from 120 models for each mechanism (see 9.7). 
Finally, section 10.5 summarizes the results of the analyses done in the prior sections of this 
chapter.  It also draws conclusions about the hypotheses postulated in  9.7. 
Also, for demonstration purposes, the video samples of game play are available here: 
• Stag-Hunt vs Thunder: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pc4ls8MzOV4  
• Stag-Hunt vs Jerry Mizuno: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ciKTgyMKvG0  
10.1 Game Performance Comparison  
The aggregate game performance of the models produced by Stag-Hunt and WTD is discussed 
first. Followed by performance for best models when playing Jerry Mizuno and then best models 





10.1.1 Aggregate Model Performance Results 
Aggregate results for Stag-Hunt and WTD models against Jerry Mizuno are given in Table 10-1 
for hits landed on opponent and Table 10-2 for hits received from the opponent. Both Stag-Hunt 
and WTD generated models perform well against the benchmark AI, Jerry Mizuno. The hits landed 
by CATNeuro models is much higher than hits received. However, the models produced form both 
KD mechanisms perform equally well against the opponent. There are no statistically significant 
differences between the hits landed and hits received values between Stag-Hunt and WTD when 
playing against Jerry Mizuno. 
Table 10-1: Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno - Hits to Opp. 
Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp. 
Average hits to opp. per round 
 
Stag-Hunt WTD 
Avg. hits / round 25.63 25.64 
Standard Deviation 4.88 4.46 
Two-sample t-test p value 0.987 (samples=360) 
 
Table 10-2: Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno – Hits received from Opp. 
Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp. 





   
 
Stag-Hunt WTD 
Avg hits received / round 18.57 18.51 
Standard Deviation 3.52 3.56 
Two-sample t-test p value  0.809 (samples=360) 
 
The corresponding results against Thunder are given in Table 10-3 (hits-to-opponent) and Table 
10-4 (hits received from opponent). Thunder is a much stronger opponent than Jerry Mizuno. Both 
Stag-Hunt and WTD produced models cannot compete against Thunder. However, here Stag-Hunt 
produced models perform significantly better when than the WTD produced models in terms of 
the hits-to-opponent metric. The difference is statistically significant in favor of Stag-Hunt. 
Table 10-3: Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Thunder - Hits to Opp. 
Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp. 
Average hits to opp. per round 
 
Stag-Hunt WTD 
Avg hits to opp. / round 10.48 9.38 
Standard Deviation 4.25 3.91 






This is not case for hits received. There is no significant difference between Stag-Hunt and WTD 
models for hits received from opponent Thunder. 
Thunder was programmed by a human expert. It contains explicit knowledge of game rules and 
can exploit specification situations in the game. Conversely, Jerry Mizuno is mostly algorithmically 
driven with a combination of Fuzzy Logic and K-nearest neighbors (KNN) methods (Chu & 
Thawonmas, 2017). It would be very hard for a purely AI driven approach to master the game 
unless much more compute resources are deployed. As a reference, Deep Mind’s, Alpha Go used 
40 days of training time to achieve a critical performance breakthrough (Deep Mind, 2017). Even 
then, the system was given the rules of Go in the form of code – the AI did not learn the rules by 
itself. 
Table 10-4: Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Thunder - Hits received from Opp. 
Performance Summary - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp. 
Average hits received from opp. per round 
 
Stag-Hunt WTD 
Avg hits recv. from opp. / 
round 
36.74 36.78 
Standard Deviation 6.28 7.18 






Each game has three rounds. The hits to/received-from results on a per round basis are given 
in Table 10-5 for Jerry Mizuno and Table 10-6 for Thunder. 
Table 10-5: Hits by Round – Jerry Mizuno Opp. 
Hits by Round – Jerry Mizuno Opp. 
Avg (Min, Max) 
Type 1 2 3 
Stag-Hunt hits to opp. 26 (17,43) 26 (16,36) 25 (14,36) 
WTD hits to opp. 26 (14,36) 26 (15,41) 25 (15,36) 
Hits t-test p-values 0.7146 0.5241 0.2969 
Stag-Hunt hits recv. from 
opp. 
19 (12,28) 18 (9,26) 19 (6,27) 
WTD hits recv. from opp. 18 (9,27) 19 (12,29) 19 (9,34) 
Hits recv. t-test p-values 0.5474 0.6624 0.8028 
 
Table 10-6: Hits by Round – Thunder Opp. 
Hits by Round – Thunder Opp. 
Avg (Min, Max) 





Stag-Hunt hits to opp. 11 (4,25) 11 (2,25) 10 (1,21) 
WTD hits to opp. 9 (2,22) 9 (2,19) 9 (2,21) 
Hits to opp. t-test p-values 0.0195 0.0157 0.1266 
Stag-Hunt hits recv. from 
opp. 
38 (22,53) 36 (23,59) 37 (23,53) 
WTD hits recv. from opp. 37 (18,56) 37 (21,56) 37 (23,54) 
Hits recv. t-test p-values 0.1948 0.1403 0.9357 
 
The statistical test results for differences in the means between Stag-Hunt and WTD for each 
round are also included in the tables. Here again Stag-Hunt performs statistically better (on a per 
round basis) but only for the hits-to-opponent measure. 
Another measure is the relative score – it’s the score achieved by the CATNeuro player minus 
that achieved by the opponent. The relative-score distributions for Stag-Hunt and WTD are shown 
in Figure 10-1 for Jerry Mizuno and  Figure 10-2 for Thunder. Y-axis is probability and x-axis is the 
relative-score. The distributions represent the relative-scores achieved by the Stag-Hunt and WTD 
models, respectively, in the games played. The title of the chart also shows the means and the t-
test for the differences between the means. For Thunder, at 17% probability of the means being 
the same, it is not as significant as the p-value for hits-to-opponent metric (Table 10-3) but it is 
still meaningful. With additional samples, the p-value should indicate better significance. As-is, the 





derived models perform better than WTD derived ones. For reference, equivalent data for Jerry 
Mizuno does not show statistical significance (Figure 10-1). Both approaches did well against the 
AI model. 
 






Figure 10-2: Relative-score density plot for Stag-Hunt and WTD when playing Thunder 
 
10.1.2 Best Model Performance Results for Jerry Mizuno 
Best models for Stag-Hunt and WTD when playing Jerry Mizuno AI are shown in tables Table 
10-7 and Table 10-8. The best models are described in terms of: 
a. The number of hits to opponent  
b. The relative score (player score – opp. score) 
The associated graphical depictions of the neural network models for (a) are given in Figure 
10-3 for WTD and  Figure 10-4 for Stag-Hunt. And for (b) the corresponding models are in Figure 





The relative score is the difference between the score achieved by CATNeuro model minus that 
for the opponent (Jerry Mizuno in this section). The scores are on a per round basis. As there are 
three rounds per game and the ten games are played by each model, the statistics are based on a 
sample size of 30. 
Table 10-7: Best Model (hits to opp.) - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp. 
Best Model (hits to opp.) - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp. 
Average hits to opp. per round 
 
Stag-Hunt WTD 
Avg hits to opp. / round 26.93 27.4 
Standard Deviation 4.71 4.1 
Two-sample t-test p value 0.6837 (samples=30) 
 
Table 10-8: Best Model (relative-score) - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp. 
Best Model (relative-score) - CATNeuro vs. Jerry Mizuno Opp. 




Relative score 25.5 10 





Two-sample t-test p value 0.4636 (samples =30) 
 
The results for the best models, against Jerry Mizuno, do not show significant differences 
between Stag-Hunt and WTD. They both do equally well. For the relative-score model, (Table 10-8) 
seemingly Stag-Hunt average is quite a bit better than WTD but the difference is not statistically 
significant. 
In terms of the graphical models that achieve the best score by hits-to-opponent (Figure 10-3 
for WTD and Figure 10-4 Stag-Hunt), the WTD model is much larger and deeper whereas the Stag-
Hunt is smaller and shallower. This is consistent with the aggregate statistics for model sizes and 
depth (discussed later in section 10.4); Stag-Hunt models tend to be smaller. 
The case is different for best models in terms of relative-score (Figure 10-5 for WTD and Figure 
10-6 for Stag-Hunt). Here the Stag-Hunt model is larger and deeper than the equivalent WTD 
model. Hits-to-opponent measures the offensive posture of the models but relative-score 
measures the balance between offence and defense. A larger model make sense in that it will 
retain more of the information available in the training data – especially if the training loss is also 


































10.1.3 Best Model Performance Results for Thunder 
The previous section compared the best model performance results and graphical model 
structures for Jerry Mizuno a benchmark AI supplied with FightingICE. This section discusses 
equivalent results models for Thunder, the 2018 champion. 
Results for the best models by hits-to-opponent are given in Table 10-9 and those for relative-
score are in Table 10-10. 
Table 10-9: Best Model (hits to opp.) - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp. 
Best Model (hits to opp.) - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp. 
Average hits to opp. per round 
 
Stag-Hunt WTD 
Avg hits to opp. / round 11.6 11.17 
Standard Deviation 3.52 3.49 
Two-sample t-test p value 0.6339 (samples=30) 
 
Table 10-10: Best Model (relative-score) - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp. 
Best Model (relative-score) - CATNeuro vs. Thunder Opp. 








Relative score -395.07 -394.37 
Standard Deviation 126.03 101.87 
Two-sample t-test p value 0.9812 (samples=30) 
 
The tables show that for the best models produced by Stag-Hunt and WTD, there are no 
significant differences between the equivalent models. The best models perform equally well. This 
shows that WTD is able to produce good models but its less consistent than Stat-Hunt as borne 
out by the aggregate results discussed earlier (Figure 10-2).  
The corresponding graphical models are in Figure 10-7 (WTD for hits to opp.); Figure 10-8 (Stag-







Figure 10-7: WTD vs. Thunder best model by hits to opp. [Training Loss:1.91, Tunable Parms:9619, Nodes:27, Conns=37, 
Depth=9] 
The equivalent graphical models for Stag-Hunt are smaller in terms of the number of tunable 
parameters or weights and deeper than those for WTD. For the hits-to-opponent best models, 
WTD has 9619 tunable weights and a depth of 9. By contrast, the Stag-Hunt has 9556 weights and 
depth of 16. These patterns hold true for the relative-score best models. This shows that Stag-



























This section compared the aggregate and best model performances of the models produced 
by the two KD mechanisms. Both the game scores and the graphical model were compared. The 
next section compares the action distributions of the Stag-Hunt and WTD models used for game 
play. 
10.2 Action Distribution Comparison 
As described in section 9.1, the controller in the FightingICE game can chose from of one of 56 
actions. The actions can be classified as offense, defense or positioning (tactical movement). Not 
all actions are necessarily played by all controllers. This section compares the action distributions 
in a “head-to-head” manner for the Stag-Hunt and WTD models used in game play. Two 
perspectives can be taken a) the action distribution of the CATNeuro players when they are playing 
against the same opponent and b) the action distribution of the opponent when playing Stag-Hunt 
vs when playing WTD.  
For both mechanisms, the distribution over actions is quite uneven (i.e. the frequencies of the 
actions vary considerably) and raw counts or histograms are not very informative. The projection 
of the same data on a head-to-head basis (see Figure 10-11 for an example) is easier to use for 
analysis and insights. The action distributions add to the understanding of players’ skill in the sense 
that a more skillful player will display a greater variety of actions. The presentations of the data in 
this way is labelled “relative action distribution”. Note that the data is just what side (top or 
bottom) plays the action higher number of times. If the corresponding colored bar crosses over 
the green line in the middle, it means that the count is higher for that side. The charts are relative, 
i.e. they are do not denote absolute counts; an action may only be played a few times by each 





charts but even so some insights can be obtained. Such charts make the comparison easier as the 
frequency of actions between the two players can be directly compared. 
The relative lengths of the colored bars can be used to visually judge the relative difference 
between the counts of the corresponding action. However, a simpler metric is the count of bars 
of one color that are longer than opposing bars of the other color. Such counts are given in the 
title area of each relative action distribution chart. Again, referring to Figure 10-11, the number of 
actions where Stag-Hunt dominates is 29. The corresponding value for WTD is 24. This metric will 
be referred to several times in the following analysis so its best to give a name. Let it be HAC for 
“higher action count” so HAC for Stag-Hunt is 29 and that for WTD is 24 in Figure 10-11. The 
relative action distributions for the Jerry Mizuno and Thunder are discussed separately next. 
10.2.1 Action Distributions – Jerry Mizuno 
This section discusses the relative action distributions for the CATNeuro players vs. Jerry 
Mizuno for both a) aggregated across all models; b) for best models for Stag-Hunt and WTD with 

















































































Figure 10-11 is relative action distribution of Stag-Hunt players vs WTD players, aggregated 
across all models. By contrast Figure 10-12 shows the relative action distribution of Jerry Mizuno 
AI when playing Stag-Hunt players vs. when playing WTD players. The titles of the graphs show 
the number of actions for which the count of actions is higher by KD mechanism, i.e. the HAC 
values, introduced earlier. For example, in Figure 10-11, the Stag-Hunt and WTD HAC values are 
29 and 24, respectively. Together, both players used 29 + 24 = 53 actions (out of the available 56) 
at least at one point in the games. 
It is interesting to note that the opponent, Jerry Mizuno has a HAC (25) that is twice as higher 
when playing against WTD players than against Stag-Hunt players (12). This indicates that on 
average Jerry Mizuno uses a greater variety of actions against WTD. In other words, on the whole, 
WTD forces Jerry Mizuno to be more versatile. Also, the total actions played by Jerry Mizuno is 
25+12 = 37. This is quite a bit less than those played by CATNeuro players (53). There are 3 ‘air’ 
actions that Jerry Mizuno used when playing against WTD that it did not use against Stag-Hunt. 
The converse is true for only one action. 
Looking at  Figure 10-11, there seems to be no major differences between WTD and Stag-Hunt 
however  Figure 10-12 shows that, from the opponent’s perspective there are discernable 
differences. Jerry Mizuno is using different strategies (distribution over actions) when playing 
against Stag-Hunt vs WTD. The dynamics are not captured when looking at just the CATNeuro 
player distributions but a more complete picture emerges with the combined view of both the 
players’ and opponent’s distributions. The overall result for Jerry Mizuno surmises that the models 
produced by the two KD mechanism tend to learn different ways of playing the game – i.e. the 





Figure 10-13 and Figure 10-14 are relative action distributions for the best models in terms of 
hits-to-opponent. As before, Figure 10-13 is from the CATNeuro players’ perspective and Figure 
10-14 from the opponent’s. The ‘players action distributions clearly show that two models are 
using different strategies – defense and positioning actions are higher for Stag-Hunt and the mixes 
are different for offense between the two. The HAC for Stag-Hunt (37) is also much higher than 
that for WTD (16).  If anything, the WTD model is stresses offense over defense as it uses two 
attack types that Stag-Hunt never uses. The slightly higher ‘hits score for WTD is maybe an 
indication of that. Figure 10-13 is Jerry Mizuno’s actions when playing against the two KD 
mechanisms. The most interesting aspect is that the combined HAC is 12+19=21. This means that 
the, against the best models, Jerry Mizuno only uses 21 out of the 56 available actions. Since these 
are the most aggressive models it is quite likely the models are pinning the opponent down and 
therefore the opponent can respond with a limit set of actions. 
Figure 10-15 and Figure 10-16 are the corresponding charts for the best models by relative-
score. Relative-score is the difference between a CATNeuro player’s and the opponent’s scores. 
First off, the score difference between Stag-Hunt and WTD is approaching statistical significance 
in favor of Stag-Hunt. The p-value is 17% - with more samples it could be reduced further. Then, 
visually, it can be seen in both charts that strategies followed are all different. Stag-Hunt is more 
aggressive as the HAC for just the offensive actions is higher. Jerry Mizuno (Figure 10-16) is also 
more aggressive against Stag-Hunt as there are 3 offense actions that it uses against Stag-Hunt 
but not against WTD (these are “AIR_A”, “AIR_DB”, “STAND_FA”).  Also, Jerry Mizuno uses the 
“JUMP” action against only Stag-Hunt – most likely to avoid getting hit when on the ground. This 





Note that “AIR_” prefix (for offense actions) is for attacks done when the character is in the air. 
These could be different kinds of kicks, or punches. The exact sequence of moves varies by the 
character type; of which there are two - Zen and Garnet. All games were played with Zen on both 
sides. Similarly, “STAND_” and “CROUCH_” prefixes related to actions while in the standing and 
crouching states, respectively. 
10.2.2 Action Distributions – Thunder 
This section performs similar analysis for the Thunder opponent as was done for Jerry Mizuno 
in the previous section. Figure 10-17 and  Figure 10-18 are aggregate-level charts from the players’ 
and the opponent’s perspectives, respectively. Here Stag-Hunt does statistically better than WTD 
but that is not really apparent from the action distributions in Figure 10-17; except that Stag-Hunt 
uses more of the “AIR_F_D_DFB”, “STAND_D_DB_BB” and “STAND_F_D_DFA” attacks (the 
differences are visually discernable). Form the opponent’s perspective (Figure 10-18), at the 
aggregate level, the action distributions of Thunder when playing Stag-Hunt vs. when playing WTD 
are about the same except for two actions. Against Stag-Hunt, Thunder uses “THROW_A” attack 
much more often and does not seem to use the “AIR_FA” attack. On the whole the HAC value for 
Stag-Hunt (30) is higher than for WTD (22). This implies that Thunder is forced to display more 
versatility against Stag-Hunt. In contrast, it was noted earlier that Jerry Mizuno (the weaker 
opponent) displayed more versatility against WTD (Figure 10-12). Also Thunder uses more types 
of actions (30+22=52) than Jerry Mizuno (12+25=37) at the aggregate level. This also shows that 
Thunder is the stronger player. 
Figure 10-19 and Figure 10-20 are relative distributions from the players’ and the opponent 





Hunt and WTD models (Figure 10-19) is not statistically different but the strategies followed are 
quite different. The HAC score for the Stag-Hunt model (31) is much higher than for WTD (19). This 
shows that the Stag-Hunt model is relatively more versatile that the WTD one. Comparatively, 
Stag-Hunt is more offensive, and WTD is more defensive. The HAC value for the just the offense 
actions is 17 for Stag-Hunt vs. 9 for WTD. The defense HAC is 1 for Stag-Hunt and 4 for WTD. 
From Thunder’s perspective (Figure 10-20) it is also apparent that Stag-Hunt is the more 
aggressive model. The HAC of Thunder’s defense actions is 5 to 0 for Stag-Hunt opponent vs WTD; 
i.e. Thunder is forced to be more defensive when playing against the Stag-Hunt model. The offense 
HAC for Thunder is about the same against both, overall, although there is a marked difference in 
some specific actions. This shows that models from both KDs are engaging well with Thunder but 
Stag-Hunt is trying to land more hits, which Thunder is defending well against. 
Figure 10-21 and Figure 10-22 are relative distributions for the best model by relative-score. 
Here the results are statistically significant in favor of Stag-Hunt. It is somewhat surprising that 
WTD is dominates in terms of HAC, across the board. This implies that Stag-Hunt is able to win 
with an overreliance on a few specific, well-timed moves or ‘combos’. The aspect of timeliness is 
not captured in this view of the data. However, a peek into timeliness can be obtained by 
observing what the opponent is doing.  
 Figure 10-22 shows that Thunder’s HAC against Stag-Hunt (28) is distinctly higher than against 
WTD (16). Thus, Thunder needs to be more versatile when playing against Stag-Hunt. This 
indicates that Stag-Hunt is making more timely moves (or using combos) that are forcing Thunder 






This section showed the relative action distributions for the CATNeuro players vs. Thunder as 
a) aggregated across all models and b) for the best models by hits-to-opponent, and relative-score. 
This view of the data covers the overall stance or action strategies of the players and opponents 
but not the prevalent sequence of actions used by the different players/opponents. The next 
section analyses sequences of actions or combos. 
10.3 Combo Analysis 
As described in section 9.7.3 the combo sequence patterns are aggregated into categories such 
as OTD, OTO, etc. on a per round basis. This data is used to test for statistical differences between 
the two KD mechanisms, against each of the two opponents.   
 
Figure 10-23: Hits by combo type - player vs. Jerry Mizuno 
The hits landed against opponent Jerry Mizuno by the models from both mechanisms, under the 
different combo categories or types, are shown in Figure 10-23. Statistically significant 





under the TOT (tactic-offence-tactic) combo category however there is no statistical difference 
between the hits landed by the two types of CATNeuro players. The TOT category is seen to 
represent agility with offense. WTD does statistically better in OTO, TDO and TDT categories but 
the differences are very small. 
 
Figure 10-24: Hits by combo type - player vs. Thunder 
Similar data against Thunder is shown in Figure 10-24. Against the stronger player, Stag-Hunt 
performs statistically more hits under several of the categories namely, DOT, OTO, TDO, TDT, and 
TOT. Categories with zero counts are not shown. Although the per round differences are minor, 
Stag-Hunt is consistently higher than WTD across all the categories. As with Jerry Mizuno, most 
hits are still landed with the TOT type combos. This data also shows that Thunder is the stronger 
opponent as the hit rates for both CATNeuro players are much lower than those against Jerry 
Mizuno. 
From the above analysis it is evident that Stag-Hunt is able to produce more versatile models 





Stag-Hunt models are able to land statistically more hits that WTD produced ones across a wide 
spectrum of combo categories. The models considered here and in the prior sections of this 
chapter are the top 10% models used for game play. The properties of the full set of generated 
models are discussed next. 
10.4 Model Properties Comparison 
This section compares the properties of the models generated by WTD and Stag-Hunt 
mechanisms. Out of all the models produced (120), only the top 10% (in terms of lowest training 
loss) were used to play the games with Jerry Mizuno and Thunder. 
Even though the majority of the models were not used to play games, they can still serve as a 
basis of comparison between Stag-Hunt and WTD mechanisms and provide further insight. Each 
CATNeuro run returns the top 20 models discovered in the run. As there are 6 runs per 
mechanism, there are 6 x 20 = 120 models per mechanism used for comparison in this section. 
Note that the models produced are orthogonal with respect to the opponents played against (i.e. 
Jerry Mizuno and Thunder); i.e. the same models were played against both opponents.  
The model properties analyzed were first given in Table 9-5. Each of these will be discussed 
next. The analysis presented for each property includes density plots (as explained earlier in 






Figure 10-25: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for the number of nodes contained in the models produced 
Figure 10-25 shows the density and of the number of nodes in the models produced. 
Statistically and visually there is not much difference between the two mechanisms. Models with 
about 24 nodes are produced on average by both mechanisms. Note the count reflects the lowest 
level nodes in each model, including input and output nodes. The count excludes the Blueprint 
nodes that are replaced by module species subgraphs at assembly time. The consistency of Stag-
Hunt is slightly better in Figure 10-25 as mass is more narrowly distributed. And the mode for Stag-
Hunt is higher. 
Figure 10-26 show the density for the total number of edges in the models. From the statistical 
perspective, Stag-Hunt models have a smaller number of edges on the whole. The difference is 





mass is also more compactly distributed. The greater consistency of Stag-Hunt seems to be a 
persistent theme. 
 
Figure 10-26: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for the number of edges in the models produced 
Figure 10-27 is for the maximum path length (or depth) of the models. It is the length of the 
longest path from top to bottom. Statistically, there is no significant difference between the 
models produced by the two KD mechanisms. However, visually the mode for Stag-Hunt is higher 






Figure 10-27: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for the maximum path lengths of the models produced 
The distributions over the number of tunable weights or parameters are shown in Figure 10-28. 
These values are calculated by the deep learning framework used for model training in this 
experiment – CNTK (Seide & Agarwal, 2016). CNTK calculates this value after a Blueprint and 
selected modules have been assembled into a complete deep learning model. It reflects the real-
world size of the model. In general, it is desirable to have smaller models for a variety of reasons, 
provided the model accuracy is acceptable. Smaller models are easier to train and faster to use at 
runtime. This is particularly important for game play because near real-time response is required 
to play the game effectively. Also, smaller models tend to overfit less. The CATNeuro system has 
a pluggable ranking mechanism (multi-objective support) that balances model size with training 





Here Stag-Hunt is statistically better in that it produces smaller models that have about 1300 
less weights to train, on average (7625 – 6291 = 1334). Figure 10-28 shows that there is more to 
the story than just the statistics. Unlike the other density plots discussed thus far, the mass for 
Stag-Hunt is more widely distributed. It is bi-modal where the higher mode matches that for WTD 
at 9K and the other peaks at around 5.5K. All-in-all the chart shows that Stag-Hunt can find smaller 
models that are also good performers. The performance aspect – in terms of training loss – will be 
discussed next.  
 
Figure 10-28: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for the number of parameter weights for the models produced 
Figure 10-29 shows the training loss density. It is the mean squared error loss between the 
training data and the model output. Here again Stag-Hunt does better with statistical significance. 
Moreover, the mass distribution is narrower indicating that Stag-Hunt is more consistently able to 






Figure 10-29: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for training loss 
The final chart in this series is the number of generations at which the best model was found, 
shown in  Figure 10-30. There are no meaningful differences between the number of generations 
taken by the two KD mechanisms to find the best model, either statistically or visually. Also, the 
range is quite large. The termination condition used was “terminate if no improvement in 10 
generations”. In the majority of the cases the best models were found at close to 30 generations 
however some were found after 70 generations. As mentioned before the training time is quite 







Figure 10-30: Stag-Hunt and WTD distributions for the generations at which the best models were discovered 
10.5 Summary and Conclusions 
For the CATNeuro system, 6 samples were taken with each KD mechanisms. A total of 120 
models were produced for each and the top 10% played against both Jerry Mizuno and Thunder. 
The prior sections discussed the performance of the game models (10.1);  the strategic variation 
in the models as reflected in the relative action distributions (10.2); and the overall properties of 
the models produced (10.4).  
For the game performance, Stag-Hunt performs statistically better in: 
a. The hits-to-opponent metric, at the aggregate level, against Thunder (Table 10-1) 





c. Best model by relative-score against Jerry Mizuno (Figure 10-16) 
d. Best model by relative-score against Thunder (Figure 10-21) 
More differences are apparent between two KD mechanism when playing the stronger 
opponent Thunder. For the benchmark AI Jerry Mizuno, both mechanisms perform equally well, 
except for c) above. 
The relative action distributions reveal the strategies followed by each of the players – be it 
CATNeuro or opponents. As expected, the weaker opponent Jerry Mizuno uses a considerably 
smaller number of actions than Thunder does. At the aggregate level, how the opponents respond 
is more informative than the action distributions of the CATNeuro players themselves. This is 
apparent in Figure 10-12 for Jerry Mizuno where the HAC for Stag-Hunt is much lower than that 
for WTD. These figures are flipped in Figure 10-18 for Thunder where the HAC of Stag-Hunt is 
higher than that for WTD. The stronger opponent uses a greater variety of actions against Stag-
Hunt models. In general, Stag-Hunt produced models that are more offense oriented that WTD 
ones. This is apparent in Figure 10-18 where Thunder uses more defense actions when playing 
against Stag-Hunt models. 
Considering model properties, it is noted that Stag-Hunt: 
a. produces smaller models than WTD does (Figure 10-28) 
b. it is consistently better in terms of training performance (Figure 10-29) 





However, beyond purely statistical measures, most density plots show that Stag-Hunt is more 
consistent (has narrower distributions) than WTD, except for when it comes to model size for the 
number of tunable parameter weights. 
 
Figure 10-31: Correlation between generations and model size 
10.6 Testing the Hypotheses 






Hy 9-1 “Cooperative knowledge distribution will yield more versatile 
models” 
holds 
 The data to answer this question comes from the game performance 
measures, relative action distributions and combo categories. From a 
performance perspective, Stag-Hunt performs better when faced with 
Thunder for the measures listed earlier. However, against the 
benchmark AI Jerry Mizuno there are no significant performance 
differences between Stag-Hunt and WTD (except for one case) since 
both did well against Jerry Mizuno bot for different reasons. Looking 
at the relative action distributions there is also no clear and consistent 
pattern. Firstly, the HAC values for the players are not very telling. 
There is greater differential between the HAC values of the opponent 
when playing CATNeuro. But here again there is lack of consistency as 
HAC values for Jerry Mizuno show that WTD is more versatile but those 
for Thunder show that Stag-Hunt is more versatile. However, the 
definitive evidence that Stag-Hunt produces more versatile models 
comes from the combo analysis performed in section 10.3. Stag-Hunt 
is able to land significantly more hits than WTD, under a variety of 
combo categories, when playing against the stronger player Thunder 
and therefore Hy 9-1 is accepted. 
 




 This hypothesis is answerable from Figure 10-30 that shows the 
density of the number of generations to find the top models for both 
mechanisms. Both statistically and visually there is nothing to choose 
between Stag-Hunt and WTD and therefore this hypothesis is rejected. 
 






 Here a relationship between the search time and model size is being 
postulated. Figure 10-31 shows this relationship graphically along with 
the correlation measures for Stag-Hunt and WTD. Stag-Hunt (0.42) 
exhibits good correlation between search time and model size 
whereas WTD (0.09) does not.  Stag-Hunt behaves as postulated; it 
seems to be more disciplined. The higher correlation for Stag-Hunt is 
also visually apparent (blue dots in the chart). Initially the correlation 
is linear but then number of nodes seem to level off as generations 
increase. This is primarily due to the limits imposed on the models in 
terms of sizes of the population individuals in the CATNeuro 
configuration used for the runs. Hy 9-3, thus partially holds. It holds for 
Stag-Hunt but not for WTD. 
 
Hy 9-4 “The training loss is lower for cooperative distribution mechanism”  {holds} 
 Hy 9-4 is relatively easy to determine. Figure 10-29 shows the training 
loss distributions for Stag-Hunt and WTD. Average Stag-Hunt loss at 
1.862 mean square error is lower than 1.905 for WTD and difference 
is statistically significant. Visually, the distribution of loss for Stag-Hunt 
is also narrower and peakier. This shows that Stag-Hunt is able to more 
consistently produce models with lower training loss and therefore Hy 
9-4 holds. 
 
Hy 9-5 “Cooperative distribution performs better than competitive 
distribution under more complex environmental conditions” 
{holds} 
 As with CATGame, CATNeuro was tested with multiple levels of 
environmental complexity. Here complexity is in the form of the 
strength of the opponents played against - Jerry Mizuno the 
benchmark AI included with FightingICE; and Thunder the 2018 
champion. Considering the aggregate performance results for both 






Mizuno and Table 10-3 for Thunder. Against Jerry Mizuno both KD 
mechanisms perform equally well are able to beat the opponent. 
However, against Thunder (representing higher complexity) Stag-Hunt 
performs significantly better. This is somewhat consistent with the 
relative-score measures shown in Figure 10-1 for Jerry Mizuno and 
Figure 10-2 for Thunder. For Jerry Mizuno there is no statistical 
difference between the relative-scores of the two KD mechanisms. 
However, against Thunder, Stag-Hunt performs better than WTD and 
with a p-value of 17%. All told there is strong evidence that 
cooperative distribution performs relatively better when 
environmental complexity is higher and therefore Hy 9-5 is 
established. 
 
The experimental results for the framework developed in section 9.7 were analyzed and 
discussed in this section. Also, the hypotheses postulated in 9.7 were discussed in light of the 
obtained results and conclusion drawn as to each’s validity. The next chapter summarizes the 





CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
11.0 Introduction 
Cultural Algorithms are knowledge-driven stochastic optimization methods meant for problem 
solving in complex systems. Inspired by anthropological processes, the CA brings much machinery 
to bear on such tasks (Chapter 2). From the Belief Space which is a persistent and responsive store 
of knowledge; a socially networked population space; to intelligent knowledge distribution 
mechanisms; it is aptly equipped to tackle the behavior of a complex system. 
The role of the knowledge distribution mechanisms is germane as they are the key allocators 
of computational resources in a CA system; even more so today when CA research focus has 
shifted to solve dynamically and hierarchically complex multi-objective problems. CA knowledge 
distribution mechanisms have steadily grown in their level of information processing capability 
(entropy) to tackle increasingly complex problems (Chapter 3). Earliest system used random 
distribution of knowledge then competitive mechanisms were developed, specifically majority 
weighted.  The focus of this research is on using games for knowledge distribution, particularly 
cooperation-inclusive games since all prior mechanisms have been competitive. 
Game theory is a deep and vast subject area (Chapter 4) but provides a fertile source of ideas 
for knowledge distribution mechanisms. Three distribution mechanisms were studied, inspired by 
several games in classical and evolutionary game theory, namely: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
Stag-Hunt and Stackelberg; all of which span both cooperation and competition. IPD and Stag-
Hunt are related in that Stag-Hunt is an evolutionary game theory variant of Prisoner’s Dilemma 
from classical game theory. Stag-Hunt involves the notion of time in a sense missing from IPD 





CATGame, a new software system, was constructed in order to facilitate this research. It 
contains a generic mechanism that can be used for injecting arbitrary games into the Influence 
function of the CA for knowledge distribution (Chapter 5).  This mechanism is used by concrete 
adaptions of the aforementioned three games (Chapter 6). In this research, the three 
cooperative/competitive mechanisms are contrasted against the default Weighted Majority 
mechanism (3.2) which is purely competitive. 
IPD and Stag-Hunt are played from the perspective of the players in the population space. Each 
individual plays the game with all of its network neighbors. Due to the structure of the population 
space, complete symmetry and reciprocity is not possible. Each individual is playing against players 
who in turn are playing against a slightly different set of players (their respective neighbors). Thus, 
the games cannot be solved in a classical sense of finding the Nash equilibrium – apart from the 
fact that it would be computationally infeasible to do so. Instead, the players make 
cooperative/competitive decisions based on the best available information. Knowledge 
distribution in each is a two-step process where the players first are classified as Cooperator / 
Defector and then based on that, the knowledge assignments are performed. As a Cooperator an 
individual forgoes egoistic behavior and instead behaves according its rank in society (i.e. social 
rank - Listing 6-2, Listing 6-3). A relatively low-ranking individual accepts a relatively explorative 
Knowledge Source and high ranker, a relatively exploitative one. As a Defector the individual keeps 
its current assignment or accepts the locally dominant KS, depending on factors. 
Stackelberg is played from the perspective of the Knowledge Sources that reside in the Belief 
Space. In microeconomics Stackelberg players make production and (implicitly pricing) decisions 





KD allocates the best individuals to the strongest KS but in a way that leaves room for the less 
strong KS. The decision making in Stackelberg is more centralized and structured, as in a centrally 
planned economic system. By contrast IPD and Stag-Hunt are more dynamic and utilize more local 
(i.e. neighborhood) information. 
The performance of the new KD cooperative/competitive mechanisms is compared with 
Weighted Majority, a purely competitive mechanism, with a dynamic landscape generator (7.1); 
Cones World. The dynamic complexity is controlled by the setting the A multiplier of the logistic 
equation. Values of A=1.0, 3.1, 3.6 and 3.9 are used. A=1.0 induces linear changes; at A > 3.0 the 
changes become non-linear; and at 3.9 the chaotic values are produced. The optimization 
landscapes are changed after 2500 generations while the optimization run is still underway. A 
total of 50 landscapes are generated in sequence for a single run. Each KD-A combination is run 
200 times to obtain statistically significant results (7.6).  
Resilience is measured by how quickly the system is able to find the new optimum after the 
proverbial rug is pulled from under it. The main performance metric is the generations-to-solution 
or G2S (7.2). G2S is tracked by landscape change. A new landscape in the sequence is created by 
changing the heights of the cones in the previous landscape using the values obtained from the 
logistic sequence generator. 
CA is a ‘social’ system and hence the behavior of the system can be tracked with several social 
metrics. Diffusion (7.3) and Segregation Index (7.4) are social metrics that measure static aspects 
of the system. However, the CA is also a dynamical system and so to understand the dynamic 





Community formations are detected using the Frequent Pattern Growth algorithm. Community-
to-community transitions are analyzed with Google Page Rank and other graph-based approaches. 
11.1 The CATGame Results 
Experimental data was collected using the Wayne State grid computing facility. Over 1 terabyte 
of detailed log data was collected from the 200 sample runs for each KD-A combination. The 
experimental results are tabulated and presented in Chapter 8. Inferences about the hypotheses 
postulated in section 7.6, are drawn in section 8.5. 
CATGame is a numerical optimization system meant for use in static and dynamic 
environments. The cooperative, game-based knowledge distribution achieved varied results 
under the different levels of complexity. It was found that IPD and Stag-Hunt generally performed 
the best from linear to chaotic; both were the most resilient to environmental changes (8.1). 
Stackelberg on the other hand was not able to track the changes as well. It performed well initially 
(i.e. in the first few landscapes of the sequence) but then its G2S performance became 
progressively worse over the progression of the landscapes. Also, Stackelberg performs 
progressively worse with increasing non-linear complexity. Weighted Majority shows robust 
behavior in the face of complexity. It is quite robust at A=1 but still lags behind IPD and Stag-Hunt 
in the earlier landscapes but catches up to them later in the sequence (Figure 8-1). With higher A 
values, IPD and Stag-Hunt start to distance themselves from the rest (Figure 8-2, Figure 8-3 & 
Figure 8-4). Overall Stag-Hunt is the most resilient of all the mechanisms tested. It quickly adapts 
to environment change levels and tracks the changes well over time. 
If Weighted Majority is the “wisdom of the crowd” then IPD and Stag-Hunt represent 





to work well in the face of environmental uncertainty. However, the structured cooperation model 
of Stackelberg is not seen as being as effective. One difference between the two types of 
cooperation is that Stackelberg does not take into account local information. It is akin to a centrally 
planned economic system; i.e. where the resource allocation decisions are centralized. The other 
mechanisms (including WTD) have a ‘market’ economy aspect where allocation decisions are 
decentralized and take into account local conditions. The collapse of socialism in recent geo-
political history is perhaps a reminder that excessive centralization is not effective when the pace 
of change is high. 
The static and dynamic social analyses provide further insight into the operations of the 
different KD mechanisms. The most telling is Schelling’s Segregation Index. Higher performing 
mechanisms have consistent response in terms of exhibiting higher average segregation as 
environmental complexity changes from linear to non-linear to chaotic (Figure 8-20). To wit, WTD, 
IPD and Stag-Hunt all exhibit an increase in average segregation in the population as complexity 
changes form linear to chaotic. Further, IPD and Stag-Hunt show a higher degree of change in 
population segregation than WTD. This indicates that IPD and Stag-Hunt are more sensitive to 
environmental changes than WTD. Stackelberg on the other hand is not consistent it its responses. 
Here the segregation first increases and then decreases as change tends to chaotic. Segregation 
index is an emergent phenomenon. It can be seen as response to the degree of stress placed on 
the system. More consistent response means that the underlying mechanisms withstand and 
don’t break down under varying degree of duress. 
The dynamic analysis (8.4) shows that both cooperative mechanisms and the competitive 





(Figure 8-46, Figure 8-48, Figure 8-50 and Figure 8-52). All mechanisms have different ‘signature’ 
in terms of the community rankings produced by the dynamics. The signatures remain somewhat 
consistent even across A-values. When one compares the chart for Stackelberg with those of the 
other mechanisms, it can be seen that Stackelberg allocates comparatively more resources to 
exploitation. This partly explains the lack of Stackelberg performance in a dynamic environment 
that seems to require higher degree of exploration especially as the environment becomes more 
chaotic. 
The community-to-community transition data is projected into another view. The communities 
are categorized as Explorative, Neutral or Exploitative, depending on each’s explorative index. 
Then statistically significant changes in net flow are measured and plotted by each A transition 
(e.g. 1.0 → 3.1, 3.1 → 3.6, etc.). Net flow here means net change (increase – decrease) into a 
particular category. Take the Explorative category and 1.0 → 3.1 (linear → non-linear) transition. 
The statistically significant inflow ([Neutral; Exploitative] → Explorative) and outflow (Explorative 
→ [Neutral; Exploitative]) are measured and the differences taken. This value is the resource 
increase / decrease into the Explorative category due to the change in A 1.0→3.1. This is done for 
all transitions and all categories. Figure 8-58 and Figure 8-59 show the net flow for Explorative and 
Exploitative categories, respectively. The interesting result is that the best performing mechanism 
– Stag-Hunt – is very consistent in allocating progressively more resources to exploration and 
progressively less resources to exploitation, with each increment in A. None of the other 
mechanisms are completely consistent. This is a strong indication that the underlying mechanism 
of resource allocation in Stag-Hunt is very robust in the face of environmental complexity. It also 





directed to exploration. The observed segregation behavior can also be explained from this result; 
increasing exploration (and decreasing exploitation) changes the mix of the communities in the 
population and therefore increases segregation as explorative KS will tend to dominate. 
Considering that the KD mechanism is the primary factor in the distribution of knowledge (i.e. 
allocation of compute resources) in the CA, it can be concluded that Stag-Hunt is the most 
consistent in making allocation decisions under varying levels of complexity and therefore shows 
as being the most robust in the face of it. 
CATGame was meant to test the behavior of cooperative knowledge distribution under 
dynamic complexity. Another notion of complexity is hierarchical complexity. How well does 
cooperation work to solve hierarchically complex problems? 
To answer this question the CATNeuro system was constructed to find optimal model 
structures for deep learning models. CATNeuro uses CA for Neural Architecture Search (NAS) – an 
emerging field that is currently drawing considerable research interest. The top evolutionary 
computation conference “IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence” (WCCI) 2020 has 
an entire track dedicated to Neural Architecture Search. 
CATNeuro uses speciation with multiple populations to evolve optimal models (inspired by 
NEAT and derivative works) (9.1). This is a hierarchical optimization problem (Figure 1-4). Tier one 
is the overall graph structure (blueprint); tier two is the selection of module species that are 
assembled into a particular blueprint; and tier three is the optimization of parameters such as e.g. 





11.2 CATNeuro Results 
CATGame is for numerical optimization in dynamic environments and CATNeuro is finding 
optimal graph structures – two very different domains and two different notions of complexity. 
The best performing cooperative mechanism from CATGame – Stag-Hunt – is implemented and 
its performance compared with the default competitive mechanism – Weighed Majority (9.3). 
The test problem is to evolve an optimal model to play the FightingICE game against the two 
selected opponents – the benchmark AI Jerry Mizuno and the 2018 champion Thunder (9.1). The 
test problem favors small and fast models that can play the game at the required frame rate. The 
deep learning model training process requires specialized infrastructure and can take a long time 
(e.g. days in some cases). Keeping the test problem manageably small is helpful but even here it 
can take about a week to complete the training and test cycles (including playing the games with 
the selected opponents). For the particular test case, the train-test cycle time can be minimized if 
access is available to a ‘farm’ of 150 GPUs. The sample size for each KD-A mechanism is only 6 vs. 
200 for the CATGame experiment. Additionally, each sample run for CATGame was over 
2500*50=125000 generations vs. only 30-70 generations for CATNeuro. CATGame produces much 
more data. The kind of statistical analysis done for CATGame is not feasible for CATNeuro. Instead 
the focus is on comparing the performance of the models generated by the two KD mechanisms 
against the two players and the comparison of the structural properties and other aspects of the 
generated models (9.7).  
Data required to train the models was obtained through the application of Reinforcement 
Learning using a policy-based approach (9.4). This process is explained in section 9.5; it takes about 





CATNeuro runs are performed with a sample of the training data. Top models are then trained on 
the full dataset and played against the opponents. Under the experimental setup (9.7), each 
model is played 10 times against each opponent and the game statistic recorded. 
The experimental results for CATNeuro are organized by: 
a. Game performance (10.1) 
b. Action strategies (10.2) 
c. Combo analysis (10.3) 
d. Model properties (10.4) 
The game performance results show that against the benchmark AI, Jerry Mizuno, models from 
both KD mechanism performed well and won all the games. Both approaches were able to use 
the same basic techniques to defeat the opponent.  
Against the 2018 champion Thunder all games are lost by each mechanism (which is more of a 
function of the available learnings from RL derive training data). However here, Stag-Hunt derived 
models do better than WTD models, with statistical significance, for hits-to-opponent and relative-
score metrics. This shows that Stag-Hunt can extract relatively more information from the training 
data. 
Considering the relative action distributions, no consistent patterns emerge between the two 
types of CATNeuro players, in head-to-head comparison (Figure 10-11, Figure 10-17). However, 
observing the opponent strategies is more telling - i.e. actions distributions of Jerry Mizuno and 





can also gauge a player’s performance by looking at how the opponent chooses to respond. Jerry 
Mizuno responds with greater versatility when playing WTD models (HAC: WTD = 25, Stag-
Hunt=12). Conversely, Thunder shows greater versatility when playing Stag-Hunt (HAC: WTD=22, 
Stag-Hunt=30). The results show that opponents respond differently and hence the models learnt 
by the two KD mechanism behave differently, at the aggregate level. Greater versatility of the 
opponent against a certain player indicates that the player is forcing the opponent to respond 
with greater variety, by making more timely moves. From this perspective, Stag-Hunt is making 
the stronger player Thunder work harder than WTD does. 
The combo analysis provides clear evidence that Stag-Hunt does indeed create more versatile 
models than WTD does. This is evidenced by the fact that Stag-Hunt lands significantly more hits 
on the stronger opponent Thunder under a variety of combo types. 
The model properties comparison shows that Stag-Hunt produces significantly smaller models 
with respect to number of edges (Figure 10-26) and number of learnable weights (Figure 10-28). 
Also, importantly, Stag-Hunt models have lower training loss on average (Figure 10-29). In general, 
smaller (more parsimonious) models are desired, provided accuracy (training loss) is not 
compromised. Stag-Hunt seems better able to balance these conflicting goals. 
Next, several hypotheses postulated in section 9.7 related to NAS and CATNeuro are analyzed 
and addressed in 10.5. The primary question this research set out to answer is whether 
cooperative knowledge distribution improves CA performance in complex environments. Drawing 
much from Game Theory this proposition is studied with respect to dynamic and hierarchical 
notions of complexity. The results show that, for the numerical optimization domain (dynamic 





better than the default competitive mechanism WTD. WTD is also robust but less so as complexity 
increases. In the neural architecture search domain (hierarchical complexity) the results are mixed 
with a slight edge for cooperation. In vivo (training loss), cooperation performs significantly better 
but in vitro (game play) it is only marginally better. The signal is weaker in the NAS problems and 
therefore “wisdom of the crowd” is about as effective as social rank centered cooperation. 
11.3 Future Direction 
The CATGame system is configured with a generic game mechanism that can be exploited for 
analyzing other cooperative and competitive game mechanisms. Game Theory – both classical and 
evolutionary – have deep reserves to draw from. Exploring other games or evolutionary strategies 
for knowledge distribution will extend the understand for building robust systems in the face of 
complexity. 
Deep learning is a prime area for further exploration. Optimal model topology and 
hyperparameter tuning is an active research area. Model tuning is a time-consuming task that still 
requires much human input and therefore automation to free up human capital is much desired.   
This research shows that evolutionary algorithms are effective means of addressing the NAS 
challenge. By design CA is well suited to solving problems in this domain. 
However, CATNeuro is a new system with many missing features such the ability to construct 
models with convolutions and recurrence. It needs to be extended to provide better coverage of 
the available functionality in deep learning toolkits. The current translation mechanism is for the 
CNTK toolkit only. Translations for other popular toolkits such as Tensorflow, PyTorch and support 





Training deep learning models is already a very time consuming. Adding stochastic search on 
top greatly extends the time required to find optimal models. If history is an indicator, hardware 
to train deep learning models should become, faster, cheaper and more plentiful. CATNeuro is 
built with parallel model training support but it needs to be developed further to seamless access 
vast arrays of training hardware to reduce search time. Many completing NAS approaches are 
being developed and CATNeuro should be benchmarked against the top contenders to derive 






APPENDIX A CATGAME FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE 
CATGame is written in a strongly-typed functional programming language F#. The equivalent 
to UML diagrams in functional programming is the functional interface; it shows the high-level 
structure in terms of the top data structures and function types. 
///type definitions for the CA 'interface'  
//defined in a functional programming way 
module rec CA 
 
///CA structure - instance of CA that can be stepped through for optimization 
type CA<'k> = 
    { 
        BeliefSpace             : BeliefSpace<'k> 
        Acceptance              : Acceptance<'k> 
        Update                  : Update<'k> 
        Influence               : Influence<'k> 
        Population              : Population<'k> 
        Network                 : Network<'k> 
        Fitness                 : Fitness 
        Optimization            : OptimizationKind 
        EnvChngSensitivity      : EnvChngSensitivity                                                   
    } 
 
///how should we respond to environmental changes 
//CA may or may not reset set internal state based on this setting 
type EnvChngSensitivity =  
 
    ///CA does not adjust internal state if environment changes  
    | Insensintive  
 
    ///After how many environmental changes to re-adjust. 
    ///A value of 1 means re-adjust to every environment change 
    | Every of int                                           
 
///Instructs CA how to respond to environment change 
type EnvChngeType =  
    | NoChange    //environment did not change 
    | Adjust      //environment changed - adjust internal state accordingly 
    | Track       //environment changed but only note the changes - do not adjust 
internal state 
 
type OptimizationKind = Minimize | Maximize  //minimization or maximization problem 
 
///tree structure of the belief space knowledge source 
type BeliefSpace<'k> = KnowledgeSource<'k> Tree 
 
///knowledge source type 
type KnowledgeSource<'k> =  





        ///Knowledge type identifier (Domain, Normative, etc.) 
        Type        : Knowledge 
 
        ///Acceptance function type of a knowledge source 
        Accept      : EnvChngeType -> Individual<'k> array -> Individual<'k> array 
* KnowledgeSource<'k> 
 
        ///Influence function type of a knowledge source 
        Influence   : Population<'k> -> Temperature -> Individual<'k> -> 
Individual<'k> 
    } 
 
type Tree<'a>        = Leaf of 'a | Node of 'a * Tree<'a> list | Roots of Tree<'a> 
list 
 
type Knowledge       = Situational | Historical | Normative | Topgraphical | Domain 
| Other of string 
 
///CA acceptance function type 
type Acceptance<'k>  = BeliefSpace<'k> -> Population<'k> -> Individual<'k> array 
 
///CA update function type 
type Update<'k>      = EnvChngeType -> BeliefSpace<'k> -> Individual<'k> array -> 
BeliefSpace<'k> 
 
///CA influence function type 
type Influence<'k>   = Influence of ( 
                            EnvChngeType                                                
//environment change signal 
                                -> Population<'k>  
                                -> BeliefSpace<'k>  
                                -> Network<'k>  
                                -> Fitness  
                                -> OptimizationKind                                          
                                -> (Population<'k>*BeliefSpace<'k>*Influence<'k>))      
//returns updated population, beliefSpace and influence function 
 
///Population individual (parameterized by KS type) 
type Individual<'k>  = {Id:Id; Parms:float array; Fitness:float; KS:'k} 
 
///Population is an array of indviduals 
type Population<'k>  = Individual<'k> array 
 
///Network function type 
type Network<'k>     = Population<'k> -> Id -> Individual<'k> array 
 
///Fitness function type 
type Fitness         = (float array -> float) ref 
 
///Id of the population individual (alias to int) 
type Id = int 
 
///The level of influence to apply (alias to float) 






///Parameters and fitness values extracted from 'best' individuals 
type Marker = {MParms:float[]; MFitness:float} 
 
///Structure to hold single step in a CA run 
type TimeStep<'k> = {CA:CA<'k> ; Best:Marker list; Progress:float list; Count:int; 
EnvChngCount:int} 
 
///function type to specify the termination of a CA run 
type TerminationCondition<'k> = TimeStep<'k> -> bool 
 
///Parameter types and ranges for the fitness problem 
//TODO: make this part of the CA structure 
type Parm =  
    /// float parameter type 
    | F of      v:float     * min:float     * max:float  
 
    ///integer parameter type (stepped through as whole integers by optimiztion 
engine) 
    | I of      v:int       * min:int       * max:int 








APPENDIX B DIFFUSION STATISTICAL TESTS 





























Landscape μ A=1 σ A=1 μ A=3.1 σ A=3.1 μ A=3.6 σ A=3.6 μ A=3.9 σ A=3.9 μ 1!=3.1 μ 3.1!=3.6 μ 3.6!=3.9
1 0.684882 0.121618 0.640029 0.143723 0.668878 0.13145 0.647377 0.132309 1 1 -1
2 0.687477 0.119064 0.685225 0.13055 0.69923 0.109417 0.692919 0.123214 -1 -1 -1
3 0.684755 0.12406 0.683283 0.124613 0.682715 0.121451 0.712467 0.119656 -1 -1 1
4 0.700683 0.11311 0.714847 0.103599 0.720614 0.098751 0.719282 0.094679 -1 -1 -1
5 0.698064 0.111194 0.711711 0.096364 0.716605 0.100754 0.709817 0.102726 -1 -1 -1
6 0.693739 0.119736 0.724081 0.092492 0.720026 0.086444 0.717085 0.088422 1 -1 -1
7 0.709505 0.105973 0.717974 0.083031 0.726222 0.083856 0.723892 0.086572 -1 -1 -1
8 0.702985 0.104832 0.730318 0.080306 0.722952 0.077389 0.723927 0.088887 1 -1 -1
9 0.695203 0.105259 0.712636 0.084233 0.71899 0.074593 0.723587 0.080256 -1 -1 -1
10 0.712062 0.108715 0.726044 0.085414 0.726248 0.07685 0.729508 0.089599 -1 -1 -1
11 0.69707 0.103368 0.721038 0.092796 0.719231 0.082477 0.719125 0.086582 1 -1 -1
12 0.697958 0.112889 0.722351 0.074053 0.72905 0.075827 0.719902 0.088754 1 -1 -1
13 0.716086 0.104594 0.721093 0.080374 0.734102 0.077008 0.728424 0.084107 -1 -1 -1
14 0.707458 0.104027 0.7251 0.072713 0.733144 0.078487 0.716043 0.081707 -1 -1 1
15 0.701595 0.103989 0.72498 0.080153 0.728979 0.084105 0.724507 0.089817 1 -1 -1
16 0.715643 0.100254 0.736115 0.074458 0.746481 0.074972 0.725345 0.077977 1 -1 1
17 0.701386 0.10257 0.723098 0.076929 0.729853 0.075054 0.723456 0.076541 1 -1 -1
18 0.699386 0.111457 0.732422 0.078128 0.726967 0.080003 0.730167 0.077148 1 -1 -1
19 0.710602 0.101651 0.725352 0.072269 0.730034 0.07687 0.735179 0.085961 -1 -1 -1
20 0.703459 0.107197 0.731414 0.074799 0.720034 0.079476 0.720593 0.072217 1 -1 -1
21 0.704564 0.105387 0.725409 0.078614 0.72309 0.076538 0.728283 0.078811 1 -1 -1
22 0.719116 0.103226 0.731046 0.074876 0.733205 0.082338 0.73087 0.07268 -1 -1 -1
23 0.707719 0.102246 0.721559 0.07301 0.726312 0.080203 0.715477 0.079458 -1 -1 -1
24 0.705619 0.103606 0.720577 0.075168 0.712519 0.079068 0.710512 0.089004 -1 -1 -1
25 0.721959 0.1029 0.735565 0.073085 0.72718 0.078241 0.735105 0.076479 -1 -1 -1
26 0.713581 0.092427 0.727977 0.078886 0.736376 0.074539 0.713214 0.077349 -1 -1 1
27 0.702832 0.099305 0.720186 0.075493 0.715576 0.078802 0.726492 0.078083 1 -1 -1
28 0.719331 0.094545 0.726096 0.073314 0.733959 0.074111 0.723772 0.07856 -1 -1 -1
29 0.710846 0.097283 0.730294 0.074579 0.721935 0.077864 0.72905 0.079058 1 -1 -1
30 0.710787 0.101626 0.72804 0.078514 0.715585 0.073342 0.729755 0.069832 -1 -1 1
31 0.722009 0.09758 0.71999 0.073832 0.732161 0.080065 0.72867 0.076166 -1 -1 -1
32 0.711615 0.093664 0.73116 0.075047 0.733156 0.070388 0.720831 0.081247 1 -1 -1
33 0.718205 0.094413 0.718915 0.079285 0.722094 0.077498 0.722202 0.080084 -1 -1 -1
34 0.721808 0.093274 0.7308 0.073688 0.731382 0.070486 0.732189 0.073135 -1 -1 -1
35 0.712471 0.106477 0.723712 0.073613 0.728637 0.083968 0.72656 0.078442 -1 -1 -1
36 0.703958 0.098777 0.718211 0.077439 0.730155 0.07743 0.724838 0.070115 -1 -1 -1
37 0.728623 0.092716 0.732189 0.072761 0.726527 0.084567 0.731951 0.082573 -1 -1 -1
38 0.718543 0.090921 0.710864 0.081912 0.717458 0.077274 0.728584 0.076383 -1 -1 -1
39 0.70511 0.093918 0.727764 0.078916 0.724391 0.078745 0.721464 0.083333 1 -1 -1
40 0.728001 0.093181 0.733495 0.077549 0.73382 0.077212 0.733598 0.077429 -1 -1 -1
41 0.712711 0.09836 0.720976 0.083972 0.722331 0.080576 0.725232 0.084096 -1 -1 -1
42 0.706687 0.100932 0.716796 0.07727 0.721915 0.075704 0.715111 0.081098 -1 -1 -1
43 0.73096 0.100518 0.721736 0.073172 0.732566 0.07046 0.729054 0.078401 -1 -1 -1
44 0.703552 0.097078 0.725452 0.073637 0.719467 0.074721 0.72388 0.07848 1 -1 -1
45 0.70899 0.096284 0.718843 0.073004 0.720397 0.07695 0.72605 0.07691 -1 -1 -1
46 0.708277 0.090335 0.729812 0.074789 0.720961 0.079163 0.730582 0.076754 1 -1 -1
47 0.712029 0.091367 0.718129 0.0775 0.71442 0.07884 0.730839 0.076673 -1 -1 1
48 0.71104 0.104562 0.729141 0.071806 0.721363 0.086555 0.721349 0.084437 1 -1 -1
49 0.719724 0.096669 0.721022 0.073804 0.736041 0.073314 0.729122 0.085545 -1 1 -1










Landscape WTD MeanWTD Stdv. IPD Mean IPD Stdv. TTest IPD != WTD SHS Mean SHS Stdv. TTest SHS != WTD STK Mean STK Stdv. TTest STK != WTD
1 0.656009 0.136437 0.67567 0.121409 -1 0.692123 0.139062 1 0.44514 0.124905 1
2 0.638874 0.136619 0.664599 0.126218 -1 0.66543 0.125283 1 0.505266 0.11745 1
3 0.654591 0.141854 0.667263 0.129044 -1 0.848041 0.149751 1 0.536298 0.125071 1
4 0.641322 0.119186 0.666199 0.115674 1 0.688047 0.134422 1 0.562801 0.119929 1
5 0.636094 0.130697 0.667111 0.115109 1 0.679541 0.130347 1 0.583421 0.123865 1
6 0.643561 0.138008 0.675576 0.125579 1 0.854851 0.162788 1 0.602909 0.127653 1
7 0.636459 0.130996 0.673673 0.126863 1 0.709468 0.140292 1 0.610515 0.133936 -1
8 0.626766 0.14422 0.673845 0.124654 1 0.66974 0.124014 1 0.610553 0.134897 -1
9 0.634161 0.131637 0.676348 0.125458 1 0.847058 0.154191 1 0.633336 0.139142 -1
10 0.64476 0.13729 0.670632 0.129605 -1 0.706942 0.125864 1 0.639254 0.143766 -1
11 0.619073 0.123088 0.678854 0.134538 1 0.687 0.125808 1 0.652594 0.136707 1
12 0.644863 0.135426 0.674953 0.126388 1 0.844728 0.144053 1 0.654982 0.141537 -1
13 0.640202 0.136998 0.687193 0.132185 1 0.672053 0.132856 1 0.670696 0.145464 1
14 0.636877 0.131576 0.680512 0.131511 1 0.675766 0.136117 1 0.673243 0.14964 1
15 0.623646 0.138009 0.668596 0.132834 1 0.849597 0.153379 1 0.687678 0.145196 1
16 0.643199 0.142802 0.67024 0.129318 1 0.708558 0.143448 1 0.685939 0.146465 1
17 0.635658 0.132495 0.657842 0.120724 -1 0.673573 0.130142 1 0.695564 0.149432 1
18 0.642053 0.152564 0.676547 0.125693 1 0.85981 0.145856 1 0.700866 0.146453 1
19 0.63136 0.130191 0.671497 0.139465 1 0.700184 0.140617 1 0.706295 0.142609 1
20 0.633246 0.144173 0.672439 0.130313 1 0.679161 0.140376 1 0.708866 0.147154 1
21 0.635164 0.123132 0.685936 0.127308 1 0.852243 0.143217 1 0.714509 0.141059 1
22 0.631354 0.11741 0.671132 0.119526 1 0.692854 0.123002 1 0.722863 0.145148 1
23 0.633868 0.130251 0.681792 0.110303 1 0.689757 0.1336 1 0.729939 0.146401 1
24 0.637781 0.147404 0.692912 0.121459 1 0.861827 0.146302 1 0.733558 0.13774 1
25 0.616026 0.136763 0.669064 0.12732 1 0.679795 0.130855 1 0.742 0.136625 1
26 0.636287 0.131389 0.672421 0.127897 1 0.672871 0.136328 1 0.741421 0.136547 1
27 0.622646 0.126157 0.690678 0.116903 1 0.838389 0.142126 1 0.741015 0.136805 1
28 0.662067 0.136176 0.67398 0.122793 -1 0.686123 0.132086 -1 0.750892 0.133885 1
29 0.622462 0.130645 0.675883 0.134923 1 0.66095 0.128726 1 0.74555 0.136237 1
30 0.627836 0.122537 0.68119 0.131892 1 0.839009 0.138432 1 0.748895 0.131581 1
31 0.632123 0.132183 0.677959 0.1179 1 0.707006 0.139969 1 0.750947 0.124059 1
32 0.626711 0.132731 0.660892 0.1254 1 0.666231 0.146479 1 0.757035 0.133546 1
33 0.638056 0.139891 0.686889 0.125119 1 0.82312 0.152193 1 0.760939 0.130962 1
34 0.633088 0.149756 0.673804 0.124547 1 0.674702 0.139819 1 0.762737 0.129547 1
35 0.634684 0.122919 0.669433 0.124572 1 0.666196 0.135756 1 0.773137 0.129876 1
36 0.634281 0.131362 0.68688 0.133558 1 0.836921 0.148813 1 0.769868 0.12287 1
37 0.625813 0.137706 0.66081 0.114204 1 0.688342 0.139338 1 0.773219 0.127779 1
38 0.62505 0.127227 0.687208 0.128933 1 0.668503 0.127502 1 0.774898 0.111673 1
39 0.620857 0.12466 0.674564 0.134551 1 0.84393 0.152479 1 0.779602 0.115594 1
40 0.652333 0.138223 0.67017 0.123908 -1 0.681909 0.136132 1 0.77795 0.119601 1
41 0.641649 0.142385 0.684611 0.127441 1 0.68538 0.130309 1 0.781798 0.113262 1
42 0.640953 0.13569 0.668246 0.13934 1 0.853368 0.125599 1 0.789386 0.111522 1
43 0.635482 0.132007 0.664997 0.112136 1 0.691149 0.136708 1 0.787637 0.11272 1
44 0.62462 0.136778 0.678471 0.11528 1 0.66793 0.126683 1 0.791041 0.114233 1
45 0.61324 0.118724 0.667506 0.120855 1 0.875637 0.13579 1 0.789763 0.101044 1
46 0.658114 0.14228 0.672371 0.13285 -1 0.702202 0.135755 1 0.798298 0.103728 1
47 0.613678 0.123653 0.672518 0.130153 1 0.675667 0.126501 1 0.802275 0.104072 1
48 0.62483 0.120949 0.675392 0.121676 1 0.826231 0.142186 1 0.798632 0.106578 1
49 0.608591 0.121599 0.678851 0.121515 1 0.688327 0.127545 1 0.799459 0.103244 1








Landscape WTD MeanWTD Stdv. IPD Mean IPD Stdv. TTest IPD != WTD SHS Mean SHS Stdv. TTest SHS != WTD STK Mean STK Stdv. TTest STK != WTD
1 0.647681 0.140271 0.709345 0.125705 1 0.698588 0.15233 1 0.457725 0.113279 1
2 0.647789 0.133511 0.684403 0.124466 1 0.649866 0.118928 -1 0.50833 0.12283 1
3 0.646842 0.130996 0.710637 0.130471 1 0.858471 0.142166 1 0.531228 0.114797 1
4 0.633409 0.135589 0.687401 0.133161 1 0.672713 0.141095 1 0.565012 0.112784 1
5 0.636512 0.126892 0.716781 0.138378 1 0.680263 0.136461 1 0.578807 0.127397 1
6 0.627161 0.132222 0.677591 0.134418 1 0.818789 0.144154 1 0.592023 0.129019 1
7 0.632328 0.129962 0.709015 0.133078 1 0.703 0.143914 1 0.606073 0.128884 1
8 0.628863 0.120496 0.683287 0.121645 1 0.670237 0.143362 1 0.631942 0.133339 -1
9 0.634579 0.14501 0.710573 0.13421 1 0.846871 0.135376 1 0.63376 0.135995 -1
10 0.633845 0.141458 0.70148 0.127556 1 0.695848 0.131935 1 0.643699 0.139852 -1
11 0.635184 0.132911 0.726933 0.124523 1 0.697597 0.13421 1 0.648325 0.14501 -1
12 0.639705 0.136362 0.698646 0.133305 1 0.825909 0.149226 1 0.653851 0.141909 -1
13 0.645728 0.134265 0.732439 0.12731 1 0.715784 0.119442 1 0.668351 0.146301 -1
14 0.646991 0.152022 0.707909 0.124563 1 0.674266 0.133293 -1 0.667368 0.143413 -1
15 0.631813 0.126376 0.741436 0.132434 1 0.858851 0.160038 1 0.678442 0.149978 1
16 0.634392 0.124688 0.705038 0.128 1 0.694515 0.135595 1 0.680494 0.149213 1
17 0.6305 0.132131 0.733424 0.124327 1 0.694819 0.136602 1 0.694526 0.151547 1
18 0.62317 0.129693 0.690509 0.128832 1 0.832465 0.148547 1 0.703424 0.151211 1
19 0.635237 0.1245 0.747325 0.115171 1 0.726561 0.139552 1 0.706535 0.149343 1
20 0.634383 0.129773 0.721974 0.125134 1 0.674939 0.142502 1 0.7095 0.152416 1
21 0.625377 0.135309 0.754348 0.139893 1 0.862594 0.15376 1 0.714635 0.146668 1
22 0.651307 0.150332 0.701588 0.118489 1 0.691643 0.131773 1 0.725816 0.143536 1
23 0.623915 0.127753 0.760915 0.128057 1 0.720784 0.133024 1 0.73283 0.141353 1
24 0.644901 0.154638 0.740681 0.130283 1 0.85764 0.141648 1 0.730673 0.144472 1
25 0.625678 0.118351 0.763716 0.126283 1 0.718073 0.153763 1 0.736298 0.140041 1
26 0.638102 0.126363 0.696108 0.130516 1 0.691895 0.139347 1 0.739597 0.141109 1
27 0.651833 0.132312 0.755789 0.136411 1 0.880772 0.131621 1 0.743032 0.141956 1
28 0.641152 0.14269 0.719547 0.13093 1 0.703272 0.139935 1 0.740681 0.137979 1
29 0.631728 0.13025 0.785453 0.132228 1 0.726506 0.139247 1 0.753725 0.134568 1
30 0.627974 0.131852 0.716474 0.120736 1 0.858942 0.153625 1 0.754895 0.130255 1
31 0.646035 0.131268 0.766573 0.125808 1 0.751316 0.143964 1 0.761661 0.133414 1
32 0.648845 0.138756 0.734287 0.128069 1 0.683406 0.126948 1 0.765406 0.126889 1
33 0.628064 0.132513 0.764699 0.132699 1 0.886047 0.140957 1 0.767956 0.129388 1
34 0.641436 0.140306 0.726401 0.117542 1 0.710313 0.148594 1 0.776129 0.127813 1
35 0.638924 0.144202 0.750497 0.131895 1 0.728877 0.142913 1 0.777801 0.113921 1
36 0.629325 0.125598 0.737553 0.133395 1 0.840187 0.145161 1 0.775079 0.115128 1
37 0.636591 0.123861 0.772591 0.128425 1 0.748368 0.14915 1 0.777319 0.120177 1
38 0.64169 0.140562 0.723099 0.128892 1 0.67698 0.140232 1 0.781661 0.119686 1
39 0.641243 0.133088 0.755266 0.136505 1 0.857751 0.141333 1 0.778643 0.119479 1
40 0.64993 0.133084 0.734161 0.132626 1 0.703529 0.136925 1 0.782263 0.11707 1
41 0.624184 0.121199 0.758985 0.130282 1 0.734029 0.145727 1 0.779477 0.117634 1
42 0.643515 0.140682 0.722064 0.127043 1 0.851506 0.14682 1 0.786608 0.108503 1
43 0.629883 0.138547 0.775155 0.132903 1 0.739597 0.132863 1 0.790149 0.108879 1
44 0.62957 0.141989 0.724436 0.122998 1 0.679556 0.131505 1 0.788746 0.110972 1
45 0.634468 0.116721 0.751956 0.131649 1 0.888965 0.14713 1 0.792047 0.107412 1
46 0.647839 0.13963 0.724687 0.137709 1 0.702553 0.145569 1 0.799377 0.10886 1
47 0.645126 0.141288 0.773623 0.138391 1 0.73483 0.150952 1 0.798266 0.094651 1
48 0.633263 0.131451 0.744102 0.123969 1 0.867848 0.147188 1 0.803114 0.099166 1
49 0.640006 0.125628 0.771298 0.129474 1 0.758994 0.149068 1 0.802538 0.09877 1








Landscape WTD MeanWTD Stdv. IPD Mean IPD Stdv. TTest IPD != WTD SHS Mean SHS Stdv. TTest SHS != WTD STK Mean STK Stdv. TTest STK != WTD
1 0.655667 0.151484 0.724535 0.119526 1 0.689953 0.148734 1 0.447368 0.1173 1
2 0.645094 0.140195 0.66981 0.135624 -1 0.6685 0.135904 -1 0.506237 0.110489 1
3 0.643289 0.140562 0.727254 0.131196 1 0.861029 0.138316 1 0.541173 0.107896 1
4 0.64152 0.131204 0.697301 0.136779 1 0.702295 0.134713 1 0.558994 0.116876 1
5 0.647591 0.150035 0.722328 0.126756 1 0.694465 0.149966 1 0.590029 0.121803 1
6 0.648213 0.12848 0.694705 0.129997 1 0.860319 0.145436 1 0.590345 0.120307 1
7 0.627158 0.127031 0.726096 0.12711 1 0.71648 0.15058 1 0.607895 0.12719 -1
8 0.641044 0.14239 0.704901 0.124561 1 0.675924 0.136442 1 0.612067 0.132629 1
9 0.642588 0.130163 0.716412 0.137526 1 0.839135 0.137768 1 0.628778 0.13936 -1
10 0.614988 0.131697 0.707579 0.140312 1 0.715734 0.133236 1 0.63583 0.141858 -1
11 0.648114 0.146554 0.727705 0.128822 1 0.700398 0.142862 1 0.642526 0.143025 -1
12 0.637494 0.142876 0.713292 0.127362 1 0.837807 0.142253 1 0.650301 0.134095 -1
13 0.641348 0.132858 0.714368 0.121898 1 0.701529 0.14895 1 0.653494 0.142413 -1
14 0.628617 0.126544 0.698719 0.132197 1 0.671743 0.133466 1 0.651772 0.146861 -1
15 0.637009 0.127456 0.726664 0.137875 1 0.853547 0.132406 1 0.664602 0.148796 1
16 0.641503 0.13312 0.704942 0.125013 1 0.68336 0.138514 1 0.677646 0.145907 1
17 0.633775 0.147505 0.737412 0.125464 1 0.702149 0.145774 1 0.680749 0.144303 1
18 0.644096 0.14362 0.714933 0.133119 1 0.844567 0.143271 1 0.687675 0.149486 1
19 0.637713 0.125544 0.709643 0.131004 1 0.711503 0.140899 1 0.702634 0.145306 1
20 0.636058 0.140047 0.710026 0.117437 1 0.696412 0.132283 1 0.70555 0.141636 1
21 0.637012 0.127238 0.726292 0.137704 1 0.867857 0.160006 1 0.713594 0.139561 1
22 0.634716 0.129373 0.717678 0.119314 1 0.709977 0.146148 1 0.714702 0.142387 1
23 0.656757 0.143165 0.731456 0.128993 1 0.697319 0.141206 1 0.71817 0.142663 1
24 0.652275 0.134741 0.727237 0.11623 1 0.828763 0.140008 1 0.721345 0.14548 1
25 0.632632 0.134916 0.755064 0.132013 1 0.713415 0.140779 1 0.721079 0.142959 1
26 0.651225 0.141297 0.727281 0.130707 1 0.677009 0.135412 -1 0.730026 0.138365 1
27 0.653982 0.135458 0.74214 0.136828 1 0.865099 0.142261 1 0.74169 0.13581 1
28 0.639784 0.147064 0.725228 0.137462 1 0.701594 0.133285 1 0.73717 0.13764 1
29 0.638599 0.135714 0.746436 0.136862 1 0.725465 0.129508 1 0.742787 0.133187 1
30 0.647254 0.139665 0.728211 0.125232 1 0.858532 0.146698 1 0.745029 0.136325 1
31 0.636865 0.131955 0.74424 0.131292 1 0.736243 0.138835 1 0.757234 0.129922 1
32 0.630728 0.13319 0.715485 0.131356 1 0.704009 0.11935 1 0.761298 0.125454 1
33 0.628784 0.128018 0.746632 0.133497 1 0.868099 0.147668 1 0.759418 0.133276 1
34 0.645433 0.134677 0.71883 0.125946 1 0.698526 0.142892 1 0.768947 0.122284 1
35 0.636781 0.149681 0.753175 0.127781 1 0.705029 0.15057 1 0.769541 0.123858 1
36 0.637485 0.140099 0.723816 0.123486 1 0.858871 0.13946 1 0.76981 0.118423 1
37 0.627097 0.121075 0.739263 0.125049 1 0.715172 0.144379 1 0.772994 0.130535 1
38 0.631854 0.139699 0.737965 0.139505 1 0.698553 0.13342 1 0.772737 0.121966 1
39 0.64355 0.131015 0.755468 0.136928 1 0.873447 0.153665 1 0.772646 0.118566 1
40 0.638942 0.132156 0.736289 0.126969 1 0.718137 0.14837 1 0.777409 0.133906 1
41 0.61738 0.123165 0.748421 0.123691 1 0.70086 0.134111 1 0.782702 0.128306 1
42 0.63776 0.128712 0.729167 0.131102 1 0.850018 0.158043 1 0.784161 0.12143 1
43 0.631497 0.13536 0.76305 0.1296 1 0.728561 0.139606 1 0.788763 0.1168 1
44 0.651146 0.144302 0.732965 0.122073 1 0.694143 0.134992 1 0.790374 0.118115 1
45 0.642044 0.127894 0.735187 0.12516 1 0.878556 0.155636 1 0.789053 0.113427 1
46 0.637538 0.14258 0.726313 0.123242 1 0.70338 0.143663 1 0.794219 0.109978 1
47 0.639442 0.134631 0.759687 0.124761 1 0.705281 0.15431 1 0.804175 0.116035 1
48 0.637655 0.118077 0.724702 0.126926 1 0.837632 0.145927 1 0.80195 0.113346 1
49 0.653307 0.148119 0.762737 0.124956 1 0.738561 0.145235 1 0.80131 0.109727 1








Landscape WTD MeanWTD Stdv. IPD Mean IPD Stdv. TTest IPD != WTD SHS Mean SHS Stdv. TTest SHS != WTD STK Mean STK Stdv. TTest STK != WTD
1 0.66036 0.144093 0.689222 0.128802 1 0.686289 0.146705 -1 0.459649 0.11334 1
2 0.650231 0.136214 0.703722 0.118223 1 0.692287 0.133915 1 0.498444 0.117565 1
3 0.637848 0.136573 0.705538 0.138933 1 0.847433 0.139673 1 0.532664 0.110527 1
4 0.628164 0.131724 0.712225 0.119928 1 0.720854 0.119217 1 0.550067 0.114919 1
5 0.638096 0.125167 0.733728 0.139951 1 0.712456 0.136809 1 0.571687 0.110093 1
6 0.639605 0.138085 0.717994 0.121871 1 0.872012 0.140268 1 0.591605 0.117615 1
7 0.63783 0.133941 0.738687 0.136943 1 0.713851 0.140829 1 0.594594 0.120028 1
8 0.633746 0.137585 0.716035 0.130804 1 0.710155 0.145369 1 0.618766 0.125653 -1
9 0.63688 0.127563 0.736298 0.132499 1 0.888497 0.144633 1 0.619222 0.135733 -1
10 0.655854 0.136926 0.722459 0.132836 1 0.723035 0.141196 1 0.620485 0.136108 1
11 0.62664 0.139273 0.727135 0.132636 1 0.740211 0.132577 1 0.632851 0.136777 -1
12 0.623643 0.129757 0.74183 0.127577 1 0.864292 0.148277 1 0.648155 0.142604 -1
13 0.639105 0.140843 0.732085 0.129384 1 0.71445 0.135483 1 0.653307 0.145912 -1
14 0.653646 0.147537 0.734944 0.140172 1 0.705743 0.138985 1 0.659588 0.144988 -1
15 0.629509 0.126444 0.736403 0.125422 1 0.855307 0.133567 1 0.667213 0.145253 1
16 0.614193 0.127388 0.745439 0.129792 1 0.724804 0.145888 1 0.674146 0.142089 1
17 0.621465 0.122097 0.737462 0.134359 1 0.697687 0.148715 1 0.675883 0.14822 1
18 0.639161 0.136993 0.733114 0.131628 1 0.874249 0.152737 1 0.683135 0.152513 1
19 0.645661 0.134454 0.748597 0.136143 1 0.722319 0.146275 1 0.695275 0.146043 1
20 0.628199 0.134644 0.748737 0.132605 1 0.710436 0.145848 1 0.699114 0.145099 1
21 0.629722 0.121136 0.735903 0.125448 1 0.852801 0.145082 1 0.695915 0.15112 1
22 0.641316 0.151657 0.758345 0.125373 1 0.734415 0.131267 1 0.702544 0.144426 1
23 0.630149 0.139877 0.724515 0.131749 1 0.709465 0.13344 1 0.710822 0.145224 1
24 0.646997 0.145682 0.75074 0.13296 1 0.876225 0.157825 1 0.72019 0.144962 1
25 0.62036 0.127126 0.742345 0.137319 1 0.719015 0.143619 1 0.713184 0.144016 1
26 0.629158 0.135415 0.737322 0.134123 1 0.706401 0.144472 1 0.72698 0.14527 1
27 0.635152 0.124598 0.752866 0.151428 1 0.850781 0.138903 1 0.731874 0.138742 1
28 0.654939 0.130814 0.737009 0.128719 1 0.733716 0.136062 1 0.744155 0.142876 1
29 0.639401 0.134815 0.755579 0.131193 1 0.723541 0.150423 1 0.740307 0.143694 1
30 0.644266 0.121065 0.756728 0.136024 1 0.880629 0.135542 1 0.744231 0.145263 1
31 0.626956 0.130116 0.753681 0.12624 1 0.707889 0.15004 1 0.74357 0.14263 1
32 0.629857 0.130235 0.740807 0.132637 1 0.705219 0.136395 1 0.74114 0.150376 1
33 0.624813 0.136597 0.731114 0.13499 1 0.879749 0.148144 1 0.74695 0.140229 1
34 0.646673 0.136139 0.737056 0.128886 1 0.707325 0.140159 1 0.753518 0.144717 1
35 0.631278 0.134846 0.754193 0.136364 1 0.702559 0.136785 1 0.760246 0.140384 1
36 0.619205 0.128103 0.76064 0.130624 1 0.879202 0.150863 1 0.765018 0.128682 1
37 0.633123 0.131253 0.74083 0.134462 1 0.746076 0.147355 1 0.768845 0.130372 1
38 0.626886 0.129688 0.737652 0.128404 1 0.725234 0.134035 1 0.772632 0.132174 1
39 0.630854 0.131861 0.741661 0.12614 1 0.877058 0.150453 1 0.779725 0.127346 1
40 0.626436 0.11901 0.741471 0.124093 1 0.720526 0.138623 1 0.779415 0.126355 1
41 0.648301 0.161078 0.743927 0.129685 1 0.691839 0.137332 1 0.784699 0.123716 1
42 0.628901 0.135313 0.768474 0.127686 1 0.867526 0.148416 1 0.788965 0.125869 1
43 0.623857 0.135046 0.755751 0.136731 1 0.711614 0.155123 1 0.792801 0.125322 1
44 0.622096 0.134688 0.759348 0.131621 1 0.716029 0.147172 1 0.789333 0.124772 1
45 0.634994 0.131117 0.755316 0.12447 1 0.878918 0.129254 1 0.789196 0.123433 1
46 0.636471 0.134768 0.748556 0.133895 1 0.72293 0.152885 1 0.796801 0.11648 1
47 0.636851 0.154412 0.755696 0.135818 1 0.707184 0.142987 1 0.797006 0.117929 1
48 0.64383 0.129904 0.750012 0.135068 1 0.877383 0.144543 1 0.797366 0.122332 1
49 0.65293 0.146496 0.752687 0.127591 1 0.724728 0.134173 1 0.803845 0.117631 1









Landscape μ A=1 σ A=1 μ A=3.1 σ A=3.1 μ A=3.6 σ A=3.6 μ A=3.9 σ A=3.9 μ 1!=3.1 μ 3.1!=3.6 μ 3.6!=3.9
1 0.67567 0.121409 0.709345 0.125705 0.724535 0.119526 0.689222 0.128802 1 -1 1
2 0.664599 0.126218 0.684403 0.124466 0.66981 0.135624 0.703722 0.118223 -1 -1 1
3 0.667263 0.129044 0.710637 0.130471 0.727254 0.131196 0.705538 0.138933 1 -1 -1
4 0.666199 0.115674 0.687401 0.133161 0.697301 0.136779 0.712225 0.119928 -1 -1 -1
5 0.667111 0.115109 0.716781 0.138378 0.722328 0.126756 0.733728 0.139951 1 -1 -1
6 0.675576 0.125579 0.677591 0.134418 0.694705 0.129997 0.717994 0.121871 -1 -1 -1
7 0.673673 0.126863 0.709015 0.133078 0.726096 0.12711 0.738687 0.136943 1 -1 -1
8 0.673845 0.124654 0.683287 0.121645 0.704901 0.124561 0.716035 0.130804 -1 -1 -1
9 0.676348 0.125458 0.710573 0.13421 0.716412 0.137526 0.736298 0.132499 1 -1 -1
10 0.670632 0.129605 0.70148 0.127556 0.707579 0.140312 0.722459 0.132836 1 -1 -1
11 0.678854 0.134538 0.726933 0.124523 0.727705 0.128822 0.727135 0.132636 1 -1 -1
12 0.674953 0.126388 0.698646 0.133305 0.713292 0.127362 0.74183 0.127577 -1 -1 1
13 0.687193 0.132185 0.732439 0.12731 0.714368 0.121898 0.732085 0.129384 1 -1 -1
14 0.680512 0.131511 0.707909 0.124563 0.698719 0.132197 0.734944 0.140172 1 -1 1
15 0.668596 0.132834 0.741436 0.132434 0.726664 0.137875 0.736403 0.125422 1 -1 -1
16 0.67024 0.129318 0.705038 0.128 0.704942 0.125013 0.745439 0.129792 1 -1 1
17 0.657842 0.120724 0.733424 0.124327 0.737412 0.125464 0.737462 0.134359 1 -1 -1
18 0.676547 0.125693 0.690509 0.128832 0.714933 0.133119 0.733114 0.131628 -1 -1 -1
19 0.671497 0.139465 0.747325 0.115171 0.709643 0.131004 0.748597 0.136143 1 1 1
20 0.672439 0.130313 0.721974 0.125134 0.710026 0.117437 0.748737 0.132605 1 -1 1
21 0.685936 0.127308 0.754348 0.139893 0.726292 0.137704 0.735903 0.125448 1 1 -1
22 0.671132 0.119526 0.701588 0.118489 0.717678 0.119314 0.758345 0.125373 1 -1 1
23 0.681792 0.110303 0.760915 0.128057 0.731456 0.128993 0.724515 0.131749 1 1 -1
24 0.692912 0.121459 0.740681 0.130283 0.727237 0.11623 0.75074 0.13296 1 -1 -1
25 0.669064 0.12732 0.763716 0.126283 0.755064 0.132013 0.742345 0.137319 1 -1 -1
26 0.672421 0.127897 0.696108 0.130516 0.727281 0.130707 0.737322 0.134123 -1 1 -1
27 0.690678 0.116903 0.755789 0.136411 0.74214 0.136828 0.752866 0.151428 1 -1 -1
28 0.67398 0.122793 0.719547 0.13093 0.725228 0.137462 0.737009 0.128719 1 -1 -1
29 0.675883 0.134923 0.785453 0.132228 0.746436 0.136862 0.755579 0.131193 1 1 -1
30 0.68119 0.131892 0.716474 0.120736 0.728211 0.125232 0.756728 0.136024 1 -1 1
31 0.677959 0.1179 0.766573 0.125808 0.74424 0.131292 0.753681 0.12624 1 -1 -1
32 0.660892 0.1254 0.734287 0.128069 0.715485 0.131356 0.740807 0.132637 1 -1 -1
33 0.686889 0.125119 0.764699 0.132699 0.746632 0.133497 0.731114 0.13499 1 -1 -1
34 0.673804 0.124547 0.726401 0.117542 0.71883 0.125946 0.737056 0.128886 1 -1 -1
35 0.669433 0.124572 0.750497 0.131895 0.753175 0.127781 0.754193 0.136364 1 -1 -1
36 0.68688 0.133558 0.737553 0.133395 0.723816 0.123486 0.76064 0.130624 1 -1 1
37 0.66081 0.114204 0.772591 0.128425 0.739263 0.125049 0.74083 0.134462 1 1 -1
38 0.687208 0.128933 0.723099 0.128892 0.737965 0.139505 0.737652 0.128404 1 -1 -1
39 0.674564 0.134551 0.755266 0.136505 0.755468 0.136928 0.741661 0.12614 1 -1 -1
40 0.67017 0.123908 0.734161 0.132626 0.736289 0.126969 0.741471 0.124093 1 -1 -1
41 0.684611 0.127441 0.758985 0.130282 0.748421 0.123691 0.743927 0.129685 1 -1 -1
42 0.668246 0.13934 0.722064 0.127043 0.729167 0.131102 0.768474 0.127686 1 -1 1
43 0.664997 0.112136 0.775155 0.132903 0.76305 0.1296 0.755751 0.136731 1 -1 -1
44 0.678471 0.11528 0.724436 0.122998 0.732965 0.122073 0.759348 0.131621 1 -1 1
45 0.667506 0.120855 0.751956 0.131649 0.735187 0.12516 0.755316 0.12447 1 -1 -1
46 0.672371 0.13285 0.724687 0.137709 0.726313 0.123242 0.748556 0.133895 1 -1 -1
47 0.672518 0.130153 0.773623 0.138391 0.759687 0.124761 0.755696 0.135818 1 -1 -1
48 0.675392 0.121676 0.744102 0.123969 0.724702 0.126926 0.750012 0.135068 1 -1 -1
49 0.678851 0.121515 0.771298 0.129474 0.762737 0.124956 0.752687 0.127591 1 -1 -1





APPENDIX D CATNEURO BEST MODELS 
The top 12 models produced from the 6 CATNeuro sample runs are shown below – WTD 
followed by Stag-Hunt. 
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Cultural Algorithms (CA) are knowledge-intensive, population-based stochastic optimization 
methods that are modeled after human cultures and are suited to solving problems in complex 
environments. The CA Belief Space stores knowledge harvested from prior generations and re-
distributes it to future generations via a knowledge distribution (KD) mechanism. Each of the 
population individuals is then guided through the search space via the associated knowledge. 
Previously, CA implementations have used only competitive KD mechanisms that have performed 
well for problems embedded in static environments. Relatively recently, CA research has evolved 
to encompass dynamic problem environments. Given increasing environmental complexity, a 
natural question arises about whether KD mechanisms that also incorporate cooperation can 





game-based KD mechanisms are implemented and tested against the default competitive 
mechanism – Weighted Majority (WTD).  
Two different concepts of complexity are addressed – numerical optimization under dynamic 
environments and hierarchal, multi-objective optimization for evolving deep learning models. The 
former is addressed with the CATGame software system and the later with CATNeuro. 
CATGame implements three types of games that span both cooperation and competition for 
knowledge distribution, namely: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), Stag-Hunt and Stackelberg. 
The performance of the three game mechanisms is compared with the aid of a dynamic problem 
generator called Cones World. Weighted Majority, aka “wisdom of the crowd”, the default CA 
competitive KD mechanism is used as the benchmark. It is shown that games that support both 
cooperation and competition do indeed perform better but not in all cases. The results shed light 
on what kinds of games are suited to problem solving in complex, dynamic environments. 
Specifically, games that balance exploration and exploitation using the local signal of ‘social’ rank 
– Stag-Hunt and IPD – perform better.  Stag-Hunt which is also the most cooperative of the games 
tested, performed the best overall. Dynamic analysis of the ‘social’ aspects of the CA test runs 
shows that Stag-Hunt allocates compute resources more consistently than the others in response 
to environmental complexity changes. Stackelberg where the allocation decisions are centralized, 
like in a centrally planned economic system, is found to be the least adaptive. 
CATNeuro is for solving neural architecture search (NAS) problems. Contemporary ‘deep 
learning’ neural network models are proven effective. However, the network topologies may be 
complex and not immediately obvious for the problem at hand. This has given rise to the 





approaches now becoming available. This paper describes a NAS method based on graph 
evolution pioneered by NEAT (Neuroevolution of Augmenting Topologies) but driven by the 
evolutionary mechanisms under Cultural Algorithms. Here CATNeuro is applied to find optimal 
network topologies to play a 2D fighting game called FightingICE (derived from “The Rumble Fish” 
video game). A policy-based, reinforcement learning method is used to create the training data 
for network optimization. CATNeuro is still evolving. To inform the development of CATNeuro, in 
this primary foray into NAS, we contrast the performance of CATNeuro with two different 
knowledge distribution mechanisms – the stalwart Weighted Majority and a new one based on 
the Stag-Hunt game from evolutionary game theory that performed the best in CATGame. The 
research shows that Stag-Hunt has a distinct edge over WTD in terms of game performance, model 
accuracy, and model size. It is therefore deemed to be the preferred mechanism for complex, 
hierarchical optimization tasks such as NAS and is planned to be used as the default KD mechanism    
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